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Abstract 
 
Young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have been constructed as problems 
against a backdrop of ‘moral panics’, which have included events such as 
the ‘Sydney gang rapes’ (2000-6) and the ‘Cronulla race riots’ (2005). 
These moral panics drew on long-standing racist discourses that represent 
these young people as a threat to the Australian ‘mainstream’. In the midst 
of these moral panics, there was concern that young people who were 
experiencing any resulting racism might respond to their experiences in 
illegal or violent ways. I was concerned that youth services and programs 
aimed at addressing these issues were not sufficiently informed by well-
grounded research into how young Australia-Lebanese-Muslims 
experienced, understood and dealt with racism. 
This thesis has attempted to address these concerns by focusing on the 
experiences of young people of Lebanese and Muslim background, who 
were born in Australia and live in the western and northern suburbs of 
Melbourne, in the first decade of the twenty-first century. My study 
employed a phenomenological conceptual framework. It relied on a number 
of qualitative research methods, including interviews, focus groups, 
ethnographic observations and video analysis. These were used to make 
sense of how these young people experienced ‘Othering’ and their sense of 
belonging to the ‘national home’.  
My research suggests that young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ ‘everyday 
experiences of racism’ are multi-dimensional and made up of more than 
just personal encounters with racism. It reveals that mediated and 
vicariously experienced racism were significant aspects of their experience. 
I suggest that interviewees’ responses to racism are namely ‘avoidance’, 
‘fighting back’ and ‘constructive engagement’. This thesis proposes that 
one way service providers can support these young people is to build on 
the pathways of resilience that young people have already been paving. 
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Introduction 
I was born in SriLanka and migrated with my parents to Australia at 
the age of seven. One of my earliest memories of what being a 
‘foreigner’ meant I can recollect happened in primary school, during 
my first few years in Australia. Onti, who had come to Australia from 
Timor, and I were two of the few ‘non-white’ children in our primary 
school. One day a pretty blonde girl in our class approached both of 
us and asked, ‘Do you know why no-one wants to be friends with you 
two’? Wanting to know the answer, as Onti and I had often asked this 
very question ourselves, we replied eagerly, ‘Tell us why’? The girl 
wearing a self-satisfied smile, turned first to Onti and then to me and 
said, ‘It is because your skin is the colour of piss, and yours’ is like 
poo’. She then skipped away happily, having shared her wisdom with 
us. Onti and I nodded knowingly. The girl’s answer made sense to us 
at the time. Onti with a shrug said to me, ‘Well, at least it is better to 
look like piss than poo’. I had to agree. After all Onti had managed to 
acquire a few more friends than I had done. The pretty blonde girl’s 
words confirmed my own beliefs developed in the course of several 
experiences of being teased about my skin colour or my accent. 
Even at this young age I knew my opportunities in life, including any 
career opportunities that might open up for me, were likely to  
depend on my ability, as Hage (Hage 2000, p. 271) put it, to 
‘accumulate’ as much ‘Whiteness’ as I could 1. Back then of course 
                                                 
1 I use the notion ‘White’ in the same way Hage (2000) uses it. The notion ‘White’ 
captures more than the often used concept of ‘Anglo’ and ‘Anglo Celtic’. The term 
‘Anglo’ for instance, can not account for the many non-Anglos who relate to and 
define themselves through the prism of ‘Whiteness,’ which is an ‘imagined’ position 
of cultural domination born out of the history of European expansion (Hage 2000, 
pp. 19-20). On discussing the concept of Whiteness (which the concept ‘White’ is 
linked to) Hage says, ‘Whiteness is an aspiration…. Whiteness and Australianness 
can be accumulated (up to a certain point) and people can be said to be more of 
less White and Australian. How White they can be depends on social attributes 
they possess’ (Hage 2000, p. 20). I use the upper case ‘White’ and Whiteness to 
indicate reference to more than just white skin colour. ‘White skin colour is certainly 
a valuable capital in claiming one’s belonging to the nation as a ‘’governmental 
White Australian’’, but it should be remembered that even white skin colour is 
cumulative… the “White” racial category has expanded to include people 
previously constructed as non-White’ (Hage 2000, p. 58). I discuss Whiteness and 
the accumulation of it more in Chapter Three, as well as the related concepts of 
‘Governmental’ and ‘National belonging’. 
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such a sophisticated way of speaking was not then available to me: I 
would have understood it then as a need to ‘blend in’.   
Later, when I was a teenager in the late 1980s and into the early 
1990s, African-American music and movies were an important part of 
everyday life for me and my high school peers. Popular culture was 
now pumping out a message that being ‘black’ was synonymous with 
being ‘cool’, funny and sexy. In this context, being ‘exotic’ was envied 
and anyone who could represent themselves as being more like Afro-
Americans (for example, by dressing and talking ‘like them’) was now 
enjoying the benefit of augmented ‘cultural capital’. The concept of 
‘cultural capital’, as people like Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and Prudence 
L. Carter (2003) use it, points to those cultural attributes that allow 
their possessors to wield power, to confer status, to ‘buy’ them 
membership into a certain group, or to access certain social and 
economic opportunities. Bourdieu has shown how certain cultural 
capital applies to certain ‘fields’ (i.e. it is contextually dependent) 
(Bourdieu 1986; Bourdieu & Passeron 1977).  
As a young Australian of Sri Lankan background, who was and is 
dark skinned and who could lay claim to certain forms of African-
American popular cultural attributes, such as ‘hip-hop’ clothing and 
music, I would not have had the legitimate and valued cultural capital 
needed in the context of Australia in the 1950s. However, in the 
context of Australia in the 1990s, in the ‘field’ of the suburban 
schoolyard, these same characteristics could now constitute a valued 
form of cultural capital.  
My ‘brown-skinned’ friends and I were even sometimes able to find 
ways of subverting ‘white’ privilege in this new popular culture. I 
remember, for example, young ‘white’ boys taunting me and my 
friends by chanting ‘curry, curry, hot, hot’. This elicited our response, 
‘Yeah, we know we are hot, HOT!’ We might even throw in for good 
measure, a flirtatious wink, knowing that being dark and ‘exotic’ 
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looking were symbols of sexual power2. Academics such as Jensen 
(2009) would describe such actions taken by my friends and myself 
as demonstrating ‘sub-cultural agency’. That is to say, instead of 
trying to embrace or accumulate as much ‘Whiteness’ as possible, 
we were now embracing, even ‘capitalising on Othering’.   
When I reflect back on my experiences of growing up in Australia like 
this, I think we see the strange interplay of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
elements at work in the experience of ‘identity’ and see these 
working in an historical way. That is, identity is something that has a 
‘duplex’ quality: identity is what other people ascribe to us as much 
as it is made up of those elements we choose to project out into our 
social world. Without necessarily knowing why the pretty young 
blonde girl said what she said, or why some years later elements of 
popular culture were now valuing all things black and cool, my 
experience catches some of the shifts in the changing dynamics at 
work in Australian identity politics, just as it reflects the evolving 
policies of multiculturalism. As academics on Australian 
multiculturalism (e.g. Ang & Stratton 1998; Jakubowicz 2002; Joppke 
2004) have observed, in the years after 1974 multiculturalism 
achieved a hegemonic status. During the years of the Hawke-Keating 
Labor government (1991-1996) multiculturalism was championed 
strongly by that government (Manne 2004, pp. 5-6). The promotion of 
multiculturalism during the Keating era provided a certain degree of 
protection for people like me. The discourse of multiculturalism had 
helped stigmatise anyone engaging in overtly racist talk or behaviour 
(Manne 2004, pp. 5-6).  
Bob Hodge and John O'Carroll (2006, p. 18) suggest that 1996 
represents a symbolic terminus for multiculturalism. This is the year 
that saw the Howard-led coalition parties form government after a 
major shift in electoral support away from the Labor Party  (Galligan 
                                                 
2
 I argue in Chapter One that historical western fetishism and sexualisation of the 
Black or ‘ethnic looking’ Other combine elements of fear and fascination (Jensen 
2009; Palmer 2003). These symbols of the sexual ‘Other’ (e.g. hip-hop music and 
clothing) are sometimes capitalised on by those being ‘Othered,’ to claim positive 
value for their position as Other (Jensen 2009). 
Page 5  
& Roberts 2004, p. 94). It was also the year that saw Pauline Hanson 
and her ‘One Nation’ political movement (McCarthy 1998) explode 
into Australian politics at the head of a major backlash against 
multiculturalism. In September 1996, Hanson made her maiden 
speech in the new parliament in the course of which she lambasted 
multiculturalism. Hanson got extensive media attention for her clearly 
stated rejection of multiculturalism, Aboriginal rights and migration 
(Johnson 1998). Hanson was not silenced by accusations that she 
was a racist. Indeed she seems to have struck a chord amongst 
many Australians who, before she came on the scene, felt they were 
being coerced into lamenting, albeit silently, the ‘good old days’. Her 
outspokenness in advocating for the ‘everyday Australian’ (meaning 
the non-elite ‘white’ Australians) enabled those sympathetic to her 
opinions to also voice their concerns and anger (Manne 2004). Not 
surprisingly some academics like Ien Ang (2001, p. 100) drew the 
conclusion that:   
The Hanson/Howard ascendancy is a clear indication that more than 
two decades of official government policy has not led to the 
generation of a deep and pervasive nation-wide commitment to 
multiculturalism.      
In the years before Hanson and Howard came to power, I had rarely 
experienced overt forms of racism. I thought, perhaps naively, that 
multiculturalism had won the battle with various forms of ethnic or 
racial prejudice. ‘Hansonism’, the term used in public discussion to 
refer to the period between 1996 and 1998 when Hanson’s views 
had significant political reach, shattered this belief forever. As I now 
remember those last months of 1996 and early 1997 it seemed as if 
all around me the racists were coming out of their closets. In the 
years after 1996 when ‘Hansonism’ was achieving its early 
successes I listened to schoolyard discussions about ‘Lebanese 
gangs’. My friends and acquaintances, many of them migrants 
themselves, with little or no significant contact with the Lebanese 
community, claimed that ‘Lebanese culture’ was violent, or that ‘the 
Lebanese’ held women in low esteem. At the time, I didn’t challenge 
the claims they were making. I now think that this was because I too 
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had accepted uncritically what I was reading or hearing through the 
media about ‘the Lebanese’.  
During the Hanson years, and in the years after, I also recollect 
questioning the extent to which I felt I belonged in Australia. In trying 
to find ‘my place’, I articulated my ‘Australianness’ more loudly by, for 
example, looking down on those migrants who ‘stuck to their own’. 
Yet, not long after, I began to reflect on how easily I had adopted the 
kinds of public views and discussions flowing around me. Ultimately I 
became angry at how I had allowed Hansonism and the prejudices I 
had grown up with to find a place inside me to shape the way I 
interacted with other Australians, and to influence my perception of 
my cultural heritage in generally negative terms. At that point my 
critical response to experiences of the contemporary version of 
‘racism’ and to the impact of Hansonism on me personally, was 
transformed into a passion for fighting racism. I wanted to learn how 
other young people experienced and coped with racism and how it 
affected their sense of belonging.  
My interest in how young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims3 experienced 
and coped with racism, and how racism may be affecting their sense 
                                                 
3
 I understand that it is more grammatically correct to say Lebanese-Australian 
Muslims (rather than as Australian-Lebanese-Muslims). I have however, chosen to 
refer to my interviewees as ‘Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ because this is what 
many of the young people I spoke to prefer to be identified as. That is, to be 
recognised as having hyphenated identities, with the Australian aspect of 
themselves put in front of (but in relationship to) the Lebanese and Muslim aspects 
of their identity.  
 
Hyphenated identities are however mutable, and in certain contexts my 
interviewees might refer to themselves not as Australian-Lebanese-Muslims but for 
e.g. as Lebanese-Muslims or as ‘Wogs’. Therefore, while you will see that I have 
used the term Australian-Lebanese-Muslim(s) most of the time in this thesis, I have 
on occasion, depending on context, re-arranged the order of the hyphenated 
identity. For example, I have used the term ‘Lebanese-Australian’ when for 
example, the interviewee themselves have clearly used this ‘identity arrangement’ 
or when it seemed to me that they wanted to emphasise their Lebanese cultural 
identity over their Australianness.  
 
Ashis Sengupta (2008) a writer on the hyphenated identity in Multiethnic America, 
make a similar argument, to the one I make, on keeping the hyphen. She writes, 
‘pairing the ethnic/ancestral by a hyphen’ highlights ‘the fluid-rather-than-fixed’ 
nature of identity (Sengupta 2008, p. 1). The relationship between two (or more) 
identities ‘is in a constant state of flux: now the first prioritized over the second, 
now the second preferred over the first, now a more delicate balance envisioned 
between the two’ (Sengupta 2008, p. 1). 
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of belonging, was sparked by the events of 2001. In this year, and 
the years following it, there has been a rapid succession of major 
events that cast Arab and Muslim communities in Australia as the 
pre-eminent ‘folk devils’.  First there was a mounting crescendo of 
anxiety and alarm about boat loads of mainly Muslim asylum seekers 
heading out from Indonesia that lead to the ‘Tampa crisis’ in August 
2001. Then the news that ‘Islamic terrorists’ had attacked buildings in 
New York and Washington on 2001 September 11 reverberated 
throughout the world. On the back of this came the USA-led 
invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 as part of a so-
called war on terror, which were interspersed with further terrorist 
attacks in Bali, London and Spain. The idea that ‘The West’ was 
engaged in a war against the (Boys) Rest (e.g. Lewis 2001; Scruton 
2002a, 2002b) provided a commonsense framing of what was 
happening. In Australia concern was also being expressed about 
young Muslims implicated in ‘ethnic gang rapes’ of ‘white Australian’ 
women in Sydney. Media coverage of the resulting trials spanned 
five years from 2001 to 2006. On 5-7 December 2005 the so-called 
‘Cronulla race riots’ took place after a short period of intense media-
sponsored mobilisation of sentiment against Muslims and Lebanese 
young people. These events, and public and media reactions to 
them, helped create a hostile context for young Muslims and anyone 
of ‘Lebanese appearance’ growing up in Australia.     
It is not uncommon in the process of doing research to reflect on 
personal experience (Maynes, Pierce & Laslett 2008, pp. 101-105). 
My interest in writing this thesis is best understood as an attempt to 
better understand my own experience while significantly expanding 
the intellectual scale of the sense-making exercise I have embarked 
on. Certainly the reader will see how my interest in how young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have responded to the intense interest 
and public hostility directed at them has a little to do with my own 
experience of life as an ethnic-Other in Australia. 
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Research context  
 
 
As I have indicated, Australian Muslims became objects of intense 
media scrutiny and often hostile public commentary following 
concern about asylum seekers, events such as the terrorist attacks 
by members of AlQaeda in New York and Washington on 11 
September 2001. In particular Lebanese communities were 
subjected to a great deal of public criticism in the wake of the Sydney 
‘gang rapes’ reportedly by a group of young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims. A public case was made that these major international 
instances of terrorism and the local incidents of ‘violence’ were all  
evidence of a major global conflict between ‘The West’ and ‘The 
(Islamic) Rest’. This proposition was promoted hard by a number of 
major international public intellectuals like Bernard Lewis (1990, 
1993, 2001) and Roger Scruton (2002a, 2002b). In Australia, public 
commentators like Andrew Bolt (2002, 2010b) claimed that 
Australians faced a local version of the ‘Islam against the Rest’ 
conflict, warning for example that ‘asylum seekers’ arriving on our 
shores, especially when they had an Islamic or Arab background, 
threatened our border security. Waxing indignant, journalists such as 
Charles Miranda (2001) claimed that terrorist sympathisers, many of 
them born in Australia, lurked in our suburbs. Other media 
commentators and journalists (e.g. Akermanis 2005; McNamara, 
Nolan & Wallace 2006; West 2005; Windschuttle, Keith 2005) have 
helped to resurrect the case that integration or a commitment to ‘core 
Australian values’ should be emphasised over multiculturalism. They 
pointed to events such as the ‘Cronulla race riots’ as evidence of 
resistance to the excesses of multiculturalism.  
In such a context I came to wonder how young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims made sense of the intense media scrutiny and often overtly 
hostile discussion about ‘people like them’. Were they, for example, 
responding in ways as I had done during ‘Hansonism’ when similar 
arguments about the ‘problems of ethnic minorities’ were being 
touted? Perhaps they, like I did once upon a time, responded on 
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occasion to racist taunts (such as ‘curry curry, curry, hot, hot, hot’) by 
positively affirming difference (‘yes, I know we are hot’)?   
Set against a context hostile to young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, 
I decided to address four basic questions in this thesis. First I ask, 
how did young (12-25 year old) second-generation Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims who live in the northern and western suburbs of 
Melbourne experience and make sense of their interactions with 
other Australians? Second I ask, how have these young people dealt 
with often challenging and hostile interactions that followed events 
such as the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre towers in New 
York on 11 September 2001 and the ‘Sydney gang rapes’, when 
racist sentiment was mobilised against Muslims, which included 
many Lebanese young people? Third I ask what sense of belonging 
do the young people involved in my research have in respect to the 
broader ‘Australian society’? 
While it is possible to treat these questions as academic I think there 
are important practical implications that stem from these questions as 
well. Accordingly my last key question relates to how the findings of 
this research might be used by community service agencies working 
with young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims (and perhaps other young 
people who share similar experiences).  
I have not been alone in my interest in establishing how Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims interpreted their experiences of racism and/or 
dealt with these experiences. Researchers, service providers4 and 
governments have been especially interested in how Arab and 
Muslim young people, including those born and raised in Australia, 
dealt with the often challenging or hostile responses that followed 
events such as the September 2001 terrorist  attacks and the Sydney 
gang rapes. There were, for instance, concerns that young people of 
Arabic speaking backgrounds and young Muslims may be dealing 
                                                 
4
 Service providers include organisation like the Victorian Arabic Social Services 
(VASS), who provide services and welfare programs for Victoria’s Arabic-speaking-
background communities, including the needs of young second-generation 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims.  
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with experiences of conflict and tension with other Australians in 
ways that might be harmful to themselves or to others. Strategies 
and programs designed to address the marginalisation and 
disadvantages faced by Australian-Muslims and Arabic-speaking-
background communities have also been put in place. These have 
generally been aimed at promoting these young people’s ‘integration’ 
into the wider community, as well as encouraging (what policy 
makers and program designers call) ‘resilience’ and ‘community 
harmony’ (NAP 2009). An example of such a program is the National 
Action Plan (NAP) community grants funding program (NAP 2009), 
which is designed to enhance ‘resilience’ in Muslim communities. 
The NAP community grants program provides funding to various 
agencies, including organisations such as the Victorian Arabic Social 
Services (VASS) to deliver programs and projects that promote 
greater harmony and ‘social inclusion’.  
Academics such as Judith Bessant (2007) and Carol Bacchi (1999) 
have argued that  such programs can miss the mark if they do not 
take into account the experiences of those who are the targets of 
these programs. Norman Denzin (1989, p. 105) echoes this 
sentiment:   
The perspectives and experiences of those persons who are served 
by applied programs must be grasped, interpreted, and understood 
if solid, effective, applied programs are to be put in place. 
My own experience of doing volunteer and paid work with 
organisations such as VASS, Australian Lebanese Welfare (ALW) 
and Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria (IWWCV) tends to 
reinforce this concern about including the perspectives and 
experiences of those persons who are served by applied programs in 
the development of such programs.    
My research is specifically designed to take into account how 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslim young people experience and make 
sense of their interactions with other Australians. I want to know how 
these young people deal with challenging and hostile interactions 
and experience a sense of belonging to the wider Australian 
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community. One of the aims of my thesis is to provide insights that 
can be applied by NAP community grants programs, and other 
programs, aimed at promoting young people’s resilience, tackling 
racism, and strengthening young people’s sense of belonging to the 
wider community.  
 
 
Research method 
 
Given my focus on elucidating the quality of the experiences of 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, I decided after reviewing the 
research methodologies on offer that the most appropriate research 
approach would be one that drew on the broadly defined 
‘interpretivist’ research tradition, especially those aspects of that 
tradition which stressed a hermeneutic approach that seeks to trace 
out the phenomenology of people’s experience and the ways they try 
to make sense of their experience (Schutz 1967, 1970; Weick et al. 
1989). I will discuss in detail what this approach entails in Chapter 
Two. To put it briefly, this approach makes the understanding or 
interpretation of human experiences by fusing together the different 
contexts, interpretations and reflections, of both the researcher and 
researched, in dialogue with each other (Sharkey 2001). As 
Clandinin and Connelly (2000, pp. 154-155) have observed: 
The study of experience is the study of life, for example the study of 
epiphanies, rituals, metaphors and everyday actions ... experience 
in this view, is the stories people live. People live stories, and in the 
telling of them reaffirm them, modify them, and create new ones.  
In keeping with this, I have approached my study of the experience of 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims with a view to elucidating the 
quality of the experience found in the stories people tell.5 I used a 
                                                 
5 As experience is conceptualised as the stories people live and tell, I will be using 
the terms ‘story’, ‘narratives’ and ‘experiences’ interchangeably throughout this 
thesis.  
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combination of one-to-one interviews and focus group discussions 
with a total of thirty-one young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. I also 
used field observations while doing paid and voluntary work with 
various service provider organisations that work with young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. Finally I also analysed videos created 
by Australian-Lebanese, Muslim and Arabic-speaking-background 
young people who were not participating in my interviews or focus 
groups, having formed the view that this material gave an added and 
valuable dimension to my research.  
It became apparent enough from my earliest encounters with young 
Lebanese Muslims that they frequently use the language of racism to 
make sense of their experience. To that extent I was not imposing 
any particular conceptual schema that was in some sense foreign to 
their own understandings when I began framing what I was hearing 
in terms of the vocabulary and theoretical schemes associated with 
the language of ‘racism’. This has meant that I have needed to 
discuss some aspects of the large and often controversial social 
science literature on racism, which I do in Chapter One.  
Equally, and to make sure that my own sense-making of what I was 
hearing was sensitive to the context from which the stories I was 
hearing came from, I ‘engaged with the life worlds’ of some young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslim people. I embedded myself in the 
community, partly also to identify interview and focus group 
participants. I ‘engaged in their life worlds’ by spending time with 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims socially (e.g. attending an engagement 
party given by one of the young people I spoke with) and participated 
in several youth programs. At these youth programs I would usually 
give a brief presentation about my research and ask anyone who 
was interested in telling their stories to come and speak to me. I 
should add that partly to acknowledge the time they gave me and 
partly to thank them for their time in my project I provided lunch and 
movie tickets to each participant. Some interviewees and focus group 
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discussion participants were recruited through direct introduction by 
VASS staff or by people who had already participated in the 
interviews and/or focus groups. All participants were informed about 
the usual ethical guidelines and protections they were to be afforded 
and all participants’ names have been changed, and certain 
identifiable details edited, to ensure complete anonymity. I discuss 
my research approach and provide further detail on the steps I took 
to answer my research questions in Chapter Two. 
In this introduction I have identified the four questions that my 
research addresses. I have also indicated something of the 
theoretical and practical rationales for engaging in this research. It 
remains for me to say something about the structure of this thesis.   
 
 
Chapter outline 
 
In Chapter One I identify something of the sense-making framework I 
will be developing to establish a response to my first research 
question: how do young (12-25 year old), second-generation, 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims who live in the northern and western 
suburbs of Melbourne, experience and make sense of their 
interactions with ‘other Australians’. Answering this question requires 
paying some attention to the history of Lebanese migration and 
settlement in Australia, and how that history has helped shape the 
context in which the people I spoke with live. Drawing on the work of 
academics such as Batrouney (1985; 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 
2006a, 2006b; 1982), Cohen (2002) and Collins, Noble, Poynting and 
Tabar (2004) I argue that the lived experience of young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims needs to be situated in a history of modern 
Australia as a ‘settler society’ characterised by racial prejudice and 
marked by sporadic ‘moral panics’. I also discuss in this chapter key 
concepts used in the analysis of my empirical material such as 
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Orientalism (Said 2003), ‘Othering’ (Jensen 2009) and ‘everyday 
racism’ (Essed 1991) . 
I discuss my conceptual approach for this research in Chapter Two, 
in which I say why I have adopted a hermeneutic-phenomenological 
research approach. I explain how I carried out my research, and how 
I made certain decisions during the research process, such as my 
reasons for using a semi-structured interview format. Then I discuss 
how I drew on the interpretivist tradition to make sense of the 
research data gathered in the course of a number of one-on-one 
interviews and focus group discussions with the young people I 
spoke with, along with field notes from my participant observation 
carried out while I was a volunteer and then a paid worker involved in 
community projects with Arabic-speaking-background (ASB6) 
communities in Melbourne between 2003 and 2009.  
In Chapter Three I begin to answer my first research question, 
namely how do young (12 to 25 year old) second generation 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims who live in the northern and western 
suburbs of Melbourne experience and make sense of their 
interactions with other Australians? I also begin to answer my third 
research question: what sense of belonging do these young people 
have in relation to the broader Australian society? I argue that the 
young people’s experiences of interacting with other Australians, and 
how they made sense of those interactions, are best approached as 
interpretive processes, informed by the social meanings given to 
                                                 
6
  I use the term Arabic-speaking-background communities (rather than say Arabic-
speaking communities or simply Arabs) in order to include those communities 
(such as the Assyrian-Chaldeans) who do not necessarily identify as Arabs and 
speak languages other than Arabic (e.g. Assyrian). Assyrians from Iraq, for 
instance, are educated in the national language (Arabic) but do not necessarily 
identify as Arabs, and they maintain their language (Assyrian) and connection to 
Assyrian culture, which predates the Arabization of the Middle East. Organisations 
such as VASS (Victorian Arabic Social Service) serve not only those who identify 
as Arabs (e.g. the Iraqi and Lebanese communities in Victoria) but also ASB 
communities (which include groups such as Assyrian-Chaldeans). Throughout this 
thesis I will be using the acronym ASB in reference to individuals and communities 
of Arabic-speaking background.  
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certain groups of people and particular events7. These social 
meanings are constituted (and continually reshaped) in the course of 
more general social processes such as media framing, moral panics 
and the politics of fear, as well as the more personal and communal 
processes that constitute the ‘life-world’ of these young people 
(Schutz 1967, 1970). I propose that Essed’s (1991) concept of 
‘everyday racism’ usefully captures some aspects of my interviewees 
‘life-world’, and how they interpreted their interactions with other 
Australians. I suggest that my interviewees’ everyday experiences of 
racism include racisms that are personally encountered as well as 
mediated or vicarious experiences. Their encounters with, for 
example, ‘other’ Australians (who approach them with hostility) are 
experienced interpretively through the lenses of their ‘general 
knowledge of racism’. This ‘general knowledge’ includes their 
understanding of ‘what counts’ as racism and past experiences of 
interacting with ‘other’ Australians. This ‘general knowledge of 
racism’ will inform whether something like an incivility experienced is 
classified as ‘racism’ or as something other than as a racist 
encounter.  
In relation to my research question about belonging, I argue in this 
chapter that the young people’s sense of wider community belonging 
is informed by factors such as their personal and vicarious 
experiences of racism, and their interpretation of what it means to 
belong to a particular collective such as the wider national 
community.  
In Chapter four I ask how did these young people deal with often 
challenging and hostile interactions that followed events such as the 
September 2001 terror attacks and the ‘Sydney gang rapes’ when 
racist sentiment was mobilised against Muslims and Lebanese young 
people? I answer this question by saying that my findings reveal that 
my interviewees respond to racism, generally, in three kinds of ways: 
‘avoidance’, ‘fighting back’ and ‘constructive engagement’. To 
                                                 
7
 I refer to events such as ‘The Sydney Gang Rapes’ which has come to symbolize 
the contempt of Muslims towards the ‘West.’ 
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develop an understanding of the different responses that fell into one 
of these three porous categories, I draw on several theories including 
the theory of ‘moral emotions’ developed by Jack Katz (1988). In this 
chapter I further develop my answer to my third research question, 
namely what sense of belonging did they have with respect to the 
broader Australian community? I argue in relation to this question 
that interviewees who adopted more often strategies of ‘constructive 
engagement’ tended also to talk a lot more about feeling a sense of 
belonging to the wider community.   
In Chapter Five I broaden the focus slightly to look at how some 
other Australian-Lebanese, Muslim, and ASB young people who 
were not part of the group of young people I had intensively 
researched, used the interactive technology ‘YouTube’. I argue that 
these young people used YouTube to ‘fight back and resist racism’, 
to ‘constructively engage’ with other Australians, and to create new 
civic spaces that invoke a sense of place and belonging that they 
may not have in their ‘real life’ communities. These arguments are 
developed by drawing on research on young people’s use of the 
internet (Blanchard, Metcalf & Burns 2007; Carrie et al. 2009) and 
theories of ‘resilience’, ‘resistance’, ‘moral emotions’ and ‘capitalising 
on Othering’, as discussed in previous chapters. I reveal also how 
internet sites such as YouTube provide a medium for Muslim and 
ASB young people to engage critically with media-sponsored 
stereotypes of young Muslims and Arabs (Stephenson 2008). 
In Chapter Six I reflect systematically on how the findings of this 
research might best be used by community service agencies working 
with young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, and perhaps other ASB 
Australians who share similar experiences. I use what is now 
described as a ‘strength based’ or ‘resilience’ approach (Saleebey 
2000; Saleebey 2006; Ungar 2004, 2005b) to argue the importance 
of working with what young people have found ‘works for them’. I 
suggest that youth workers, in embracing this perspective, can tap 
into what motivates young people to do things they do, and build on 
young people’s capacities and strengths. For example, some young 
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people are motivated to be ‘good Muslims’ and challenge media 
stereotypes about them; some (like any of us) act on ‘moral 
emotions’ (Katz 1988); and many of the young people have strengths 
that youth projects can incorporate such as an ability to engage in 
creative ways via new technologies such as YouTube. I also argue in 
this chapter, that service providers have an important role to play in 
helping young people develop their skills to challenge racism in its 
various forms, including the skill of critically reflecting on one’s own 
prejudices and participation in racist practices  
In the conclusion I summarise my key findings.  
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Chapter One: The Historical and Social 
Construction of the Young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslim ‘Problem’   
 
There was a boy…8 he was about 10 when [the 9/11 attacks 
happened] …and his name was Osama… Yeah, his life has 
changed because of it… he wants to change his name.  I didn’t 
even know who Osama Bin Laden was. None of us knew who 
Osama Bin Laden was until the terrorist attack … it’s scary to see a 
ten-year-old child crying to [his] mum scared of terrorism. It is 
something you don’t really expect to see, especially here in 
Australia. 
      Coco, female interviewee 
 
The Lebanese are the largest and longest settled of the Arab-
speaking communities in Australia (Batrouney 2006a). According to 
the 2006 census data, there were at least 150,000 Australians of 
Lebanese ancestry resident in Australia (see also Jupp 2001, p. 
561). Whatever the popular perception of Lebanese as Arabs and 
‘therefore’ Muslims, the 2006 census data (see Appendix A) showed 
that there were then 82, 662 Christians of Lebanese ancestry 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). Most Lebanese-Christians 
affiliate with one of three Christian sects: Orthodox, Maronite and 
Melkite (Batrouney & Batrouney 1985; Batrouney 2000). The 2006 
census showed that 61,288 of those identifying as Lebanese 
identified as Muslims (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006). The 
population of Lebanese-Muslims in Australia includes a majority of 
Sunni and Shi’ite and minority of other Muslim sects such as Alawi 
                                                 
8
 To indicate an interruption to speech or when the interviewee does not finish their 
sentence, the speech is tailed of using three dots. I have also used dots in quotes 
taken from interviewees to indicate parts of speech that have been omitted for 
reasons such as poor audibility during transcription. 
 
I have used square brackets [ ] in the quotes taken from interviews to indicates 
parts of the interview that are not directly the words of the interviewee(s). This has 
been done on occasion for the purposes of clarity but more often when the words 
of my interviewee(s) were not audible when listening back to the tape recordings of 
the interview. Hence the words in the square brackets are my guesses as to what 
they were saying and are based on my notes and memory of what the interviewee 
was saying. 
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(Foroutan 2009, p. 296). Another 2176 people of Lebanese ancestry 
identify as Druse9 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2006).  
Yet, as some researchers (Betts & Healy 2006; Topsfield 2006; 
Yamine 2006) have pointed out, and in spite of the greater number of 
Christian Australians of Lebanese background living in Australia, 
most of the recent public discussion and controversy about the 
Lebanese has focused on Australians of Lebanese-Muslim 
background. To understand the significance of this we need to 
account for how the immigration of Lebanese to Australia has taken 
place. This will also assist in setting up some background knowledge 
needed to appreciate the often ambiguous and shifting relationships 
of belonging that some young people of Lebanese-Muslim 
background experience in relation to the Australian national home.  
For as the history of Australia suggests, the experience of 
establishing an ‘Australian identity’ is both rich in paradox and 
marred by a persistent vein of racism and prejudice which has from 
time to time impacted negatively on Lebanese and Muslims 
Australians.     
In this chapter, I do several things. First I briefly outline some of the 
key elements of the historical processes that have seen so many 
Lebanese leave Lebanon and settle in Australia. One crucial aspect 
of the more recent history of Lebanese settlement is the succession 
of moral panics (Cohen 2002) that erupted first in the 1990s and 
peaked after 2001, which framed the Lebanese-Muslim presence in 
Australia as a problem. The idea of ‘historical explanations’ has been 
used to show how and why the ‘Lebanese problem’ is typically 
conceived of as a ‘Muslim problem’ even though, as I quickly 
                                                 
9
 The Druse are considered by most writers to be a minority Muslim sect (Azar & 
Mullet 2001; Inhorn 2008). Other writers state that the Druse’s religious affiliation is 
said to overlap both Christianity and Islam (Kennedy 2000). As explained by 
academic James Jupp (2001, p.256), ‘Historically the Druse originated in the 
eleventh century as a sect among Ismai’lli Muslims but are no longer accepted as 
Muslims, although they see themselves as Muslims. In the collection of ABS 
statistics, the Druse are counted as a distinct religion and are grouped under ‘other 
religions’ (as opposed to grouping them under Islam).   
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indicate, a larger proportion of the Lebanese in Australia actually 
identify as ‘Christian’. Following a discussion of these moral panics I 
turn to consider the value of certain frames found in the theoretical 
work of scholars like Said (2003) and Essed (1991) which I want to 
draw on as I develop my interpretive framework in this thesis. In this 
context I discuss some of the theoretical work that has centred on 
‘Orientalism’, ‘Othering’ and ‘everyday racism’, and how this makes 
sense of contemporary debate about who ‘deserves’ to belong in 
Australia. I do this to show how these discourses have contributed to 
the framing of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims as ‘problems’. 
The historical process of settlement and a set of discourses about 
identity and ‘whiteness’ have shaped the contemporary life 
experiences of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, including how 
they experience, understand and deal with experiences of racism, 
and how they understand  ‘belonging’ to the broader ‘Australian 
society’.  
 
 
The third wave from Lebanon: The ‘problem with them’ 
 
As Trevor Batrouney (2002, p. 39) points out, the Lebanese 
presence in Australia has been achieved in the course of three 
successive waves of migration over more than one hundred years. 
The first wave occurred between the 1880s and the 1920s  
(Batrouney 2006b, p. 32). The second wave followed between 1947 
and 1975, while a third major wave of immigration began in 1976 and 
continued on to 1990 as a consequence of  the civil war in Lebanon 
(Batrouney 2000, 2001b). As Batrouney writes: 
The descendants of the first wave settlers now extend to five and 
six generations while second-wave Lebanese-Australians include at 
least three generations. The third wave, which came to Australia 
during and after the Civil War in Lebanon, typically extends to two 
generations. A major difference across each of the immigrant waves 
has been that of size. The pioneer settlers represented a small and 
alien group within a predominantly Anglo-Celtic community in 
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Australia. The second wave substantially increased the size of the 
Lebanese population in Australia. However the most profound 
changes in terms of size, composition and settlement needs came 
with the exodus from Lebanon during and after the Civil War. The 
first two waves were predominantly Christian, while the third wave 
was predominantly Muslim (Batrouney 2000).  
I am primarily interested in the third wave of migrants, because it is 
the Lebanese-Muslim migrants who came as part of this third wave, 
and the children born to them (which includes all my interviewees) 
that have chiefly been represented as ‘problems’ in the public 
discussion of the problem represented by Arabs and Muslims (Betts 
& Healy 2006; Humphrey 1998; Topsfield 2006; Yamine 2006). 
Betts and Healy (2006), for example, report that Lebanese-Muslims 
who have settled in Australia, including even those who are second-
generation, are economically and socially far worse off than other 
Australians, including the Lebanese from other faith backgrounds. 
Betts and Healy (2006) use statistical indicators such as levels of 
unemployment, education and household income to make the claim 
that Australian-Lebanese-Muslims are worse off than other 
Australians (including Australian-Lebanese-Christians).  Like Betts 
and Healy (2006),  Humphrey (1984) has also argued that the 
relative disadvantage Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have 
experienced needs to be contextualised by the historical 
circumstances of their arrival and subsequent settlement in Australia. 
Betts and Healy (2006) suggest  that the disparity could be linked to 
the fact that many Lebanese-Muslims who have now settled in 
Australia arrived in the course of the Lebanese civil war and that this 
wave of migrants experienced greater difficulties in settlement and 
‘integration’ than those who had arrived in previous decades. 
Batrouney and Batrouney (1985, p. 101) note that, in many respects 
those arriving in the third wave: 
… were in a worse situation than their predecessors who had 
migrated in times of peace. In Lebanon the education of many 
children had been non-existent or disrupted for many years. The 
whole pattern of their lives was geared to survival in war, yet they 
had to pick up the pieces of their lives in a strange country with very 
different ways… It is noteworthy, too, that the Australian 
government did not accord the Lebanese immigrants refugee status 
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and the benefits which that entailed. Similarly aid was not 
forthcoming when it was most needed in the late 1970s. 
These ‘quasi-refugees’ did not have the opportunity to plan and 
prepare for migration as they fled to find a place of refuge, often 
going to refugee camps in other parts of the world (i.e. Cyprus, 
Athens, Gulf states) before arriving in Australia. Many of those 
arriving in the third wave also experienced disruptions to their 
education and employment during the civil war (Batrouney 2001a, p. 
567). Furthermore, as ‘most refugees were from the rural and urban 
poor of Lebanon few had the cultural capital (especially qualifications 
and English language) to secure skilled or professional work’ 
(Humphrey 1998, p. 24). This in turn affected their employability in 
Australia.  
It is surely noteworthy that the Lebanese who arrived in the early 
1980s entered Australia at a time when Australia was well in the grip 
of a major economic recession (Humphrey 1998). Batrouney (2006b, 
p. 32) writes that, while most of the migrants arriving in the first two 
waves were upwardly mobile, the third wave of migrants encountered 
major employment problems. As Batrouney (2006b, p. 32) puts it:  
A major discontinuity may be seen in the unemployment problems 
experienced by significant numbers of the third wave immigrants, 
which are continuing to have profound effects on the settlement of 
this group.  
Also contributing to the difficulties was the lack of resources and 
support available to help the third wave of Lebanese migrants to 
participate in the social, economic and cultural life of Australia. As 
many have also pointed out, (Batrouney & Batrouney 1985; 
Batrouney & Blatt 1982, p. 15; Couani 1988, p. 20; Humphrey 1984) 
the resources of the already established Lebanese churches and 
community welfare organisations, and the already settled Lebanese 
families, were unable and (sometimes unwilling) to cope with and 
cater for the mass influx of migrants arriving in the third wave. 
Batrouney and Blatt (1982, p. 6) add that the ‘… political conflict in 
Lebanon, reflected in the expatriate community, exacerbated 
problems in coping with the sudden influx’. Interviews with Lebanese 
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settlers who came in the  late 1950s and early 1960s revealed that 
they were concerned that the new arrivals were ‘shattering the 
image’ that the Lebanese-Christian community had worked hard to 
build (Batrouney & Batrouney 1985; Batrouney & Blatt 1982). They 
spoke of a:  
…united, Christian respectable, upwardly mobile, propertied, 
business-orientated community which, through its religious leaders, 
had developed links with people thought to be influential in 
government, professional and business circles. 
The Civil War shattered that self-image and caused it to be replaced 
by the power struggles that had reduced Lebanon to chaos, thereby 
depriving the new arrivals of many of the established leaders and 
the resources they controlled…(Batrouney & Blatt 1982, p. 6) 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims were not only seen as a problem by 
the wider Australian community, but they were also looked down on 
by the other established and predominantly Australian-Lebanese-
Christians. Humphrey (2001, p. 567) notes that the Lebanese-
Muslims in Australia have been considerably affected by the ongoing 
experience of discrimination against Arabs and Muslims:  
The racism generated by the Gulf War in 1991 towards Arabs and 
Muslims had a considerable impact on Lebanese-Muslim 
communities, who found they had to defend their position and rights 
in multicultural Australia. The Lebanese Muslims were particularly 
resentful that they should in some way be held responsible for the 
military actions of the Iraqi government in the Middle East. The 
growth of racial intolerance in Australia in the 1990s has further 
reinforced identification with Islam over national and sectarian 
origins.  
In short, the Lebanese who had left as a consequence of the 
Lebanese civil war faced major economic and social challenges in 
establishing themselves in Australia and arranging for their children’s 
education.  
These problems experienced by the most recently arrived wave of 
Lebanese settlers after 1980 provided some commentators with a 
theme with which to find fault with these migrants.   
The story line was relatively simple in the hands of commentators like 
Henderson (2006) and Franklin (2007). Any problem with the 
integration of Lebanese Muslims has not had anything to do with the 
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‘host’ society or with the way Lebanese-Muslim migrants were 
treated, or even anything to do with how their participation in the 
wider community was facilitated. Rather the problem had to do with 
Lebanese-Muslim migrants themselves. As Henderson (2006) saw it: 
They were from rural areas, had little education and minimal English 
language skills…. The problem with Lebanese Muslims was that 
they were ill equipped to enter the workforce. Also, a number were 
fundamentalist Islamists’. 
IMMIGRATION authorities warned the Fraser government in 1976 it 
was accepting too many Lebanese Muslim refugees without "the 
required qualities" for successful integration. 
Franklin (2007) too saw fit to comment on the alleged lack of capacity 
on the part of Lebanese Muslims to integrate:  
The Fraser cabinet was also told many of the refugees were 
unskilled, illiterate and had questionable character and standards of 
personal hygiene. 
The emergence of the documents raises the questions of whether 
the temporary relaxation might have contributed to contemporary 
racial tensions in Sydney’s southwest, which exploded a year ago 
into race-based riots in Cronulla.   
It proved convenient also for other commentators (Bolt 2006, 2010a; 
Jones 2005) when asking why the last wave of Lebanese 
immigrants, particularly Lebanese-Muslims and the generations born 
to them, have experienced more problems than the longer 
established Lebanese-Christians, to say that this is best explained by 
religious and cultural differences and indeed by the Lebanese-
Muslims’ unwillingness to embrace the ‘Australian way of life’.  
As Humphrey (1984, p. 2) has pointed out, characterising problems 
like unemployment as a ‘Lebanese-Muslim problem’, 
…fails to differentiate between the circumstances of recent and 
established Lebanese immigrants and accepts racism, political 
propaganda, and class antagonism for sociological analysis … The 
historical argument states that Lebanese are disadvantaged 
because they fled from civil war in Lebanon and have remained 
disadvantaged because of economic recession in Australia. The 
argument is that because of the inadequate welfare infrastructure 
and the burden placed on the different Christian and Muslim 
communities they have not been able to recover from this initial 
disadvantage. 
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Whilst it matters that we make arguments about the historical 
context, it also matters how we do this and what assumptions we rely 
on when doing so. There are, for instance, some important problems 
embedded in the arguments advanced by Humphrey (1984) and 
Betts and Healy (2006), which stress that the disadvantage 
disproportionately facing contemporary Lebanese-Muslims is best 
explained by what are ‘historical circumstances’.  
One problem of relying on an appeal to historical circumstances 
occurred to me when I noted that the above mentioned study by 
Katharine Betts and Ernest Healy (reporting that Lebanese-Muslims 
were worse off than Lebanese-Christians and other Australians, both 
migrants and native born) attracted nationwide media coverage 
(Australian Associated Press 2006; Hobart Mercury 2006; Shanahan 
2006; Topsfield 2006; Yamine 2006). It raised the question, why did 
this study receive this kind of mass-media interest? Also, whose 
interests were being served by this kind of explanation? These 
observations and questions in turn raise another problem, namely 
that these kinds of arguments, often tinged with historical 
determinism, are perhaps not all that different from other 
explanations offered in response to the questions, ‘why are 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ experiencing greater disadvantage 
and why they have not ‘successfully integrated into’ Australia?  
Leaving aside the highly problematic assumptions being relied on in 
framing these questions, the most usual explanation has been to 
point to certain inherent ‘characteristics’ alleged to define the identity 
of Lebanese-Muslims and/or to point to problems in their 
environment. It has often been said that it is the inherent deficiencies 
and/or defects in the social milieu that explain the conflicts between 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims and ‘mainstream Australians’ (as 
brought to the foreground by events such as the Cronulla riots). As 
can be seen in the following diatribe from the popular talk-back radio 
host Alan Jones (2005), media shock jocks can help to fuel the 
popular idea that any conflicts between Lebanese-Muslim 
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communities and the wider community, is best understood by 
pointing the finger at the culture and religion of Lebanese-Muslims:   
The pack-mentality of some cultures, the attitude of disrespect, the 
mind-numbing gangster rap music and the semi-automatic weapons 
are all here. And as is the case with the United States, the gangs 
are virtually all drawn along ethnic lines. In the USA the strongest of 
these are the Hispanics. Here it is the Middle-East persuasion and it 
doesn’t take a psychologist to work out that the mentality between 
these two cultures is very similar. …  
We don’t have Anglo-Saxon kids out there raping women in 
Western Sydney… I don’t hear people complaining about Catholics, 
Protestants and Anglicans, I’m sorry, but there is a religious element 
in all of this and we’ve got to make sure we welcome people into our 
community but we welcome them in on certain terms and certain 
standards and those standards are not being met… All across 
Sydney there is a universal concern that there are gangs, the gangs 
are of one ethnic composition…     
The notion that it is Lebanese culture or an ‘Islamic mentality’ that is 
to blame for the altercations between Lebanese-Muslim and Anglo-
Saxon Australians were themes repeatedly drawn on by Jones 
throughout his radio broadcast and reinforced by his radio talk-back 
callers (Jones 2005). The same kind of explanation has been offered 
in rationalising the various disadvantages being experienced by 
‘these people’, such as the disproportionate levels of unemployment 
amongst Australian-Lebanese-Muslims when compared to other 
Australians. High-profile conservative journalist Andrew Bolt (2010a) 
has also used a ‘culturalist’ rationalisation when explaining the 
relative disadvantage facing Australia’s Muslim communities (in 
particular Lebanese-Muslims): 
Only one reason is given for high Muslim unemployment - 
"underlying discrimination and prejudice towards non-Europeans in 
Australia". 
So why have Lebanese from Christian backgrounds done so much 
better here on almost every measure, even providing Victoria with a 
premier and NSW with a Governor? 
Is the difference really nothing to do with Islam, the faith of so many 
poor nations? Is Muslim poverty, terrorism and crime really just the 
fault of our miserable society? 
Or is our real fault to have apologised too much for what we are, 
and to have failed to protect this great society from newcomers too 
disposed by their culture to reject our own?  
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Bolt is arguing that indications of disadvantage, such as the high 
levels of unemployment amongst Muslim communities, reflects the 
backwardness and limitations of Muslim communities themselves 
(that is, the deficiencies inherent in their religious beliefs and culture), 
and lead them to reject ‘our’ culture and religion. He argues that 
Lebanese people of Christian backgrounds do not face the kinds of 
problems that plague Lebanese-Muslims, insinuating that perhaps 
religion has something to do with the relative disadvantages faced by 
Lebanese-Muslims. If Muslim communities’ marginalisation might in 
someway be related to the wider community, then perhaps it is only 
insofar as non-Muslim Australians being too apologetic and 
accommodating of the kinds of people who should not be included in 
the national family. 
This interpretative framework seems to have played a major role in 
the succession of ‘moral panics’ that began to target Lebanese 
Muslims in the early 1990s and then after 2001 as a major problem.  
 
 
Moral panics and constructing the young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslim ‘folk devil’ 
 
The concept of a ‘moral panic’ owes much to the pioneering work of 
Stanley Cohen (2002). Cohen’s work seems especially relevant to 
understanding the heightened preoccupation with and fear of Arabs 
and Muslims in Australia, which began in the early 1990s and peaked 
after the September 2001 terrorist attacks in America as well as more 
local events. According to Cohen (2002, p.9), the idea of a ‘moral 
panic’ can be used to describe the circumstances that follow when: 
A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its 
nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the 
mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians, and other right-thinking people; socially accredited 
experts pronounce their diagnosis and solutions; ways of coping are 
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the conditions then disappears, 
submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes 
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the object of the panic is quite novel and at other times it is 
something which has been in existence long enough, but suddenly 
appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic passes over and is 
forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it 
has more serious and long term repercussions and might produce 
such changes as those in legal or social policy or even in the way 
the society conceives itself. 
Cohen argues that, 
Calling something a ‘moral panic’ does not imply that this something 
does not exists or happened at all and the reaction is based on 
fantasy, hysteria, delusion and illusion or being duped by the 
powerful (Cohen 2002, p. viii).  
Several criticisms have arisen since Cohen’s, now classic text, Folk 
Devils and Moral Panics was first published in 1972. One criticism is 
that Cohen’s model implies:  
…the nature of the reaction (the “panic”) is disproportionate, that is, 
more severe than the condition (event, threat, behaviour, risk) 
warrants... And hence, that the reaction is exaggerated, irrational or 
(above all) unjustified (Cohen 1999, p. 587) 
In response to this criticism, Cohen argues that we can and should 
evaluate whether a particular moral panic is justified, and make 
judgements as to whether or what is happening deservedly 
constitutes a moral panic (Cohen 2002, p. 2). I would suggest that it 
is reasonable to make judgements about whether, for example, moral 
panics like that whipped up by the former politician Pauline Hanson 
about Australia being swamped by Muslims (McKnight 2010) is 
based on an irrational fear and hype or not. Typically such 
assessments can be done quite simply by observing what happened 
and by considering the evidence; in this case, it could be judged as 
irrational given the fact that Muslims constitute less than 2% of the 
Australian population (IDA 2007, p. 34).    
Cohen also points out that it is the role of sociologists to think 
critically and to expose over-reaction and exaggeration (hysteria, 
prejudice and panic) about such claims, to consider their political 
intent and how they influence the ways we see, think and act.  He 
also says that the job of sociologists is to identify under-reaction. 
When people are apathetic, engage in denial, and when they are 
indifferent to important social issues, it matters because those kinds 
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of responses prevent us from acknowledging what is happening. 
Without acknowledgement that wrong-doing is taking place (such as 
torture, political massacres or social suffering) there can be no action 
to stop it, and there can be no remedial action (Cohen 2002). Thus, it 
follows, considering whether or not a series of events is a ‘moral 
panic’ is important if we are to assume responsibility and have the 
capacity to respond to wrong doings.     
Another critique of Cohen’s model is that it portrays ‘folk devils’ as 
powerless victims in the face of media distortion and public outrage. 
Mc Robbie and Thornton (1995) however point out  that moral panics 
can also work to empower ‘folk devils’ and that ‘folk devils’ are often 
active agents in the construction of moral panics. They propose that 
moral panics can be 
… seen as a culmination and fulfilment of youth cultural agenda in 
so far as negative news coverage baptizes transgression. What 
better way to turn difference into defiance, lifestyle into social 
upheavel, leisure into revolt? ... 
For, in turning youth into news, mass media both frame sub-cultures 
as major events and disseminate them… Sociologists might rightly 
see this as ‘deviancy amplification’, but youth have their own 
discourse which see the process as one in which a ‘scene’ is 
transformed into a ‘movement’. 
That is to say, some ‘folk devils’, for example young people who are 
labelled in the media as dangerous ‘gangs’ members or variously 
constructed as ‘objects’ of fear, can themselves exploit the ‘moral 
panics’ that are generated. They can use a moral panic to meet their 
own needs and desires by, for example, drawing on what is being 
presented to develop powerful self identities and to gain respect and 
status in the eyes of their peers.   
McRobbie and Thornton also critique Cohen because they say he 
assumes ‘the public’ will react in a uniform way and that reaction is 
directly and exclusively caused by the media’s reporting. McRobbie 
and Thornton point out how different sections of ‘the public’ respond 
to media coverage in a variety of ways.  
Furthermore, the moral panic thesis has become so successful in 
contemporary discourses that it has been appropriated and 
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incorporated by the individuals and institutions conventionally seen to 
be the drivers and targets of moral panics. For example, journalists 
will often accuse politicians of ‘whipping up moral panics’ in order to 
divert attention away from other more pressing problems (McRobbie 
& Thornton 1995, p. 266). Other agents of ‘social control’, such as 
the police, are aware of the dangers of over-reaction and hence it is 
not uncommon to hear that the police are interested in improving 
public perceptions of public safety, indicating that they are aware and 
concerned that people’s fear of crime is disproportionate to the actual 
incidences of  crime. 
Whilst I agree that ‘moral panics’ are (and always were) used and 
shaped by various players, and that various actors in the process 
(e.g. ‘the folk devils, the media, ‘the public’) are all active agents in 
the process, I disagree with the suggestion that the ‘mass media’ no 
longer play a dominant role in the construction of ‘folk devils’ and in 
framing social problems. ‘Folk devils’ also can and do ‘fight back’ 
(McRobbie & Thornton 1995) but they don’t have the same power as 
the mass media in transmitting moral panics and in reproducing and 
sustaining dominant ideologies (Cohen 2002, p. xxix).  Having said 
that, it is worth noting the role of digital technology and the way that 
provides opportunities for people to contribute to or counter the 
narratives published by the mainstream media.  
While acknowledging its limitations, Cohen’s conceptualisation of 
moral panics does offer a useful theoretical tool for identifying and 
conceptualising how power is exercised, and how we are influenced 
to see certain events and people (Cohen 2002, p. xxxv).  His thesis 
has been particularly helpful in tracking and understanding how 
young Lebanese-Muslims in Australia have been constructed as 
‘problems’, and how various sectors in the community have 
responded to the moral panics about them. 
As Cohen pointed out, the negative media images of the folk devils 
around whom the moral panics circle can help to mobilise a public 
outcry, which can then be used to justify harsh and oppressive 
treatment of the ‘folk devil’ (Simpson 1997, p. 9). While the 
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crackdown on the folk devils can be directed by the state, it can also 
be taken up spontaneously by members of the public who feel they 
have the right to deal with the ‘folk devils’ by taking direct vigilante 
action (Simpson 1997, p. 9). Members of the public may feel 
especially justified in taking matters into their own hands if they feel 
that the government is not intervening quickly, decisively or simply 
not forcefully enough in relation to the perceived threat.   
The years 1990 to 1991, during which the Gulf War raged, saw one 
of the first serious moral panics directed at Australians of ‘Middle 
Eastern appearance’ and at those who observed the Islamic faith 
(Poynting, Noble & Tabar 2001; Wakim 1998). There were many 
reported incidents of people in Islamic dress or of ‘Middle Eastern 
appearance’ being spat at, harassed and/or assaulted. There were 
also incidents of arson and vandalism directed at property owned by 
people identified as Arabs or Muslims (Hage 1991, p. 8). As revealed 
during the Gulf War, ‘moral panics’ can lead to harsh and oppressive 
treatment directed at perceived ‘folk devils’ and ‘the manning of the 
moral barricades’. Gradually the intensity of racist hate towards 
Arabs and Muslims that peaked during the Gulf war died down, at 
least until the next moral panic about Lebanese gangs (Collins et al. 
2000). 
As is often the case with moral panics, such as the one that emerged 
in 2001 about ‘Lebanese gangs’, each threat is presented as entirely 
new, unprecedented even, or as the ‘worst threat’ ever encountered 
(Cohen 2002). Moral panics, however novel they may appear, are 
never that. In defining or describing the folk devil, all moral panics 
draw on long-standing ideas and metaphors such as those about the 
dangers of the Other and the adolescent as delinquent or deviant. 
Research like Cohen’s (2002) on young ‘delinquents’ reveals the ‘folk 
devil’ is again and again selected from those who have been deemed 
the underclass, the marginalised and oppressed, those groups never 
fully embraced as part of the community. The moral panic about 
‘ethnic’ and ‘Lebanese youth gangs’, which has resurfaced several 
times in the past two decades in Australia, is an example of the 
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intermeshing of two age-old narratives. One is an ‘Orientalist’ story 
about the Arab-Muslim ‘Other’ (Said 1981, 2003) and the other is the 
long-told story about young people as inherently delinquent (Bessant, 
Sercombe & Watts 1998; Pearson 1984).  
A reading of Geoffrey Pearson’s (1984) study of  the idea of 
‘hooligans’ reveals that the fear of young people has a long history 
pointing to some persistent assumptions or myths that the enduring 
fear of young people is based on. Those myths include the idea that 
they are very ‘different’ to the rest of us, and that their ability to judge 
what is good and bad or right and wrong is either weak or non-
existent because they are more like animals than human or because 
their hormones have taken over (Palmer 2003). There is also the 
idea that they are more prone to bow to ‘peer pressure’ (Bessant 
1994; Bessant, Sercombe & Watts 1998; Wyn & White 1997). Such 
‘commonsense’ beliefs are instrumental in the process of 
categorising and defining certain types of young people as 
delinquent, deviant or criminal, and therefore requiring especially 
rigorous intervention and policing (Bessant 1995; Kelly 2000b). 
Young people who are routinely subject to policing and interventionist 
practices, and deemed as particularly problematic, are those young 
people who are represented as being part of the ‘underclass’, or 
otherwise coded as ‘disadvantaged’, ‘marginalised’, ‘excluded’ or ‘at 
risk’ (Kelly 2000a, 2000b, 2009). 
In countries like Australia, where there is a significant degree of 
cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, the moral panics relating to 
young people also tend, as Rob White (2007a) has pointed out, to 
rest on ideas of ‘cultural differences’ – the lynchpin of ‘new racism’. 
This is why young people who are from a minority ethnic, linguistic or 
religious background, who are seen as very different to that of the 
‘mainstream’ Anglo-Celtic, Christian Australian population, are 
represented as ‘ethnic youth gangs’ that threaten community safety, 
particularly when they also appear to be ‘socio-economically 
marginalised’ and frequent public spaces in large numbers. In this 
way, as many scholars in youth studies have shown (Lygo 2004, pp. 
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129-135; Pe-Pua 1996; Perrone & White 2000), ‘ethnic youth gangs’ 
become regular fodder for media-fuelled ‘moral panics’.   
The story of moral panics about Lebanese ‘gangs’ has developed 
over several years of media reportage about ‘ethnic youth gangs’. 
During the mid-1990s, Vietnamese young people became 
synonymous with youth gangs, courtesy of the way elements of the 
media represented them (Quek 1997). Soo-Lin Quek (1997) pointed 
out that during one of the moral panics about Vietnamese youth 
gangs in 1994, O’Loughlain (the Assistant Commissioner for Crime at 
the time) helped to create a binary opposition between ‘young 
Australians of Vietnamese background’ and ‘other Australians’. He 
did this by promoting the view that Vietnamese youth gangs were a 
problem because they ‘can’t assimilate… with White Australia (Quek 
1997, p. 179). According to Quek (1997, p. 181): 
O’Loughlain’s words also seem to signify a view that “white 
Australia” needed ethnic minority groups to “assimilate”. “They” 
(Vietnamese young people), have to assimilate to “our” (white 
Australia) culture and material world.  In so doing, the Assistant 
Commissioner of Crime had established a binary opposition 
between us/them where white Australia becomes the leading 
positive term and the Vietnamese community is the contrasted 
derivative. 
Indigenous youth have also been negatively stereotyped regularly by 
the media (Sercombe 1995, 1997). Howard Sercombe (1995, p. 83) 
found that 64 per cent of all articles in the West Australian, a Perth-
based newspaper that he had analysed, linked youth to crime. Along 
with this kind of media reportage, there have been many calls for a 
‘war’ or crackdown on the violence and crime associated with ‘ethnic 
youth’ (Collins et al. 2004, pp. 55-56).  
There were certain key events that academics such as Collins, 
Noble, Poynting and Tabar (2000) have identified as triggering a 
moral panic about Lebanese youth gangs. One of the first moral 
panics about ‘Lebanese youth gangs’ was triggered in 1998 when 
Edward Lee, a 14-year-old schoolboy of Korean background who 
was mortally stabbed by a group of young men of Lebanese 
background (Collins et al. 2000, p. 1). It was reported by journalists 
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such as Andrew Clennell and Les Kennedy (1998) that Lee was 
stabbed during a fight which ‘had started when the group of five, all 
Asians, got out of the car and a group of Lebanese men who were on 
the road at the time decided they did not like the group’. A ‘zero 
tolerance’ police crackdown against Lebanese youth followed this 
incident (Collins et al. 2004, p. 90).   
The second major moral panic over ‘Lebanese youth gangs’ took 
place in August 2001 during the trial of a group of young Australian-
Lebanese men who in 2000 had gang-raped young women in 
western Sydney (Dagistanli 2007; Manning 2004; Warner 2004). 
There was another series of ‘ethnic gang rapes’ in 2002, which also 
caught media attention. This time the perpetrators were four young 
people from a Pakistani-Muslim background and one non-Muslim of 
Nepalese background (Aslan 2009, p. 89).  
There are various interconnected themes woven through the ‘ethnic 
gang rape’ moral panics. As Collins, Noble, Poynting and Tabar 
(Collins et al. 2004, pp. 116-117) pointed out:     
… contradictory racist themes include: Lebanese/Muslim men’s 
purported disrespect of women in general; Lebanese/Muslim men 
being allegedly brought up to regard ‘White’, ‘Western’, ‘Caucasian’, 
women as ‘sluts’ and thus ‘fair game’ as distinct from their own 
women who are respected or at least valued as property; ‘ethnic 
gang rape’ as an expression of anti-‘Aussie,’ anti-White, anti-
Western hatred which is supposedly encouraged in Muslim 
communities at large; Muslim and ‘Third-World’ cultures as barbaric, 
uncivilised, violent and misogynistic in their law and their morality; 
condemnation of laxity and indulgence in the Australian legal and 
political system towards transgressors and calls to mete out ‘their 
own medicine’. 
Another theme that emerged in each of these moral panics was the 
supposed failure of Lebanese youth (even those born in Australia) to 
integrate into ‘White’ Australia and accept ‘Australian values’ – a 
theme concurrent with the culture-conflict thesis (McNamara, Nolan 
& Wallace 2006). A further linked theme involved correlating violent 
‘ethnic behaviour’ with the alleged failure of multiculturalism. This 
could segue into implicit and sometimes explicit calls to return to the 
glorious past when assimilation had been the policy (Hage 2003; 
Windschuttle, K 2005). 
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These themes were played out in other moral panics centring on 
Arabs and Muslims in Australia. For instance, media reporting of the 
earlier moral panic over ‘Lebanese-gangs’ in the late 1990s also 
causally linked the outburst of violence to culture and the alleged 
failure of Lebanese youth to ‘integrate’ and to accept ‘Australian 
values’ (Collins et al. 2000). 
The political benefit of this succession of moral panics, played out in 
the course of several years of media reportage on Lebanese youth 
gangs, was reaped by the federal coalition government. In this 
respect, the broader context in which young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims were seeking to find their place in Australia was never likely 
to be supportive. The arrival of asylum seekers described variously 
as Muslims or as ‘Middle Eastern’ evoked a near constant backdrop 
of anxiety and fear.   
On 16 December 2000, 16 January 2001 and 6 and 14 June 2001, 
asylum seekers described as ‘Middle Eastern’ arrived on Australian 
shores (Collins et al. 2004, p. 23). During this period the coalition 
government harnessed people’s fears of ‘terrorists’ arriving in leaky 
boats and the ‘importation’ of crime and violence, and this, as argued 
by some, helped the Howard coalition government to win the 2001 
election (Collins et al. 2004; Furedi 2005; Wright-Neville 2006).  
Almost certainly the moral panic about terrorism and the related 
mobilisation of public anxiety and antipathy towards Arabs and 
Muslims benefited those political parties who were best able to 
harness these fears. In order for any government to sell such policy 
solutions to the voting public, the public needs to feel threatened in 
the first place. In an environment of fear and anxiety, the more likely 
it is that voters will support a government that promises to reduce this 
anxiety (McCulloch 2004). The ‘politics of fear’ was the dominant 
strategy used by the Howard Coalition government again in the wake 
of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 
September 2001. This event, which colloquially came to be referred 
to as 9/11, had major ramifications worldwide.  
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The attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were 
defined as an ‘act of war’ against the United States of America and 
its allies (which includes countries such as Australia). The 2003 US 
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (White House 2006, p. 14 
cited in Reese & Lewis 2009) defined the attacks on 11 September 
as an attack on:  
‘... the very idea of civilized society’. It identified the enemy as 
terrorism, an ‘evil’ threatening our ‘freedoms and our way of life’ (p. 
1). The related National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America (White House, 2006) clearly divides ‘us’ from ‘them’, linking 
terrorism to rogue states that ‘hate the United States and everything 
for which it stands’ (p. 14).  
This framing was instrumental in bringing together America, Australia 
and other state allies to form the ‘Coalition of the Willing’. Within 
months US-led forces would invade Afghanistan and later Iraq, as 
part of the so-called ‘war against terrorism’. Joseph Siracusa (2006, 
p. 42) notes that: 
...while many countries abstained from committing troops to the 
cause, Australia augmented its original commitments to U.S. 
operations, pledging navy frigates, long-range maritime aircrafts, 
tanker aircrafts, FA-18 fighters, and 150 Special Air Service troops 
to the coalition. 
Howard’s hard line on terrorism and regional security resonated with 
the Australian electorate in the subsequent national elections. The 
Howard government was elected for a third successive term in 
November 2001 with a ten-seat majority in Parliament. Two issues 
dominated the election campaign: 
Australia’s handling of refugees and asylum-seekers, and the 
Australian response to the terrorist attacks on the United States. 
Following September 11, large swings in opinion polls in Western 
countries favored incumbent leaders and governments. In 
accordance with this pattern, the majority of the Australian 
electorate reacted positively to Howard’s posturing. 
In such a context the politics of fear did not abate as terrorist attacks 
continued to attract worldwide attention. This included the terrorist 
attacks which has come to be known as the ‘Bali bombings’ referring 
to terrorist attacks on the Sari nightclub and Paddy’s Irish pub in Bali 
on 12 October 2002. These were venues frequented by many 
‘western’ tourists, and especially by Australians. The ‘Bali bombings’, 
and the later bombing of the London underground railway and a bus 
in July 2005 were represented in the Australian media as further 
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evidence that a ‘clash of civilisations’ was well under way (Humphrey 
2007; Lewis & de Masi 2007).  
The Australian Government introduced a wide range of ‘counter-
terrorist measures’. Well-publicised arrests and police surveillance 
were aspects of these measures. The homes of Australian-Muslims 
suspected of having terrorist links were raided at the end of October 
2002, soon after the Bali bombings, and in a series of raids in July 
2005 (Poynting & Perry 2007). Other than raiding people’s homes, 
the counter-terrorism measures adopted in Australia included an anti-
terrorism advertising campaign sponsored by the government. 
Designed to justify tough security measures, the advertising 
campaign also invited members of the public to assist in identifying 
potential terrorist threats. As argued by Stephanie Younane (2006), 
the high-profile advertising campaigns mostly served to whip up 
public fear and anxiety about Arabs and Muslims in Australia by 
representing them as outsiders positioned beyond the boundaries of 
national identity. Yet the heightened level of public anxiety was not 
just about the threat of terrorism in Australia.  
Some of this public anxiety had deeper antecedents arguably 
established across decades of white colonialism. Academics such as 
Hage (2003, pp. 48-68) and McCulloch (2004, p. 89) suggested that 
the primal seizure of land from Indigenous Australians left the 
colonisers (and their descendents) with a permanent anxiety that 
they too one day might be subjected to an equivalent dispossession. 
During periods like the gold rushes of the 1850s and the 1990s 
(following the rise of Pauline Hanson) there was much public anxiety 
about Asians ‘taking over’ Australia (Hage 2000).  
Something of this anxiety seemed also to be on display in what has 
come to be referred to as the ‘Cronulla race riots’. Fears about Arabs 
and Muslims ‘taking over’, were promoted in the lead-up to and 
following the Cronulla riots. These riots were also an important point 
of reference for many of the young people I interviewed. 
Cronulla is a predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant a beach-
side suburb in Sydney, and lies within an electorate held by the 
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Liberal Party. Former prime minister John Howard once described 
the area as ‘a part of Sydney which has always represented to me 
what middle Australia is all about’ (O'Riordan 2005). On 11 
December 2005 around five thousand people, many carrying 
Australian flags gathered at Cronulla. Ryan Barclay (Barclay & West 
2006, p. 79) claimed that Cronulla residents had gathered: 
 …to celebrate Australian beach culture in defiance of the years of 
sporadic and increasing intimidation from ethnic male youths who 
were seen to threaten the values and the way of life enjoyed by 
beach goers. For a small minority of locals and other old 
Australians, it may have been seen as an opportunity to exact 
revenge and express their racist views publicly. 
According to those who were part of the rally (with evidence that 
some of those involved belonged to far-right white-supremacist group 
the Cronulla protest was ostensibly aimed at ‘reclaiming the beach’ 
(Poynting 2006b, p. 87). 
Folklore had circulated for years about how, for years, young 
‘Aussie’ women had been offended and insulted and made to feel 
unsafe on the beach by young men of an essentially misogynistic 
and un-Australian culture. According to this story, the locals of 
Sutherland Shire had for years been ‘putting up with’ immigrant 
outsiders from the working-class western suburbs who, in addition 
to affronting ‘our women,’ were exclusively responsible for littering 
the parks and beaches, uniquely involved in boisterousness and 
sky-larking, played football on the sand, and dressed inappropriately 
for the beach by wearing too many clothes.  
The proximate source of the protest-cum-celebration had been the 
bashing of two lifeguards the weekend before the rally by a group of 
young men of Lebanese background (Barclay & West 2006, p. 78). 
The lifesavers had apparently attempted to stop a game of soccer 
being played on the beach by the Lebanese youth, and insulted them 
with ‘Lebs can’t swim’ (Ang 2006, p. 34). The lifesavers were then 
physically attacked as the verbal contestation became physical 
(Barclay & West 2006, p. 27). The event was perceived as ‘the last 
straw’ for some of the Sutherland Shire residents, possibly because 
of the powerful symbolism that this incident could be seen as 
representing. Australian-Lebanese-Muslim young men were 
positioned as not belonging to the community which had a ‘rightful’ 
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claim to the beach. According to Jock Collins and Carol Reid (2009, 
p. 384) this was because:  
The beach is a symbolically sacred-site of white Australian youth 
masculinity, with lifesavers an iconographic image of (white) 
Australian male identity.  
Symbolically, the bashing of the lifesavers by the young Lebanese 
men, could be seen as affront to the idealised icons of Australian 
masculinity that lifesavers have historically come to signify in 
Australia (Saunders 1998). The game of soccer being played on the 
beach, which could be treated as a ‘foreign’ sport (as opposed to say 
surfing), could be seen as an attempt by ‘non-White Australians’ to 
colonise ‘White space’ (the beach). And, finally, the refusal by the 
Lebanese youth to stop playing on the beach when requested by the 
lifeguards symbolically represents the refusal by groups like the 
Lebanese to assimilate quietly into the Australian way of life.  
Though the Cronulla residents may have gathered in celebration (as 
Barclay claims) there were certainly a number of attendees focused 
on demonstrating that Arabs, Muslims and Lebanese people were 
not welcome. The attendees were mostly young Anglo-Australians, 
some of who received the following rally call: ‘This Sunday every 
Aussie in the Shire get down to North Cronulla to help support Leb 
and Wog bashing day … Bring your mates and let’s show them this 
is our beach and they are never welcome… let’s kill these boys' 
(cited in  Poynting 2006b, pp. 86-87).  
Some attending the rally waved and wrapped themselves in Aussie 
flags; sang Waltzing Matilda; and traced the words ‘100% Aussie 
Pride’ in the sand (Poynting 2006b). More disturbingly, a few others 
went further and sang racist chants such as “Go Nulla, Fuck Allah” 
(Quayle & Sonn 2009). Some proudly displayed slogans such as 
‘Fuck off Lebs’, ‘ethnic cleansing unit’ and ‘Aussies fighting back’ on 
T-shirts and placards and even scrawled on skin (Mitropoulous 2006; 
Poynting 2006b). Fuelled by excessive amounts of alcohol they went 
about bashing anyone who appeared to be Lebanese, including a 
Jewish man and woman of Greek ancestry (Mitropoulous 2006). 
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In the days following the rally there were retaliation attacks. One of 
the calls to hit back declared (Mitropoulous 2006, p. 37): 
Our parents came to this country and worked hard for their families. 
We helped build this country and now these racists want us out… 
time to show these people stuck in the 1950s that times have 
changed. WE are the new Australians. They are just the white 
thieves who took land from the aboriginals and their time is up. 
Christine Inglis (2006) claims that on the following day (12 
December) a large group of Lebanese young men assembled 
outside a major Lebanese mosque before making their way to 
Cronulla to take their revenge. In Cronulla, and in the surrounding 
suburbs, cars were destroyed and some white Australians were 
bashed. ‘An arson attack on a church hall in a distant suburb with a 
sizable population of [people from a] Middle Eastern background also 
was alleged to be part of the tit-for-tat retaliations’ (Inglis 2006).  
There have been many explanations offered about both the 
immediate and the more long term causes of the Cronulla riots 
(Clements 2006; Collins 2006; Poynting 2006a; Smith 2006). One 
theory is that the riots were a manifestation of ‘White Australian’ 
anxiety massaged by the mass media and politicians. According to 
this theory, the race politics played out in relation to a series of moral 
panics over Arabs and Muslims (such as the ‘ethnic gang rapes’ and 
9/11 attacks) have merged to create the pre-eminent folk devil in 
contemporary Australian society – young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims (Poynting 2006a).  
Whatever the range of explanations one thing is clear:  the 
succession of moral panics helped to make young Lebanese 
Muslims a key ‘folk devil’.  As Carol Bacchi (2009) has insisted, how 
a given ‘social problem’ gets represented and how the framing of the 
‘problem’ takes place matters deeply even if, or perhaps especially 
when, the representation of the problem is essentially false. 
According to Bacchi (1999) there are all sorts of consequences that 
flow from the way in which a social issue is framed, including how 
you respond to or deal with ‘the issue’. She also says that it is 
important to note what is missing from the frame. For instance, if the 
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issue is constructed as the ‘problem’ of the disadvantages 
experienced by Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, and the tensions 
between them and other Australians (often illustrated by reference to 
events such as the ‘Cronulla riots’) then what are the implications 
that flow from the way in which ‘this problem’ has been constructed? 
The consequences include the likelihood that the problem-framing 
places the blame on Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, and those who 
‘allowed’ them into the country. It also takes the focus away from 
critical questions such as: who exactly are Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims a ‘problem’ for? It would seem that they ‘are a problem to 
those of us who are outside the boundaries of what we have defined 
as the problem’ (Ryan 1976, p. 12). More importantly, could ‘the 
problem’ be constructed differently? Furthermore, whose interests 
are served in framing ‘the problem’ in this way? The answer usually 
is that it serves the interests of those who blame the victim (Ryan 
1976, p. 12).  
The reasoning used by public commentators such as Andrew Bolt 
and Alan Jones about the alleged lack of integration by Lebanese 
Muslims into Australia relies on what William Ryan (1976) has called 
the logic of  ‘blaming the victim’. According to Ryan, blaming the 
victim is a mystifying process that serves a specific (albeit 
unintentional) function of maintaining the status quo, for example by 
privileging the interests of one group at the expense of other groups 
(Ryan 1976, pp. 10 - 11). This process works by explaining what’s 
wrong with the victims, by pointing to differences, real or imagined, 
between the ‘victim’ group and the rest of the ‘normal’ population. 
Through the victim-blaming account, wide-scale social problems 
(such as unemployment and crime) are explained as peculiar to a 
particular population in the community, who are constructed as very 
different to the ‘normal’ or ‘mainstream’ group.   
‘The poverty cycle’ theory, for instance, is a popular way of 
explaining away the predicament of people living in poverty, by 
pointing to these people’s personal deficiencies. ‘These people’ are 
constructed as very different to ‘us’ (i.e. those of ‘us’ in the middle 
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class) because they are seen to lack a sense of personal 
responsibility, and commitment to hard work and good morals. 
Academics Bonnie Thornton Dill, Maxine Baca Zinn and Sandra 
Patton (1999, p. 271) write: 
The predominant explanatory system among conservatives and 
centrists correlates lack of strong work ethic, laziness, and the 
prevalence of single-mother families with a ‘culture of poverty’ that 
perpetuates an endless cycle of intergenerational poverty.  
Such spurious explanations are offered to avoid taking action on 
systemic problems, which are largely outside the control of those 
being blamed. Taking such action would however upset the status 
quo or work against the interests of privileged groups (Ryan 1976). 
It also diverts attention away from other possible factors, like the 
interpretative frameworks used by people already resident in 
Australia who may have found it easy and convenient to drop these 
frameworks onto newly arrived migrants, with negative 
consequences.  
In short, while we can make some use of the historical context in 
which Lebanese immigration has taken place, we need to do so 
carefully. Some of the disadvantages faced by second generation 
Lebanese-Muslims can certainly be related to the history of 
Lebanese migration and settlement in Australia, but we need to 
question whose and what interests are served in using particular 
historical frames. As I have suggested, the Lebanese-Muslim 
migrants who came to Australia after 1975 were constructed as very 
different and deficient in relation to ‘us’, and it was decided that most 
were unable/unwilling to ‘assimilate’ into ‘mainstream Australia’. This 
understanding was based on ‘facts’ like the claim that many 
Lebanese-Muslims entered Australia as ‘quasi-refugees’, that they 
came  from rural and urban poor backgrounds and that many had low 
level English language proficiency (Franklin 2007; Henderson 2006). 
More importantly perhaps, most were also thought to have brought 
with them their ‘Muslim extremists’ ways of thinking and behaving 
(Franklin 2007; Henderson 2006). As Ryan has argued more 
generally, by defining certain out-groups as radically different to ‘us’, 
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it then becomes possible for us to divert attention away from other 
explanations and point to the supposed deficiencies of those people 
most affected by the imbalances in power, wealth and opportunity 
(Ryan 1976). More importantly, it allows us to wash ‘our’ own hands 
of the idea that certain privileged groups may be part of the problem 
that is seen as peculiar to these ‘Other’ groups. It obfuscates the 
possible recognition of complicity in the discourses that allow 
Lebanese-Muslims to be seen and treated as very different to us. 
Yet as Pearson (1984) and Cohen (2002) have acknowledged, moral 
panics do not spring up from nowhere. Typically there is a long 
history of negative representations of particular out-groups. I now 
turn to that proposition. For it seemed apparent to many Australian 
observers in the 1990’s (e.g. Collins et al. 2000; Collins et al. 2004) 
and the 2000s (e.g. Poynting 2002; Poynting & Perry 2007) as well 
as many of the young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims I spoke with 
(from 2003 to 2009) that the social construction of Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims as a problem for the wider community owed a 
good deal to certain old habits of mind.   
One way of making sense of these discursive strategies was pointed 
out by Edward Said (2003) in his very influential account of what he 
called ‘Orientalism’. 
 
 
Orientalism and the ‘Other’ 
 
Although my interviewees did not draw on Edward Said’s vocabulary 
or conceptual framework when talking about their experiences, the 
theoretical insight provided by his thesis on Orientalism is clearly 
relevant for making sense of what Essed (1991, p.288) has called 
‘everyday racism’ — the kind of racism I argue has been experienced 
by many young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. This is because their 
experiences seem to point to the way Anglo-Australians have long 
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understood Arab-Muslims as Other (Said 1981, 2003). I will begin by 
discussing Said’s work before turning to the rather more Protean idea 
of racism.  
As is now understood, Said’s (1981, 2003) account of ‘Orientalism’ 
proposes  that the ‘West’ has long held a skewed view of Arabs and 
the Islamic world. Orientalism can mean several things according to 
Said (2003, p. 2) because as he  puts it:  
The most readily acceptable designation for Orientalism is an 
academic one… Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches 
the Orient… is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is 
Orientalism… A more general meaning for Orientalism…. is a style 
of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the 
Occident”.  
Said argues that, from the specialised academic fields of Oriental 
studies, Orientalism filtered through into all aspects or social and 
political life and became established as ‘common sense’ ways of 
representing the very diverse peoples and cultures that were 
packaged as non-Westerners. I use the concept ‘common sense’ in 
the way Antonio Gramsci (2005) uses it. ‘Common sense’, as he 
understands it, are those ‘folkloric’ truths or taken-for-granted 
assumptions that have been disseminated from powerful groups in 
society to the masses. Thus, ‘common-sense truths’ are historically 
and socially constructed ‘truths’ or folkloric ideas that have ‘spread 
beyond the confines of intellectual groups’. Common-sense truths 
often serve the interests of the powerful in society and are, therefore, 
rarely critically examined (Gramsci 2005, p. 423). 
The ‘common sense’ of Orientalist ‘truths’ have spread through 
media such as government policies and popular culture. (See 
Appendix B for a discussion of how Hollywood movies have 
contributed to the ‘Othering’ of Arabs and Muslims). A construction of 
the Islamic and ‘Middle-Eastern Other’ that continues to have 
currency is the notion that the world of the Islamic East – 
notwithstanding its varied histories, societies and languages – is still 
mired by religion, primitivity and backwardness (Said 1981, p. 10). It 
might almost go without saying that events such as the attacks on 
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New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 revived Orientalist 
ideas about Islam and the dangers of the ‘East’.  
While the argument presented by Said may seem deterministic and 
give little capacity for people to critique or think beyond or outside of 
Orientalist discourses, Said’s intention is not to dismiss the possibility 
of contesting Orientalist ideas. Instead Said (2003, p. 325) wanted to 
describe a particular system of ideas and to raise questions such as: 
How does one represent other cultures? What is another culture? Is 
the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a 
useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-
congratulation (when one discusses one’s own) or hostility and 
aggression (when one discusses the “other”)? [Emphasis in 
original.] 
I understand Said to be arguing that it is only by asking such 
questions, and by being responsive to the complex of embodied, 
sensuous, multilayered qualities of human experience, and not 
relying on simplistic essentialist stereotypes, that it is possible to be 
properly sensitive to what is involved in representing and studying 
the ‘Other’ (Said 2003, p. 327). This is how it might be possible to 
free oneself from the constraints of Orientalism. It is precisely this 
kind of reflexivity that I tried to practise throughout the research 
process, from the drafting of my research questions through to the 
writing up of the thesis. Furthermore, by asking questions like the 
ones Said has proposed, we can be attentive to processes of 
‘Othering’.  
The concept of the ‘Other’ is central to Said’s (2003) Orientalism. The 
‘Other’ is the ‘Oriental’, a people who reside in the East and who are 
socially and historically constructed as both strange and different, in 
an irreducibly oppositional relationship to the people of the Occident.  
That is to say they are the opposite of the European in the 
‘progressive’ Western world.  
The ‘Other’ is a concept not only used by Said, but also by several 
other academic in various fields, including feminist intellectual 
Simone de Beauvoir (1972). Stephen Harold Riggins (1997, p. 3) 
argues that the concept of Other has an ancient history in philosophy 
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and can be traced back to Plato, who used the term to represent the 
relationship between an observer (the Self) and an observed (the 
Other):   
In the modern social sciences, the “external other” or the “social 
Other” is commonly used, in a more restricted sense that that of 
Plato, to refer to all people the Self perceives as mildly or radically 
different. 
In cultural studies the Other is often used in reference to those 
constituted as inferior, devalued and diminished, but at the same 
time eroticised and envied by the more powerful group (Said 1981, 
2003). For the Europeans/the West, the ‘Other’ constitutes the 
people who represent everything they are not. ‘They’ are the 
Oriental, out there in the East – they are ‘our’ Other. They become 
mirrors to which the Self is refracted and known.   
The discursive process and strategies by which the Other is 
constructed and labelled as different to ‘us’ is called Othering. 
Othering, however, is not only done by the more powerful and 
privileged or those in the majority. It certainly is not only deployed by 
those in the West. As Riggens (1997, p. 6) puts it:  
Discourses of Otherness are articulated by both dominant majorities 
and subordinate minorities. Others are not just groups that are 
devalued, marginalised, or silenced by dominant majorities… 
However, for understandable political reasons, most research 
concentrates on the discourses of Othering by majority populations.  
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that those being positioned as 
‘Other’ are not passive subjects, who simply submit to the dominant 
imposition, by passively accepting the construction of themselves as 
‘Other’. Bell hooks (1990) and Edward Soja (1996) have argued, for 
example, that people, who may be marginal in real and imagined 
spaces and places, can nevertheless claim the right to author their 
own identities. Those people constructed or positioned as ‘Other’ are 
as much active participants in the social construction of identities as 
those doing the Othering.    
Soja (1996) has suggested identity formation does not have to be 
grasped in the dichotomous relation between Self/first and Other. 
Some strategies can be employed to inhabit a ‘Third Space’, a space 
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of resistance. This space can be ‘central and marginal and purely 
neither at the same time’ (Soja 1996, p. 97). While this notion of a 
romanticised utopian space can be critiqued,10 Soja’s (1996) and 
Hook’s (1990) recognition that ‘Others’ can resist, embrace and 
reject the ways in which they have been constructed, does have 
some value.  
Drawing on the work of Soja (1996) and others (Carrington & Wilson 
2004; Skeggs 2004), Sune Qvotrup Jensen (2009, pp. 25-26) 
observes that: 
… othering is not a straightforward process of individuals or groups 
being interpellated to occupy specific subordinate positions. On the 
contrary, agency is at play, and people far from always accept 
becoming the other self. Othering can be embraced, capitalised, 
resisted or disidentified from…. Elements of othering discourses 
may be appropriated, because such elements can be given local 
value as part of a subcultural style. This is possible because the 
specific discourses of othering relevant here are not only fixing and 
pathologising; they are perhaps also, at a deeper level, ambivalent 
in their gaze upon the other, as they also contain implicit exoticism 
and fascination of the other. The other can, as Riggens has pointed 
out, at one and the same time be devalued and reduced and be the 
object of more or less conscious desire, erotization and envy of the 
powerful majority (Riggens 1997: 5).   
I use Jensen’s agential approach to ‘Othering’ throughout this thesis, 
but particularly in Chapter Five, to argue that one way young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims deal with those more negative 
experiences by both embracing and in effect capitalising on the 
‘Othering’ that they are experiencing.  
I have already raised the idea that the experiences young Muslim Lebanese 
have had of late can be understood in some fashion as a consequence of 
what Essed (1991, p.288) has called ‘everyday racism’. Since this idea is 
central to my research I want to outline something of the particular 
understanding of racism that I have adopted for this study and my reasons 
for doing so. 
Everyday racism  
 
                                                 
10
 For a critique of the ‘Third Space’ refer to Ien Ang’s work (2001, pp. 163-176). 
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The concepts of ‘race’ and ‘racism’ remain among the most 
contested of categories in modern social sciences. Jakubowicz et al. 
(1994, p. 27) write:   
Racism can be understood as the set of values and behaviours 
associated with groups of people in conflict over physical 
appearance, genealogy, or cultural differences. It contains an 
intellectual/ideological framework of explanation, a negative 
orientation towards ‘the Other,’ and a commitment to set of actions 
that put these values into practice. 
Laksiri Jayasuriya (1999, p. 2) argues that in the Australian context 
there are at least ‘two logics of racism’: there is the ‘old racism’ 
characterising the formative period of Australian racism in the mid-
nineteenth century, followed by the ‘new racism’ of the twentieth 
century. Old racism is primarily based on pseudo-scientific biological 
theory in which the world’s population can be categorised into 
different races. Bereson and Matheson (1993, p. 5) explain that a:  
... commonly accepted definition of race relates to a people who 
have, or are supposed to have, common ancestors. It also relates to 
those with similar distinguishing features, such as skin colour and 
physiognomy, common social or community heritage, and similar 
religious practices.  
Importantly, these categories of people could be hierarchically 
ordered and ranked in terms of a scale of superiority/inferiority. The 
theory empowered those deemed as superior to develop paternalistic 
policies, and practices of domination over ‘inferior races’. Over the 
years the concept of race has become a lot more fragile and 
understood as more of a social construct than a scientific ‘fact’ 
(Jayasuriya 1999, p. 3). The available biological and psychological 
science reveals that there is: 
… no basis for believing that the groups of mankind [sic] differ in 
their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development. The 
biological differences between human beings within single races 
may be great as the biological differences between races (UNESCO 
1951).  
Social Darwinism, implying superiority by ‘an aristocracy of nature’, 
has clearly lost ground in most contemporary societies. The notion of 
cultural differences between different groups has, however, come to 
replace biological differences in ‘everyday racist’ practices. The new 
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form of racism emerging from the late twentieth century is not only 
colour blind, serving the interests of liberal ideologies and class 
interests, but it also serves other needs and desires. According to 
Jayasuriya (1999, p. 25) this shift from old to new racism indicates a 
new level of racist ideologies. No longer is the ‘Other’ (for example, 
the Lebanese-Muslim) marginalised on the basis of their racial 
inferiority or other shortcomings, but rather they are now defined as a 
threat to national integrity, economic viability and the social peace of 
the nation (Jayasuriya 1999, p. 25). This new form of racism arises in 
the context of global migration, to fulfil the need to legitimise and 
maintain the power of the White majority in nations where ethnic 
minorities are agitating for a share in power and resources, and 
inclusion in the national space (Jayasuriya, Walker & Gothard 2003).  
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva and David Dietrich (2011) describe  ‘color-blind 
racism’ as the ideological anchor of new racism. 
The ideology of color-blind racism works to defend and justify the 
contemporary racial order… [it] rationalizes the status of minorities 
as the product of market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena, 
and their alleged cultural deficiencies’  (Bonilla-Silva & Dietrich 
2011, pp. 190-191 ).  
According to Bonilla-Silva, ‘color-blind racism’ highlights cultural 
difference and liberalism while overlooking the influence of structural 
inequalities. It focuses on the idea of the individual and their deficits 
or attributes, to explain and justify inequitable power relations, as well 
as social, economic and political differences between ethnic groups.  
‘Cultural racism’ is one form of colour blind racism whereby 
presumed cultural practices are used to explain and justify racial 
inequality. It enables those using this frame to ‘blame the victim’ and 
to explain and justify inequalities (e.g. the high numbers of 
Lebanese-Muslims who are unemployed and in low-paid jobs) by 
attributing the disadvantages they face to personal deficiencies such 
as a lack of motivation, poor work ethic and self-discipline – which 
are presumably reflective of their cultural upbringing. 
A good illustration of how the ideology of ‘cultural differences’ is 
played out in racist practices within the Australian context, is the 
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infamous ‘children overboard’ saga of 2001 (see Appendix F). The 
‘children overboard’ saga represents the operation of a new racism 
based on ideas such as cultural difference (as opposed to the older 
biologically inflected form of racism).  
Bonilla-Silva (Bonilla-Silva 2003) identifies four frames of color-blind 
racism (namely, abstract liberalism, cultural racism, naturalization 
and minimization of racism11). ‘Abstract liberalism he says is the most 
important, as it constitutes the foundation of the new racial ideology’ 
(Bonilla-Silva 2003, p. 26). This he argues overlaps with ‘cultural 
racism’, and incorporates elements of political and economic 
liberalism. It’s a framing that allows socio-economic inequalities (eg, 
the high concentration of people of Lebanese-Muslim background 
living in poorer suburbs such as Broadmeadows, or the observation 
that lots of Indian students occupy high-risk jobs such as taxi-driving) 
to be explained by factors such as ‘market-mechanics’ or ‘consumer 
choices’.   
Bonilla Silva (2003) like others who write on new forms of racism, 
such as Philomena Essed (1991) and Jane Hill (2008), make the 
same point: 
Racism is not rooted in the cognitive make-up of the individual, but 
produced and reproduced through language and culture, through 
the hidden assumptions and presuppositions on race, ethnicity or 
nationality (Tileaga 2009, p. 689).  
According to Essed the concept of ‘everyday racism’ helps us to: 
 … cross the boundary between structural and interactional 
approaches to racism and to link details of micro experiences to the 
structural and ideological context in which they are shaped (Essed 
1991, p. 288).  
                                                 
11
 ‘Naturalization is a frame that allows whites to explain away racial phenomenon 
by suggesting that they are natural occurrences’ (Bonilla-Silva 2003, p. 28). For 
example, claims can be made that it is ‘natural’ that particular organisations and 
suburbs are dominated by a particular ethnic group because it is ‘natural’ that 
people gravitate towards likeness.    
 
‘Minimization of racism is a frame that suggests discrimination is no longer a 
central factor affecting minorities life chances (“It’s better now than in the past” or 
“there is discrimination, but there are plenty of jobs out there)’ (Bonilla-Silva 2003, 
p. 29).  
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She explains that  
… everyday racism does not exist as single events but as 
cumulative practices. Specific instances acquire meaning only in 
relation to the sum total of other experiences of everyday 
racism…(Essed 1991, p. 288) … new experiences are interpreted 
and evaluated against the background of earlier personal 
experiences, vicarious experiences and general knowledge of 
racism in society (Essed 1991, p. 8). 
Racism is also reproduced ‘through the formulation and application of 
rules, laws and regulations and through access to and allocation of 
resources’ (Essed 1991, p. 44). Racism can be seen as a process 
which comes to be seen as ‘normal’ by the dominant group: 
‘Analogous to everyday life, everyday racism is heterogeneous in its 
manifestations but at the same time unified by repetition of similar 
practices’ (Essed 1991, p. 288).  
Everyday racism can be experienced in seemingly benign and 
insignificant ways, but cumulatively it can have a powerful impact. 
Everyday racism, for example, includes instances where ‘ethnic 
Others’ are starred at because they look ‘different’’. It is reflected in 
comments such as “Where do you come from?” and “You speak 
English surprisingly well”. It can be seen in policing practices that 
target young men in public spaces because they appear to be of a 
certain ethnic background.  
Not all forms of racism however can be counted as ‘everyday 
racism’. I refer, for example, to racism that is more overt and not 
coded – like the events discussed earlier which took place in the 
‘Cronulla Riots that saw people who ‘looked Lebanese’ physically 
abused. 
It could be argued that insights provided by Essed have little 
relevance to the Australian context, given that the concept of 
‘everyday racism’ was developed based on Essed’s research 
conducted in the Netherlands and the United States. Many 
academics (Mellor 2004a; Mellor et al. 2001; Noble 2010) who have 
researched racism in Australia however find this concept of ‘everyday 
racism’ helpful for analysing and understanding the local experience. 
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I agree it is a concept that can be applied to the contemporary 
Australian context and is valuable for appreciating my interviewees’ 
stories.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have explained why young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims, and Arabs and Muslims in Australia more generally, have 
come to be constructed as problems, and why their claims to belong 
in Australia have been routinely challenged. I have argued here that 
the young people I interviewed experienced and made sense of their 
interactions with other Australians in all sorts of ways, but always did 
so in a context, constituted out of historical experience, and multiple 
discourses – many of them relying on deeply prejudicial 
representations of ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims’. 
I argued that one of the ways young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims 
have been framed as a problem has been by referring to the 
historical circumstances of these young people’s parents’ arrival and 
‘integration’ into ‘mainstream’ Australia. The Lebanese-Muslim 
migrants who came to Australia during the civil war in Lebanon (1976 
-1990) were constructed as very different and strange to ‘the average 
Australian’ because, as the argument goes, they were refugees, 
Muslim ‘extremists’, from rural and urban-poor backgrounds, and had 
little English-language proficiency (Franklin 2007; Henderson 2006). 
The young people born to these parents were also constructed as 
very different to the rest of us, and this was done by referring to the 
deficiencies of their parents – reminiscent of the ‘cycle of poverty’ 
argument. The strategy of ‘blaming the victim’ has allowed people 
with the power of definition, including politicians, policy makers and 
experts, to explain the problem in terms of the deficits of the ‘victim 
group’ rather than by referring to the way important political, cultural, 
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social and economic resources are distributed (Ryan 1976). The 
strategy of ‘blaming the victim’ has also allowed government, and 
even whole communities, to absolve themselves from taking 
responsibility to address the actual problems, especially if the 
explanation points to the idea that ‘we’ are part of the problem.  
Apart from the strategy of ‘blaming the victim’, I argued that ‘colour 
blind racism’, ‘Orientalism’ and other discourse such as neo-
liberalism, have all been at play in the construction of ‘Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims’ as a problem for the wider community. Sustained 
public narratives about who ‘deserves’ to belong to the national 
home, and ideas about young people, especially those who are 
‘ethnic’ and ‘marginalised’, have also contributed to a politics of fear 
about young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. In Melbourne, the 
concern has focused mainly on those living in socio-economically 
marginalised areas, such as the northern and western suburbs. Such 
‘Othering’ narratives would all play their parts in the representation of 
certain events such as the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
‘Sydney gang rapes’ and the ‘Cronulla race riots’.  
The representation of these events within particular frames serves 
particular interests and power relations. Older well-established 
Anglo-Australians, for instance, reap a lot of benefit from ‘colour-blind 
racism’. I have argued that the framing of events, and the social 
construction of Australian-Lebanese-Muslims as a problem, has 
shaped how other Australians understand and act towards young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims.  
The framing of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims as problematic 
‘Others’ has also informed how young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims 
experience and make sense of their interactions with other 
Australians; how they deal with the hostile and challenging situations 
that emerged following the various ‘moral panics’ about ‘Australian-
Lebanese-Muslim youth’ (and Arabs and Muslims more generally); 
and their sense of belonging to the wider community. 
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I also suggested in this chapter that new forms of racism, anchored 
in ‘color-blind racism’, and reproduced through ‘everyday racist 
practices’, is what characterises some of the new forms of racism 
that young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims find themselves subject to. 
It is in this context that I interpret my interviews, focus group 
discussions, online videos and field notes.  
I now turn to the next chapter which explains how I collected and 
interpreted my research ‘data’.  
 
Page 55  
Chapter Two: Gaining Insights from Others 
 
Basically to me it’s like a lack of knowledge. Like some people, 
because they’re afraid or they just don’t know maybe something 
about the culture maybe retaliate because they don’t understand it. 
That’s pretty much racism to me. 
 Mia, a young female interviewee, speaking to me in 2007 about 
 what racism means to her.  
 
When Martha Nussbaum (2010) referred recently to the work of 
Mahatma Gandhi, she reminded readers that the kind of political 
struggle for freedom and equality that Gandhi waged must first of all 
be a struggle within each person because ‘compassion and respect 
contend against fear, greed, and narcissistic aggression’. Nussbaum 
argues that this internal conflict can be observed in the discussions 
and conflict about inclusion and equality that take place in modern 
societies. This internal conflict is evidenced in debates, for example, 
about immigration, gender equality, sexual orientation or affirmative 
action. She says that one explanation for the fierceness of these 
debates in places like Europe, America and Australia is a lack of 
sympathetic understanding of the plight of the victims of widespread 
prejudice or xenophobia, often set loose by those who seek 
advantage in these debates by mobilizing fear, greed and 
aggression.   
One way of addressing this problem, she says, is to cultivate a 
greater capacity for sympathetic understanding. Pointing to the 
research of Batson (1991), Nussbaum (2010, p. 37) observes that: 
… children who develop a capacity for sympathy or compassion – 
often through empathetic perspectival experience – understand 
what their aggression has done to another separate person … 
Empathy is not morality but it can supply crucial ingredients of 
morality. 
These remarks suggest the positive value of any research process 
that is trying to make sense of the lives of people like young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, who have been systematically 
represented as ‘Other’ or as threatening the lifestyle, wellbeing or 
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values of the wider community, and does so by means of a 
determined exercise in understanding.   
Understanding the lives of others is never easy. The purpose of this 
chapter is to describe the theoretical framework used to understand 
the lived experiences of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, and 
the ways they have dealt with sometimes hostile interactions. This 
chapter also aims to describe some of the practical issues involved in 
shaping and carrying out my research.  
I begin by discussing the interpretivist tradition, which has informed 
my thinking about the methods that might best help me gain access 
to the life-worlds and the lived experiences of young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims. I provide a rationale for opting for the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological approach, used throughout my 
research project, and then move on to describe how I went about 
gathering research material. I explain how the research approach 
adopted has not only helped with interpreting empirical material, but 
also assisted in dealing with some ethical concerns I faced during the 
early stages of my research. Consideration is then given to how 
ideas derived from the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition, like 
the ‘hermeneutic circle’ and ‘symbolic interactionism’, were used to 
analyse the interview and focus group transcripts, field notes and 
YouTube video footage. 
  
 
The Interpretivist Tradition 
 
Whenever I have talked about my research I have often been asked 
about my research method. On hearing that I had interviewed ‘only’ a 
small number of young people for my study, a common response 
was, ‘Well … how can you make generalisations about young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims from just a small number of 
interviews’? I have usually responded by saying that my research 
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was not intended to enable me to make generalisations about a 
group of people, and that it was instead aimed at learning from the 
experiences of the people I was working with.  
It may well be that those concerned about the way I have undertaken 
my research have preconceived ideas about what ‘proper’ social 
research is or should be. Certainly there is a well-established view 
that credible social research should adopt some kind of gold 
standard represented by large-scale social surveys of large and or 
representative samples of the population under study (Lee 1989), 
where the data are subsequently worked over by various kinds of 
inferential statistical techniques.  
Modern social-science research is conventionally understood to fall 
into two broad schools or traditions. As Wilding and Whiteford (2005) 
argue, the respective philosophical or epistemological underpinnings 
of the traditions in contention, namely the broad-church positivist 
tradition and the equally broad-church interpretivist or symbolic 
interactionist tradition, are very different.  
Researchers who subscribe to the positivist tradition argue, for 
example, that the phenomena studied by the social sciences are like 
those studied by natural scientists: observable, objective and 
persistently real. These qualities render the social events, social facts 
or phenomena measurable, and if approached with the right method 
(i.e. the scientific method) then these phenomena can be known 
objectively and as they actually are. This means they can be known 
in ways that are free from the researcher’s ‘biases’ (Shepard et al. 
1993). They aim to discover a single, objective universal truth/reality 
(Savin-Baden & Major 2010, p. 1). Even better, and again if scientific 
method is applied, it will be discovered that the phenomena are both 
measurable and predictable and therefore explicable by reference to 
a nomothetic law, which means phenomena can be both explained 
and predicted. Indeed, the mark of the successful explanation is that 
it also works as a prediction. These explanations involve first the 
collection of aggregate data designed to identify those antecedent 
causal factors that may explain why a particular kind of behaviour 
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like, for example, criminal behaviour or school non-attendance has 
taken place. If done right the expectation is that the researcher may 
then discover some covering law or generalisation and apply this to 
the phenomena in question. In this tradition a ‘theory’ is the law or 
generalisation that explains and predicts phenomena. 
Without for a moment denying the value of this kind of method for 
addressing certain problems, I was aware of criticism by other social 
scientists who argued that neither human behaviour nor thought can 
be objectively known, nor the ‘causes’ of behaviour identified in the 
way the positivist tradition has long held to be possible (Shepard et 
al. 1993). This view has been made strongly by those affiliated with 
the interpretivist tradition. It was also clear that when looking at the 
way those associated with this tradition propose to do research, this 
approach seemed more likely to assist in developing the sorts of 
insights I was after, that is, insights into how young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims living in the northern and western suburbs of 
Melbourne both experienced and made sense of their interactions 
with other Australians. Donald Campbell (1975, p. 179) has argued 
typically that the only route to gain knowledge into the life-worlds of 
people, ‘noisy, fallible, and biased though they be’, is by observing 
and studying human interactions. The ‘interpretivist’ or ‘symbolic 
interactionist’ tradition is based on the insight that our social reality is 
created both out of and through human interaction (Earthy & Cronin 
2008, p. 426). My choice of study was guided by a strong sense of 
wanting to promote a ‘sympathetic understanding’, which Nussbaum 
(2010) has argued needs to be cultivated as a key civic value and 
practice. This is a value attached to the broad tradition Weber (1978 ) 
refers to as ‘interpretivist sociology’, which insists on the need to 
engage in the difficult project of understanding the lives, beliefs and 
actions of people. As Trevor Batrouney and John Goldlust (2005, p. 
5) point out: 
… one of the more effective ways of understanding the social world 
is by examining how individuals respond to and reflect upon their 
experiences and, in particular, the manner in which they construct 
their own meanings of such experiences. Such an approach often 
tends to favour qualitative rather than quantitative techniques of 
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data gathering and often reports its findings by citing the words of 
respondents rather than by the accumulation, categorization and 
numerical qualification of survey or interview data.  
 
 
The hermeneutic-phenomenological approach 
 
The symbolic interactionist tradition offers a ‘relatively distinctive 
approach to the study of human group life and human conduct’ 
(Blumer 1968, p. 1). It provides me with a framework to explore how 
young Australian-Lebanese Muslims made sense of their interactions 
with other Australians. In using this approach I drew on the work of a 
long line of scholars that include George Herbert Mead (1946), 
Erving Goffman (1959, 1986) and Herbert Blumer (1968).  From 
within the diverse ‘interpretivist’ tradition, I drew especially on what 
can be called a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. Primarily 
because it aligns with the key aim of this research, which is to better 
understand the life-worlds of young, second-generation, Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims living in the northern and western suburbs of 
Melbourne.  
The hermeneutic-phenomenological approach is one of the central 
forms of modern qualitative and interpretivist research. The classical 
phenomenological approach was developed initially by Edmund 
Husserl (1967) as a highly sophisticated  epistemological strategy 
designed to address some deeply puzzling aspects of philosopher 
Immanuel Kant’s (2008) transcendental critique of knowledge. In 
particular, twentieth century phenomenology took off from Kant’s 
(2008, p. 69) claim that we can never know ‘things in themselves’, 
but only as they appear to us, since all knowledge is gained through 
the lenses of human construction. Husserl’s phenomenological 
approach was developed in the process of formulating an answer to 
the question: how can we ever come to know ‘things’, including other 
people’s experiences, as they are in reality experienced by them?  
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Husserl’s phenomenology understood as the study of human 
experience was subsequently given an existential twist by one of his 
students, namely Martin Heidegger (1993, 2004), and later Hans-
Georg Gadamer (2004), a student of Heidegger’s. They extended 
and modified Husserl’s work to produce what is now known as the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological approach. It was also given a 
sociological twist by other students of Husserl like Alfred Schutz 
(1967, 1970) who did much to develop a framework subsequently 
embellished by Herbert Blumer (1968) and Peter Berger and Thomas 
Luckmann (1966).  
The key differences between the earlier pure phenomenological 
approach, and the later ‘hermeneutic-phenomenological’ approach, 
can be identified by discussing the differences between Husserl and 
Heidegger’s ideas on how we can come to uncover the life-worlds of 
human experience. Both Husserl and Heidegger sought to uncover 
life worlds or human experience as it is lived, but there were some 
significant differences in their ideas (Laverty 2003, p. 11). One 
difference was that Husserl believed it was possible to understand 
human experiences through a contemplative or rational process in 
which the philosopher identifies and overcomes their own 
assumptions so that the researcher can truly come to terms with 
another’s experience (Husserl 1967). He proposed that human 
experiences can and should be taken completely ‘free from all 
theory’, just as it is in reality experienced (Husserl 1967, p. 111). That 
is to say, Husserl believed that the influence of the researcher’s 
values and personal history could and should be recognised and 
countered so they do not overly interfere with the research process.  
Heidegger on the other hand believed that Husserl had continued the 
long western tradition of treating the problems he was addressing as 
if a narrowly rational or contemplative process could solve the 
epistemological problems. Heidegger insisted that this ignored the 
deeply grounded and situated nature of people’s ideas in relation to 
the ways they lived (their life-world) and did things – or their practice. 
In terms emulated by many later theorists, Heidegger directed us to 
Page 61  
pay attention to the daily practices and sense-making schemes we 
rely on as we live and do things. Furthermore, Heidegger argued that 
we cannot ‘bracket’ off our own experiences and assumptions 
(Heidegger 1993). He said it was unavoidable that the interests, 
experiences and life-worlds of the researcher will shape how the 
researcher understands the life-worlds and experiences of those 
being researched. The researcher therefore needs to be reflective, 
and is:  
… obligated to understand the context under which the text or 
dialogue was being produced and to bring forth interpretations of 
meaning. These interpretations arose through a fusion of the text 
and its context, as well as the participants, the researcher, and their 
contexts based on an ontology that is subjectivist (Laverty 2003, p. 
21) 
It is an approach that can present the researcher with both dilemmas 
as well as opportunities. In speaking about her own experience in 
using this tradition, Lisa Whitehead (2004, p. 518) observed how, 
Hermeneutic phenomenology is a philosophy and not a 
methodology, and the researcher is required to read and extract the 
principles of this and apply them to the study. This leaves the 
researcher open to criticism that the process of translating 
philosophy into practice involves the researcher’s interpretation. In 
seeking to make the decision trail clear to others, the researcher 
must distil the philosophical principles which are necessarily 
subjective and set these out in a way that is accessible and open to 
scrutiny (Whitehead 2004, p. 518). 
I too attempted to ‘distil the philosophical principles’ of hermeneutic-
phenomenological into my research. I did this by setting out how I 
applied these principles in ways that are accessible and open to 
scrutiny. I will speak more about the challenges in doing this, later in 
this chapter. 
I turn now to discuss how I went about gathering the ‘data’ that would 
ultimately help answer my research questions.  
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Getting the Research Material 
 
Because my study aimed to understand how young second-
generation Australian-Lebanese-Muslims both experienced and 
made sense of their interactions with other Australians, I strategically 
selected a number of young people who fitted my selection criteria, 
which included things like: they were Australian-born, self-identified 
as Muslim, claimed Lebanese ancestry and lived in the northern and 
western suburbs12 of Melbourne. This strategic and selective 
selection of young people I judged to be more likely to achieve my 
research aims, rather than any other way of selecting research 
participants – like for example, a random sample of the Australian-
Lebanese population. This has meant that, while my findings may not 
be relevant to, say, the young Australian-Lebanese-Christian 
population living in the eastern suburbs of Melbourne, it certainly 
does provide the material needed to answer my research questions 
and to meet the research aims.  
Some questions might be raised about my sampling method, such 
as, was there a problem with the way I recruited participants with the 
help of the Victorian Arabic Speaking Service (VASS)? And, did this 
method of recruiting exclude those young Lebanese Muslims who 
were so marginalised that they were not part of the VASS network? 
While this is a possible problem, my status as an outsider to the 
community meant there was no other way for me to build 
relationships of trust and secure interviewees other than through the 
                                                 
12
 The social class aspects of selecting young second generation Lebanese-
Muslims from the northern and westerns suburbs such as Broadmeadows, Coburg 
and Newport is worth mentioning here. Typically, both Lebanese Muslims and 
Lebanese Christians in the south eastern  and eastern suburbs (such as Brighton 
and Doncaster) are socio-economically better of than those living in the northern 
and western suburbs (such as Broadmeadows and Newport) and enjoy a more 
privileged class status (Baum 2008). Further research could look more explicitly 
into the complex intersections of class and the experiences of Lebanese-Muslims. 
Unfortunately an examination of class, as well as other key frames that shape our 
lived experience such as gender, was not within the scope of this PhD research.     
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networks created through my volunteer and paid work at 
organisations such as VASS.   
Given the aims of my research it also made sense for me to use 
research techniques like the one to two hour interview and/or focus 
group discussions supplemented by intensive ethnographic fieldwork. 
Such qualitative methods were chosen over quantitative methods 
(such as mass distributed surveys) that might perhaps have given 
me greater breadth but not as much depth of insight into the young 
people’s lives.  
A total of thirty-one young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims participated 
in my research. Of these, nineteen were young men and twelve 
young females. They participated in either a one-to-one interview 
(lasting between one to two hours) or in a focus-group discussion 
(which usually ran for a little over two hours). As you can see in the 
table provided on the next page, a small number took part in both an 
interview and a focus group session and some opted for two 
interviews or two focus groups.  
Plain language statements were given to participants in both English 
and Arabic.13 All interviewees completed a ‘Background Details of 
Participant Form’ (see Appendix G), which was used to document the 
participant’s contact information and to collect demographic details 
such as participant’s age and the suburb they lived in. These forms, 
along with consent forms, audio recordings on tapes and mini-discs 
were kept in lockers in the RMIT University postgraduate study 
space, according with ethics requirements. Unfortunately these 
lockers and all their contents were destroyed accidentally by the 
university in the course of a process of refurbishment. Fortunately I 
had managed to transcribe most of the interview recordings before 
the materials in the lockers were destroyed. Unfortunately other 
materials such as the forms detailing participant’s background 
                                                 
13
 I had both the plain language statement and the ‘Background Details of 
Participant Form’ translated into Arabic by a professional and accredited translator. 
This is because some participants were under the age of 18 and their parents 
(from whom I needed to get consent) needed the forms in Arabic.  
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information was destroyed before I could analyze this data. 
Regrettably I am therefore unable to provide detailed profiles of 
interviewees as I had planned to originally or analyze any differences 
between participants (for example, examine differences between 
participants who lived in certain suburbs or by age). 
In the focus groups and interviews I used a semi-structured interview 
format. According to Robyn Longhurst (2010, p. 103) semi-structured 
‘…interviews (sometimes referred to as informal, conversational or 
‘soft’ interviews) and focus groups (sometimes referred to as focus 
group interviews) are about talking to’ and listening to people. 
Although the interviewer may have some questions or some 
discussion topics in mind, semi-structured interviews and focus group 
interviews ‘unfold in a conversational manner offering participants the 
chance to explore issues they feel are important’ (Longhurst 2010, p. 
103). The interviewer has the freedom to phrase and rephrase 
questions as they see fit according to the themes the researcher 
wishes to explore as well as to follow up anything the interviewee has 
brought up (Fontana & Frey 2003).  
 
 
Table of Interview and Focus Group Participants 
  
Participant 
Pseudonym 
Female 
or 
Male Individual interview Focus group 
1 Mia Female  
1 one-to-one 
interview   
2 Ramsaya Female 
1 one-to-one 
interview 1 focus group 
3 Nuer Female 
2 separate one-to-
one interviews 
  
4 Coco  Female   
2 separate focus 
groups 
5 Mischa Female   
2 separate focus 
groups  
6 Emma Female   1 focus group 
7 Chanel Female   1 focus group 
8 Hana Female   1 focus group 
9 Sophia Female   1 focus group 
10 ZuZu Female   1 focus group 
11 Lisa Female   1 focus group 
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12 Sara Female 
1 one-to-one 
interview 1 focus group 
13 Rocky Male 
1 one-to-one 
interview 1 focus group 
14 Jack Black Male   
2 separate focus 
groups 
14 Anthony Male   
2  separate focus 
groups 
16 
Michael 
Jackson Male   1 focus group 
17 Bu Male   1 focus group 
18 John Male   1 focus group 
19 Kane Male   1 focus group 
20 Levi Male   1 focus group 
21 Alex Male   1 focus group 
22 Valentino Male 
1 one-to-one 
interview 1 focus group 
23 Aden Male   1 focus group 
24 Salim Male   1 focus group 
25 Egor Male   1 focus group 
26 Usher Male   1 focus group 
27 Ali Male   1 focus group 
28 Axle Male   1 focus group 
29 Muly Male   1 focus group 
30 Butch Male   1 focus group 
31 Budgie Male   1 focus group 
 
Before commencing the formal aspect of my research I did a ‘pilot 
study’, which involved testing my interview questions on a few of my 
friends who participated in a trial focus group discussion. They were 
also required to fill out the ‘Background Details of Participant’ form. 
Hala Abdelnour was one of the participants in my pilot study. She 
happened to be a young Australian of Lebanese-Christian 
background and a youth worker doing intensive work with young 
people from ASB and Muslim backgrounds. She, along with the other 
pilot group participants, provided useful feedback, which was used to 
refine interview questions and the ‘Background Details of Participant 
Form’.  
My semi-structured interviewing format entailed asking exploratory 
questions that were aimed at: eliciting stories about their experiences 
of racism; their sense of belonging to the wider community; their 
actions in response to incidences of racism; and their memories of 
those times when they felt like they were being treated or perceived 
as ‘Other’. The questions I used to guide the conversation altered 
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depending on ‘my audience’. For example, sometimes I began a 
focus group discussion by asking, “Has anyone experienced 
racism”? If the conversation didn’t start rolling I would re-phrase the 
question and put a slightly different slant on it by asking something 
like, ‘Have you ever felt that youse were being treated differently or 
unfairly cos you’re Muslim or cos you’re Lebo’? Follow-up questions 
were asked once my interviewees began talking.  
Interviews and focus groups discussions were transcribed. Some of 
those transcriptions I did myself while others were done by paid 
professionals. When quoting participants in this thesis I have 
removed identifying details and used pseudonyms to secure 
participants anonymity. Most of the pseudonyms were chosen by the 
interviewees themselves.   
From 2003 to 2009 I ‘immersed’ (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw 1995) 
myself in the life worlds of young Australians of Lebanese-Muslim 
backgrounds. This involved field observations while participating in a 
range of activities such as youth camps, forums, festivals and 
leadership programs. These activities were organised by agencies 
such as the Victorian Arabic Social Services (VASS), Islamic 
Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria (IWWCV) and Australian 
Lebanese Welfare (ALW). I did some volunteer work with ALW and 
IWWCV, and both volunteer and paid work for VASS, during the 
course of my PhD. Material for this study was also gleaned from 
YouTube videos created by young ASB and Muslim Australians, 
(which form the basis of my discussion in Chapter Five). 
My research findings, which came from my field notes, interviews 
and focus-group discussions and analysis of videos, were compared 
and analysed in relation to the research findings of comparable 
research (e.g. the findings from research focused on Australian 
Arabs’ and Muslims’ experiences after 9/11).   
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The interpretive process  
 
 
Those working with the hermeneutic-phenomenological perspective 
claim that all social interactions and actions, including social 
research, involve the practice of interpretation. This is reflected by 
the relatively stable and habitual qualities that define much of social 
life, which requires well established patterns of meaning and 
frameworks for both informing and interpreting social interactions. 
Sharkey (2001) claims that, ‘prior understandings’ are essential in the 
task of interpretation, as well as for developing new understandings.  
The task of interpretation is not one of jettisoning one’s prior 
understandings, it is rather one of discovering and testing them and 
rejecting and affirming them in dialogical play or interpretation. New 
understandings inevitably emerge during the conversation with the 
text … (Sharkey 2001, p. 29) 
Sharkey’s description of the interpretive process aligns well with the 
way I conducted my interviews and interpreted the experiences 
shared by interviewees. For example, during the interviews and 
focus-group discussions that I did as part of this study, I often shared 
my experiences and understandings with the young people I was 
interviewing. These young people would also explain to me how their 
experiences, and interpretations of those experiences, were similar 
and different to my own. In this way, following the insights I had 
gained from my hermeneutic-phenomenological readings, I began to 
grasp the ways my ‘prior understandings’ were being identified and 
tested, sometimes affirmed and sometimes rejected. Through the 
research process, and particularly through ‘dialogical interplay’ with 
the young people I was interviewing, new understandings emerged 
that I hope more closely aligned with interviewees’ experiences 
(Sharkey 2001, p. 29).   
A conversation with Nuer a young Lebanese Muslim woman, can be 
used to illustrate how ‘prior understandings’ were tested and how 
new understandings were able to emerge. My initial observations of 
Nuer suggested she had exhibited plenty of buoyancy and resilience 
in living her life in the post-9/11 context. I guessed that this was due 
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to her strong religious commitments. However, towards the end of 
the conversation, I learnt that while she considered her religion 
important, it was not her only source of inspiration and strength when 
faced with hostility. The following extract from the interview with Nuer 
reveals what happened: 
Kavindi: You seem like a really positive, happy person… Do you 
think your religious background… has something to do with…? 
Nuer: Mostly because of the religion and just reading a lot of books 
of motivation. Listening to the works of Tony Roberts, CDs… And 
having this sort of attitude of saying “why waste your energy on 
things you can’t change, where you can focus it on something you 
can change for the future”. So it’s focusing on the positive rather 
than the negative. Through motivational speeches and through the 
[service provider] organisation sort of helped me out as well… 
speaking to kids. Teaching them like sort of learning myself and 
applying it to my life as well. No point in telling them what to do if 
you don’t do it yourself. You got to sort of live that example.  Pretty 
much religion as well because religion tells you that it’s not worth 
sort of pondering around saying that’s bad times you’re not going to 
achieve anything. You got to sort of translate that into a positive 
thing and go from there. 
In effect Nuer was saying that some of her inspiration and strength 
came from the training and opportunities she had when she worked 
for a youth organisation. Her work for this organisation entailed 
speaking to other young people about her experiences. According to 
Nuer, listening to inspirational talks and motivational readings was 
important for developing a positive attitude. So too was the 
opportunity to give motivational speeches to other young people. 
This, she said, helped her deal with racism.  
As can be inferred from this conversation with Nuer, differences 
between the researcher and the interviewee need not necessarily be 
a problem. The assumptions I had made about Nuer, and why she 
seemed to be so resilient, were identified and tested and through our 
dialogue new insights and new understandings emerged.  
Those who work within the interpretivist tradition often see their work 
as committed to providing in-depth ethnographic accounts of 
people’s life-worlds. Clifford Geertz, an anthropologist and a leading 
exponent of the interpretivist tradition, aimed for example to offer 
what he calls ‘thick descriptions’ of people’s lives. He said that the 
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thick descriptions ‘are really our own constructions of other people’s 
constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to’ (Geertz 
1975, p. 9). Those thick descriptions are attempts to capture the 
meanings embedded in the actions and interactions that make up the 
life-worlds of ordinary people.  As Blumer (1968, p. 2) points out:  
The first premise is that human beings act towards things on the 
basis of the meanings that the things have for them… The second 
premise is that the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises 
out of, the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows. The 
third premise is that these meanings are handled in, and modified 
through, an interpretive process used by the person in dealing with 
the things he encounters.  
Added to these premises are several other linked presuppositions, 
which include the following principles: 
human group life consists of fitting to each others lines of action… 
such aligning of actions takes places predominately by the 
participants indicating to one another what to do and in turn 
interpreting such indications made by the others; out of such 
interaction people form objects that constitute their worlds; people 
are prepared to act towards those objects on the basis of the 
meanings these objects have for them; human beings face their 
world as organisms with selves, thus allowing each to make 
indications to himself; human action is constructed by the actor on 
the basis of what he notes, interprets, and assesses; and the 
interlinking of such ongoing action constitutes organisations, 
institutions, and vast complexes of interdependent relations. To test 
the validity of these premises one must go to a direct examination of 
actual human group life (Blumer 1968, p. 49).  
The observation that human beings act towards things on the basis 
of the meanings that the things have for them has particular 
relevance for understanding how people within particular social 
networks act towards others, especially those they see as very 
different to themselves.  
Among the advantages of the hermeneutic-phenomenological 
approach is its capacity to show how the relationship between the 
researcher and those being researched enters into the narration of 
experience, as well as the interpretive process involved in 
understanding and sharing experiences (Sharkey 2001).  This insight 
helped to resolve certain ethical and research dilemmas (as I discuss 
next) that I began grappling with in the early stages of the research 
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project. These dilemmas also opened up some major issues about 
the very nature of interpretation.  
 
 
Ethical and research dilemmas 
 
In effect the dilemmas I am referring to have to do with the 
quandaries of   interpretive research, and the question: what does 
someone who wants to understand someone else, need to know or 
to have experienced? I thought having had experiences of racism, 
and being a visible Other myself, would help to develop and establish 
connections or bonds with the young people I was interviewing, 
which is important for qualitative research. I was concerned however, 
that drawing on my own experiences and ‘prior understandings’ 
might constrain my ability to make sense of my interviewees’ 
experiences from their point of view. This problem, as I discovered 
later, has been recognised in the development of the hermeneutic 
tradition.  
Gadamer (2004), who helped to develop the hermeneutic tradition, 
argued that there was no way to achieve a perfect circle of 
understanding. He said that any act of understanding was always 
going to be situated in a particular historical time and place, and that 
whatever it was that was being understood was itself also situated in 
time and place. In effect, whether the people you are making sense 
of lived in Athens in the sixth century (BCE) or in Broadmeadows in 
2009, people have a historically shaped consciousness and are 
accordingly embedded in the particular history and culture that 
shaped them. This, however, is true of the erstwhile interpreter too. 
In effect, any interpretation involves a fusion of frameworks of 
meaning, where the person doing the interpreting seeks some kind of 
fusion with whatever they are trying to make sense of or understand. 
There is, however, no objective or neutral point of view that will 
enable us to form a view about the success, or otherwise, of our 
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attempt to understand. This may be why Hurd and McIntyre (1998), 
for example, have suggested that when the researcher identifies 
excessively with the interviewee’s experiences this may become a 
problem. Hurd and McIntyre (1998, p. 78) define this potential 
research dilemma as the ‘seduction of sameness’. They say the 
problem begins when the researcher identifies too closely with the 
people whose experience s/he is trying to make sense of and this 
can result in the misinterpretation of their experiences. The risk is 
that it can hinder the researcher’s ability to be ‘critically reflexive’. I 
found some useful ways of thinking about this ‘problem’ in the 
hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition.  
If I use these ideas to reflect on my research I can say that I did have 
a number of ‘prior-understandings’ of the kinds of prejudiced, even 
hostile, encounters the young Lebanese Muslims I was speaking with 
were likely to have had. My prior understandings or imaginings were 
not only based on media representations (and other sources), but 
also informed by my own personal experiences of racism and some 
of the contradictions involved in my wanting to ‘belong’. However, I 
realised from the very outset of this research that, whatever 
similarities I might have with my interviewees, I also needed to be 
mindful that there were some important differences. This includes the 
fact that while I could be considered ‘Oriental’ and Other, I am 
perhaps a less problematic ‘Other’ in the eyes of some Australians, 
especially when compared to young Lebanese Muslims, who, as 
Poynting (2006a, p. 32) says, have come to be constructed as ‘the 
pre-eminent folk devil of contemporary Australian society’. As an 
Australian with a Sri Lankan background, who is not a Muslim, and is 
a PhD student, I enjoy a different status. I may be perceived to have 
accumulated more ‘national capital’ (Hage 2000, pp. 193-196) than 
my interviewees, and this can influence how I am seen within the 
wider community as well as how I would be seen by the young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims I was interviewing. In short, because of 
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my status as a member of a less-vilified minority group, my gender14, 
my status as university researcher, and my age and the social 
context in which I grew up, I needed to be mindful of not making 
unwarranted assumptions. (I can also report that some of my own 
frameworks of interpretation were challenged in the course of my 
conversations with the young people that I interviewed and worked 
with.)  
These reflections can be related to my readings on the ‘politics of 
representation’. As Norman Denzin (2004, p. 85), who has been a 
key figure in the development of research methods for many 
decades, has reminded us: 
The politics of representation is basic to the study of experience. 
How a thing is represented involves a struggle over power and 
meaning. While social scientists have traditionally privileged 
experience itself, it is now understood that no life, no experience 
can be lived outside of some system of representation. 
Indeed, there is a powerful symmetry between my observations in 
chapter one about the way the media or politicians have set about 
representing young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims and my attempts 
to represent them. It matters greatly how people are represented. 
This is why researchers have to be careful when they construct 
interpretations about other people and their life-worlds. This is 
particularly so for those who have already been dealt with 
prejudicially and been subject to misrepresentation. As Said (1981, 
2003) has pointed out, the life-worlds of Arabs and Muslims have 
consistently been (mis)represented by those who have the power to 
create meaning via their representations of Others, and this includes 
intellectuals and researchers.   
Indeed, concern about being mis-represented was one reason why 
some of the young people I approached for interviews were initially 
                                                 
14
 I mention gender because the public perception of the ‘Lebanese-Muslim Problem,’ and 
the ‘problem of ethnic youth’ more generally in Australia, is a gendered one (Collins 2002, 
pp. 12-13; Sercombe 1999; White 2007b). That is, the problematisation of young people 
(including young Lebanese-Muslims) is focused mainly on young men rather than women 
(Kelly 2000b; Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2003). Young Lebanese-Muslims, and many other 
groups of young men from minority backgrounds, are perceived as backward, brutal and 
misogynistic (Collins et al. 2004, p. 151). Such stereotyping positions me, as a woman, as a 
less problematic ‘Other’. 
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wary about having anything to do with my study. They said they were 
all too familiar with being exploited, with having their stories turned 
around and used as ammunition for other people’s agendas.  
I was challenged by having to deal with questions like the following. 
Even if I have had similar experiences to my interviewees in being 
treated as Other, and even if I had at times questioned my own 
sense of belonging to ‘the Australian community’, would I really be 
able to understand the experiences of Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims? This question needed to be addressed given that they 
were worried that I would misrepresent their experiences. What this 
boiled down to was a concern that my research might further 
exacerbate their marginalisation.  
To paraphrase one young Muslim, even well-meaning researchers, 
journalists and youth experts can, in their attempt to try to help, end 
up doing the opposite. He said he was sick and tired of being asked 
to attend the endless programs, interviews and forums that were 
focused on young Muslims and/or Arabs. It merely reminded him that 
people like him were being seen as ‘problems’. Some of the other 
young people I spoke with said they did not want to be given ‘special 
treatment’ or ‘targeted’ for enrolment in Muslim or ASB-specific 
programs and services designed to address ‘the problem’ of ‘their 
marginalisation15’. They also reported that such ‘special treatment’ 
often evoked jealousy and resentment from other Australians. They 
described the hostile responses they got from others when Muslims 
and Arabs were seen to be receiving special treatment. This, they 
explained, exacerbated tensions between themselves and other 
groups within the broader community. Thus research like my own 
was seen as dangerous and as having the potential to cause further 
divisiveness, and to make worse their experiences of being treated 
as ‘Other’. I certainly appreciated these concerns, and especially the 
point that however well-intended my research was, it could be picked 
                                                 
15
 E.g. leadership programs aimed specifically at enabling young Muslims to have 
a stronger voice in the wider community. 
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up by others and fitted to agendas that would not serve the interests 
of the Australian-Lebanese-Muslim community.   
Those early obstacles were, however, overcome by taking certain 
steps, such as by working intensively as a volunteer on community-
building activities to develop a rapport with a number of Australian-
Muslim and ASB communities in Melbourne. Through my efforts I 
gained the support of the Victorian Arabic Social Services (VASS). 
This not-for-profit organisation helped to establish my credibility and 
reputation as someone who could be trusted to provide a fair account 
of Australian-Lebanese-Muslim’s experiences. Workers at VASS 
introduced me to many young people and once they got to know me 
and my commitment to their communities (demonstrated by my 
volunteer work on projects with the community), they not only were 
willing to participate in the research themselves, but also helped 
recruit other young people for interviews16. In short, my partnership 
with VASS allowed me access to communities that I would not 
otherwise have been able to ‘get into’. That initial right of entry was 
critical for making first contact and relationship-building of the kind 
that allowed me to gain an insider’s accounts that is needed for 
interpretive research. That preliminary work included developing an 
understanding of Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ cultures by 
immersing myself in the daily life of the communities. This allowed 
me to appreciate more fully what meaning they gave to ‘belonging’ 
and their experiences of racism, which was the main goal of my 
research. 
It can also be noted that, while being an ‘outsider’ in the Australian-
Lebanese-Muslim community had its limitations; it also had its 
benefits. For example, some of my interviewees said they were 
relieved to know that someone outside their community cared about 
                                                 
16
 I also did volunteer work with several other organisations including Australian 
Lebanese Welfare (ALW) and Islamic Women’s Welfare Council of Victoria 
(IWWCV). Whilst I was not able to recruit interview participants through 
organisations other than VASS, my volunteer work with organisations such as 
ALW and IWWCV provided valuable ethnographic insight for my field notes. 
 
Page 75  
the issues they were facing and had taken an interest in them. Most 
of the young people also seemed to enjoy participating in the 
interviews. They saw it variously as an opportunity to vent their 
frustrations and/or as an opportunity to educate others about what it 
was like to be a young second-generation Australian-Lebanese-
Muslim growing up in Melbourne. In short, while there were some 
things interviewees were not prepared to share with me because of 
my ‘outsider’ status, there were also things they did share with me 
because I was an ‘outsider’. It is likely that some would not have 
shared certain information if I had come from within their community. 
It was suggested by some of my interviewees that my position as an 
outsider meant that they did not have to worry about my gossiping 
about their personal lives with others in the tight-knit Australian-
Lebanese-Muslim communities in Melbourne.  
The hermeneutic circle has been helpful in resolving certain ethical 
and research dilemmas discussed thus far, because it requires 
openness to (instead of imposing, inserting, or conceptualizing) the 
truth (Youngquist 2002).  
The hermeneutic circle is based in the interpretivist tradition which 
refutes essentialism – the notion that there is an underlying objective 
truth to be found in social phenomenon such as young peoples’ 
dealings with racism. As such, use of the hermeneutic circle has 
helped to militate against any temptation to develop mass 
generalisations about the young people who are the focus of this 
study – which as discussed in Chapter One can result in harms such 
as the negative stereotyping of Australian Lebanese-Muslims. It 
works as a buffer against essentialism because the hermeneutic 
circle is geared towards learning from people’s experiences, 
reflecting upon and testing assumptions and common stereotypes 
about ‘these young people’. It requires the development of mutual 
understanding through conversation. The risk of harm (that can come 
from when ‘experts’ such as researchers try to develop particular 
‘truths’ about a group of people they research) is reduced because 
this analytical framework requires an admission upfront that the 
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interpretations provided in this thesis are ‘unfinished, provisional and 
incomplete’ (Denzin 1989, p. 83). As articulated by Denzin (1989, p. 
158) those who employ the hermeneutic circle embrace the point 
that: 
… all interpreters are caught in the circle of interpretation. It is 
impossible to be free of interpretation or to conduct “purely” 
objective studies.  
In the spirit of this approach, I unabashedly acknowledge that 
someone else looking at the same ‘data’ being analysed in this 
thesis, can provide different interpretations to those which I have 
provided. Given that the hermeneutic circle allows for a multiplicity of 
interpretations in relation to any given ‘text’, the reader will see that 
throughout this thesis I have a drawn on a range of theories to make 
sense of the material I have gathered. The limitation of taking this 
approach to my analysis and interpretation of ‘data’ is that it may 
appear to some as ad-hoc and messy, which could have been 
avoided had I opted to use a single theory from which to 
explain/interpret my findings. The strength however is that the reader 
will see the possibility of interpreting social phenomenon in many 
ways. Furthermore, the use of a variety of theories will provide new 
and fresh insights that would otherwise not have bee possible had I 
constrained my enquiry to just one particular theory.  
Next, I provide a more explicit account of how the hermeneutic circle 
has been applied.  
 
 
Closing the hermeneutic circle?   
 
As I have indicated, I had decided to make sense of the transcribed 
interviews, my field notes, and my analysis of YouTube videos, by 
drawing on what has been referred to as a ‘hermeneutic circle’.  
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As Marlene Cohen, David Kahn and Richard Steeves (2000, pp. 73-
74) indicate the ‘hermeneutic circle’ refers to an approach  to 
interpreting data in which the smallest statements must be 
understood in terms of the larger cultural contexts. I developed this 
interpretive process by first reading both my field notes, and each of 
my interview and focus group transcripts, several times. I did this to 
establish both a holistic understanding of interviewees’ experiences, 
as well as to identify some of the themes emerging in relation to the 
first three of my four research questions. To re-cap, these questions 
are:  
• how do young Australians of Lebanese-Muslim background 
experience and make sense of their interactions with other 
Australians;  
• how have they dealt with the challenging and hostile interactions 
that have followed events such as 9/11; and  
• what sense of belonging do these young people have in relation 
to the broader Australian society?  
Finally, I re-read all the transcripts and field notes to identify any 
similarities and differences amongst the participants in relation to 
each of these research questions.  
Analysis of research materials using the hermeneutic circle also 
required that I incorporate an understanding of the socio-political and 
cultural contexts that the participants and I were both immersed in. I 
also needed to critically self-reflect on my own prior understandings 
that interplay in the interpretation of interviewees’ narratives 
(Debesay, Nåden & Slettebø 2008).   
I can illustrate how the ‘hermeneutic circle’ was applied in interpreting 
research materials by referring to the following extract from a focus 
group discussion. As you will note below, Coco (a young female 
interviewee) had questioned why the media identifies or makes the 
cultural and religious backgrounds of only certain groups of people a 
significant matter when reporting the news: 
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... why is that whenever something happens, and it happens to be a 
Muslim youth, why is that [the media have to announce that] they 
are Muslim youths [who committed the crime]? Do you know what I 
mean?  Like those five white boys that raped that girl, that disabled 
girl, why didn’t they say [those boys who raped that girl was] 
Catholic Christian Jew, Buddhist, Hindu whatever... yes that 
Lebanese guy he did rape a girl in Sydney but why does it have to 
be [announced by the media] that he’s Lebanese-Muslim. They over 
exaggerate everything.  Like that guy that shot those people in 
Tasmania. What’s his name? Why didn’t they say he was brought 
up as a Christian and went to church every Sunday, why wasn't his 
Christianity [brought up as an issue]?   
So how can the above narrative be analysed using the hermeneutic 
circle? As mentioned previously, it requires that the smallest 
statements (such as the above) be understood in relation to the 
larger context. The larger context helps to give meaning to what is 
said by participants such as CoCo. I acknowledged also, that my 
reading of Coco’s statement is coloured by my own prior 
understandings and prejudices, and as such, it is only one of many 
possible interpretations.  
In the first step of analysis, I can see that this statement, when 
compared to other parts of Coco’s interviews transcript, is consistent 
with the other experiences she has shared, all of which point to 
CoCo’s frustration with Muslims being misrepresented and 
stereotyped, especially by the mass media. This common theme, of 
frustration with stereotyping and misrepresentation, that was picked 
up on when comparing the earlier statement made by CoCo with 
other parts of CoCo’s narrative, is illustrated with the next extract.  
My sister is a nurse and she was telling one of the other nurses 
about our family. She told them I’m a nurse, my younger sister is a 
social worker, another one is a teacher, another is becoming a 
lawyer and she was explaining and [this nurse she was talking to] 
just started to cry she couldn’t believe it, she’s like “how do your 
parents let you go to uni”. She was so shocked. 
They assume that you’re oppressed and you’re not allowed to.  
They don’t see it is so different than when you live in Saudi Arabia. 
Having identified a common theme (namely, frustration with the 
stereotyping of Muslims), I note the various statements she made 
about this in her focus group sessions. I then did a close reading of 
other interviews and research materials (e.g. field notes). 
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In this way I was able to establish that the frustrations expressed by 
Coco, about being stereotyped and misrepresented, were not 
exclusive to her. Indeed most, if not all my interviewees shared 
similar frustrations. This is illustrated in the following extract from a 
focus group discussion in which two female participants, who have 
called themselves ZuZu and Ramsaya, talk about popular 
representations and assumptions made about Lebanese-Muslims. 
ZuZu: I’ve never heard Catholic-Greek rapes a girl or Catholic Italian 
or anything.  
Ramsaya: The media is what everyone listens to and although they 
know it’s full of crap they believe it because it’s always in their face. 
ZuZu: Some people don’t come into contact with Lebanese-Muslims 
so the only thing they know about them is what they hear on the 
media or reading the newspaper and stuff and that’s the only view 
they can take. 
Ramsaya: I walked into a shop once and a lady asked me out of the 
blue “where do you come from?” I felt like an idiot and I said to her 
“Coburg.” [Laughter]. And she looked at me and said no which 
country? And I said I’m Australian. And she said no...  what are 
you? And I said I’m Australian and my background is Lebanese. 
And she said “oh okay, I just finished reading a book about um a 
book called Sold, have you read it?” And I said to her “no”. [And this 
lady says] “Oh it’s about a girl that get’s sold to Yemen” 
           Zu Zu: Yemen. 
Ramsaya: Which is a Muslim country. And she’s like “they treated 
her really horrible”. And she just told me this story and assumed that 
was what was going to happen to me. You could tell that’s what she 
was thinking and she wanted me ... 
Zu Zu: Maybe she wanted you to say, “yeah me too!” [laughter] 
In this way, I was able to recognise shared frustrations about how 
Muslims are represented. Furthermore, all of the interviewees 
identified the media (including popular books such as ‘Sold’ that were 
about Muslim women being oppressed) contributed to these negative 
stereotypes.  
The hermeneutic circle can be made more complete if interviewee’s 
statements are considered in the wider socio-political context.  As I 
argued in Chapter One, this is a context in which interviewees had 
media reports about ‘Lebanese-Muslim gang rapes’ fresh in their 
minds, and where there had been a proliferation of books, TV shows, 
and public commentary about the ‘problems’ posed by Arab and 
Muslims. In this respect when ZuZu said, ‘I’ve never heard Catholic-
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Greek rapes a girl or Catholic Italian or anything,’ can only be said to 
make sense if we remember that Zu Zu is referring to what had been 
recent media coverage of the gang rapes in Sydney, in which the 
Lebanese-Muslim backgrounds of the rapists were the foci of 
considerable public attention. 
Use of the hermeneutic circle also requires that the interpreter’s prior 
assumptions are tested.  This was done wherever possible, and is 
illustrated with the following exchange between myself and a focus 
group participant:  
Kavindi: Is that the biggest?... One of the biggest problems for 
young people: the media? 
Zu zu: Yeah. 
Prior assumptions could not always be so explicitly tested with 
participants. Sometimes because my own assumptions were not 
brought to light until after the interview session drew to a close and I 
had a chance to reflect on the conversations between myself and the 
young people. Perhaps too there are other assumptions left un-
recognised, and this may be left to the readers and critics to point 
out. The hermeneutic circle however, with its emphasis on reading 
‘texts’ in context, has been particularly helpful in helping me identify 
my prior assumptions, and then using that to develop fresh insights 
into what interviewees shared with me. This was exemplified in the 
course of a focus group discussion when Salim, one of the young 
men in the group, who expressed his frustration with a question I had 
put to the group: ‘Why is it good to be a young Lebanese-Muslim’? 
He responded by saying: 
It’s not really a question. Cos there is nothing really good about that. 
It’s only good for us. We are happy that we are young Lebanese-
Muslims. It’s maybe cos we believe in different beliefs. And it’s like 
why is it good to be a young white Aussie? Does that question get 
asked? I don’t think it does.  
Using the idea of a hermeneutic circle proved helpful here because it 
encouraged me to think further about Salim’s frustration with my 
question. To do this I needed to put the question into the larger 
socio-political context. That context is one in which Australian-
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Lebanese-Muslims have been constructed as the ‘Other’, and where 
there is much debate about the kinds of people who ‘deserve’ to be 
‘Australian’ (Hage 2003, p. 44). The debate is often based on 
assumptions and notions that some groups of people somehow have 
more legitimacy and a greater claim to be here and to call 
themselves ‘Australian’ than others (Fisher & Sonn 2007, p. 29).  
Salim’s critique may be best understood by appreciating the context 
in which he lives, where too often it is automatically assumed that 
being a ‘white Aussie’ is the best kind of Australian to be. In that 
context, being a young male Lebanese-Muslim is very low on the 
ranking list. Salim is sensitive to this aspect of social context. Salim 
was clearly upset about what he saw as having to justify why it was 
good to be a young Lebanese-Muslim. As he said, it is not likely that 
such a question would be asked of a white ‘Aussie’. In his retort to 
my questions, Salim indicated awareness that Whiteness is an 
invisible privilege in the national field, and as such it is only non-
White Others (like himself) who are scrutinised (i.e. on what is good 
about being Lebanese-Muslim?). This reading also highlights why 
Salim may be concerned about ‘falling into the trap’ of having his 
culture or religion put under the microscope and assessed in terms of 
its worth. His critical response has relevance to the ‘discourse of 
value’ that Heidegger (1978) refers to. 
It is important to finally realise that precisely through the 
characterisation of something as ‘a value’ what is so valued is 
robbed of its worth. That is to say by the assessment of something 
as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object of man’s 
estimation. Every valuing, even when it values positively, is 
subjectivising. It does not let things: be. Rather, valuing lets things: 
be valid (Heidegger 1978, cited in Hage 2000, p. 121).  
In other words Salim is protesting against having to justify why his 
faith and cultural background is ‘valuable’. He understands that if he 
answers my question by saying ‘what is good about being a young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslim’ then he is implicitly accepting 
discourses that position Australian-Lebanese-Muslims in relation to 
‘White’ Australians. That is, he would be accepting a discourse that 
assigns to some migrant cultures a different value or status to that 
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enjoyed, for example, by Anglo-Australians. The presumed 
superiority of being an Anglo-Australian is represented in such a way 
as to imply that other minority cultures only exist in a subordinate 
way to serve the latter, rather as a pinch of pepper is used to spice a 
stew or soup: they fulfil a function as an ‘enriching’ culture (Hage 
2000, p. 121). 
As illustrated thus far with, the hermeneutic circle is one approach 
used to analyse research materials. ‘Symbolic interactionism’ (which 
is also part of the Interpretivist tradition) is another framework for 
making sense of the ‘research data’.  
 
 
Interpreting interviewee’s narratives using Symbolic-
Interactionism   
 
The observation frequently made by generations of ‘symbolic 
interactionists’ and summed up by Blumer (1968, p.2) is that ‘human 
beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings that the 
things have for them.’ This has particular relevance for making sense 
of what Aden, another young man in the same focus group as Salim 
(who I spoke about earlier), had to say.  
Aden was happy to respond to the same question I had put to Salim, 
and to do so differently. Unlike Salim, Aden relished the opportunity 
to speak about and promote the positive value of being ‘Lebanese’ 
and being part of ‘Muslim culture’. Indeed Aden took up the invitation 
to identify what is good about being a young Lebanese-Muslim man 
with gusto:  
How about we talk about cultural things? Like big festivals, big 
gatherings, weddings… Say his dad [pointing to another focus 
group participant] comes from Lebanon, right? I’m not joking to you. 
There’ll probably be food from start of that door to the other side of 
the house … Man … people are very generous. They’ll spray you 
with hundreds of dollars… some Arabs are very uptight about their 
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money right? But why they are tight? Because if it’s going 
somewhere that it’s not meant to be going that’s a waste of money. 
A Jew would say. Apparently. I dunno. I’ve seen it on TV or 
something. A Jew would save five cents a day and apparently he 
gets some hundred dollars at the end of the year. Right, he saves a 
dollar a day, right? He gets this much at the end of the year. But we 
are not. We are not. We are very generous.  
Everything. Eid festivals. It costs a fortune. I dunno, if you’ve ever 
been or not. It costs a fortune. The fireworks alone costs around 
fifteen grand to do. It lasts 15 minutes. That’s fifteen grand gone. 
Like that … It all comes down to respect … I’m enjoying [talking 
about] this … Respect is like the most important thing …You barely 
ever hear a Lebanese, a Muslim, or an Egyptian say “my parents, I 
fucking hate’em” or you know …  “I hate my mum, she’s a fucking 
dumb/bitch slut” blah, blah. You never hear that.  Like if he [pointing 
to another focus group participant] says, “My mum’s being a dumb 
bitch”, I’ll turn around and slap him for it. I’ll go, “why the fuck are 
you saying that about your mum”? You know what I mean? We care 
about our families so much. And then Aussies they got one brother 
or one sister and they hate them. They can’t stand’em.  
Let me tell you one thing. I was working with this guy, right? And 
this Aussie guy come up to me and he goes, “man are you like 
interested in girls and that”? “What the fuck’s wrong with you? You 
think I’m interested in donkeys?  Fucking hell, I’m interested in girls. 
You know? And he goes “yeah then you ought to see my sister, 
man”. And I go, “why”? And he goes, “man my sister is so hot man 
you want her number, man? You want her number”? I go, “You 
know what? You’re a fucking wanker”! You know, if anyone does 
touch my sister I would shoot him. I would chop his dick off and go 
bury him somewhere. Right? And he’s telling me “come do my 
sister”. His sister, man! He goes, come do her. This kid’s fucked. I’m 
not lying to you.  
Aden’s response can, for example, be read as it were, ‘literally’, as 
he makes comparisons and refers to an ethic of care expressed by 
‘his people’ towards family – something he claimed is missing from 
the ‘white Aussie’ culture. The same comparative opposition 
positions can be seen in terms of his claims about ethical 
considerations such as generosity, celebrations, family and the ethos 
of respect. More generally we can treat his defence of Lebanese 
ways as part of a representation that both validates and positions his 
culture as superior to what he has described as ‘white Aussie’ 
culture. He was clearly quite critical of ‘white Aussie’ culture and was 
also disposed to talk disparagingly about ‘Jews’. I read his response 
as being sensitive to a context in which he understood that Lebanese 
and Muslim Australians were being undervalued by people and 
institutions claiming to represent ‘mainstream’ Australia.  
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Blumer’s (1968) claim that ‘the meaning of… things is derived from, 
or arises out of the social interaction that one has with one’s fellows’ 
is also useful for understanding or making sense of the research 
process. Aden, like all my interviewees, was well able to identify and 
read certain signs or symbols as they are attached to people and this 
would have been going on in my interactions with them. As symbolic 
interactionists argue, meanings are handled and modified through an 
interpretive process used by the person in dealing with the things that 
he or she encounters (Blumer 1968). Aden would, for example, have 
understood my non-Anglo name, taken note of my dark skin, and 
registered my accent as not typically ‘Aussie’. In this way I suspected 
that my interviewees may have assumed that I would understand and 
sympathise with them about life as a member of a minority group in 
the context of a dominant Anglo ‘culture’. Even though I am neither 
Muslim nor Lebanese I was in some sense ‘one of them’ simply by 
virtue of my not being a ‘white Aussie’. It became apparent in Aden’s 
response to my interview question that he had interpreted symbols 
such as my ‘minority status’ appearance to mean that I was likely to 
share his imaginings about ‘White Australians’ and their families. 
Thus, he acted towards me (e.g. he told me that ‘the Lebanese-
Muslims’ are more ‘respectful’ to their family members than ‘White 
Australians’ are) on the presumed basis that I would share the same 
perspective because of our similar positions as ‘Others’ in relation to 
‘White Australians’. Therefore, I believe that interviewees such as 
Aden were more comfortable than they might otherwise have been. I 
am sure Aden assumed that I would share his perspectives on ‘White 
Australians’ and their lack of ‘respect’ for family members because, in 
his social interactions with other ‘non-White Australians’, he has 
found that that ‘non-White’ Australians generally agreed with his 
perspective.  
Symbolic interactionism is also useful for understanding how words 
like ‘Muslim’ are loaded with all sorts of significance and associated 
with being variously ‘anti-Western’, ‘dangerous’ or a ‘terrorist’. 
Likewise, objects like the hijab have come to signify being ‘Muslim’, 
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and in turn represent all the meanings associated with Muslims. In 
this way the ‘objects’ or words themselves have a powerful symbolic 
status with emotions such as fear and hatred attached to these 
(Cohen 2002, p. 27). As Cohen has noted more generally, terms like 
‘Muslim’ are lifted out of their context and torn from any previously 
neutral or culturally informed appreciation, and through that process 
acquire wholly negative meanings such as ‘potential terrorist’ (Cohen 
2002, pp. 27-28). In other words, ‘symbols and labels eventually 
acquire their own descriptive and explanatory potential’ (Cohen 2002, 
p. 28). Young Australian-Lebanese-Muslim women like my 
interviewee Ramsaya, who wears the hijab, can easily become the 
target of prejudicial treatment because of how her headscarf is 
understood by some in the wider community. She described the 
encounters she had on more than one occasion, while walking on the 
streets of Melbourne: ‘I have been sworn at, I’ve been spat at, I’ve 
been looked at, run from’. Ramsaya described how on one occasion 
she was wearing her hijab and was verbally abused by a stranger 
while driving her car.  
…. The guy could have possibly been stoned, I don’t know, but he 
was holding alcohol, I was in the car and he just started abusing 
me, “you eff’n terrorist, you go back to your own country”, stuff like 
that and my sisters aren’t covered and they didn’t realise how much 
we [Muslims who do wear the hijab] do get abused. At that point my 
sister said to me, “It is so wrong, I didn’t even realise how much you 
get abused”.  
Rocky tells a similar story. His cousin was ‘picked on’ for ‘looking 
Muslim’. Rocky went with a group of his friends and cousins to a 
football match between Carlton and Essendon. One of his cousins, 
who sported a beard, was ‘teased’ by some ‘Essendon fans’ because 
of what the beard represented to them (i.e. ‘Islamic terrorist’).  
We were at the footy the other day. A bunch of about fifteen/sixteen 
of us and we all go for Carlton … one of my cousins has a beard, 
it’s not full but it’s about two/three centimetres long.  It’s a short 
beard.  And as we were getting into an argument between 
Carlton/Essendon, instead of keeping it just Carlton/Essendon, they 
[the Essendon fans] start saying go back to your country, Osama, 
they start screaming out names like that and then when security 
come they tell us [instead of the Essendon fans] to calm down.  So 
that’s another part of racism.  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I discussed how I arrived at the conclusion that a 
hermeneutic-phenomenological approach was best, given my 
research intentions. Some of the valuable aspects of this approach, 
as well as some of the ways it helped to address certain problems 
that I encountered during the early stages of my research were 
outlined. I also explained how I went about collecting the material 
needed to answer my research questions, and how ideas, stemming 
from the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition such as the 
hermeneutic circle and symbolic interactionism, were used to analyse 
empirical material.  
While there are some research gaps left by the data collection 
methods I have adopted, the benefits of my chosen route outweighed 
its limitations. In the end, as I indicate later in this thesis, the 
research approach I adopted did enable me to generate valuable 
insights into the experiences of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. 
Undoubtedly further research will be needed to address some of the 
gaps in my research. One area for further research is to establish if 
young Australian-Lebanese-Christians living in the eastern suburbs 
of Melbourne have had similar experiences to those shared by my 
interviewees, following events such as the terrorist attacks in the 
United States in September 2001, and the Sydney gang rapes. It 
would also be interesting to find out if there might be any differences 
in research findings if a similar study were to be conducted by 
someone who is already embedded in the community and is easily 
identifiable as part of the community (i.e. identifies themselves and is 
identified by others as Australian-Lebanese-Muslim). Perhaps also a 
researcher who is more of ‘an insider’ could secure interviews with 
those young people who are not in any way connected to service 
providers such as VASS, and those life-worlds that I otherwise did 
not have access to.  
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Granting that the ‘proof of the pudding is in the eating’ I turn to the 
first item on the menu namely establishing how young second-
generation Australian-Lebanese-Muslims experience and make 
sense of their interactions with ‘other Australians’.  
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Chapter Three: Experiencing Racism and 
Belonging 
 
Now, of course we have to differentiate between Lebanese 
Christians, who are just as indignant as are other Australians about 
the behaviour of Lebanese Muslims, many of whom are Australians, 
but they call themselves ‘Lebanese Muslims’. 
Alan Jones on The Alan Jones Show, Radio 2GB (in For Being Lebanese  
2002)  
 
In his study of the social processes of making distinctions between 
kinds of people, Eviatar Zerubavel (1991, p. 61) remarked that reality 
is not made out of ‘insular chunks unambiguously separated from 
one another by sharp divides but rather of blurred vague essences 
…’  He adds that segmenting reality into ‘discrete islands of meaning 
usually rests on some social conventions and most boundaries are 
therefore mere social artefacts’. He points to the role of ‘mental 
scalpels’ in the creation of categories like ‘sexuality’, ‘gender’, 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’, and how these ‘mental scalpels’ create 
categories that not only vary enormously across time and space but 
can also be deeply contested within one community. That categories 
like ‘gay’/‘straight’ or ‘white’/‘coloured’ are ‘mere social artefacts’ is an 
idea central to the hermeneutic-phenomenological tradition. That 
these distinctions are also both deeply felt and authentically 
experiential aspects of daily life is also the case as so many young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims can testify as they talk about and 
interpret their interactions with other Australians, and their sense of 
belonging to the broader Australian society.  
The purpose of this chapter is to document and describe some of the 
ways young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims I spoke with make sense 
of their interactions with other Australians. This chapter will also 
provide some interpretations of how interviewees understand their 
sense of ‘belonging’ to the broader ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 
1991) that is, Australia. As I will show here, drawing in part on the 
theoretical traditions laid down by key figures like Schutz (1967, 
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1970) and Blumer (1968) in the hermeneutic-phenomenological 
tradition, like all of us the young people I spoke with draw on a range 
of categorical classifications that are then put to interpretative work in 
a various settings and interactions.   
What those classification schemas are and how they are used in their 
daily lives is arguably a consequence of social encounters occurring 
regularly in the social relationships and interactions that make up the 
life-worlds of these young people. These life-worlds are very 
complex, as are the components of these interpretative schemas. As 
Blumer (1968, p. 2) argued, how people both understand and engage 
with other people is a process that is continuously being informed by 
a range of wider social narratives. In the case of the young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims I interviewed, both their understanding 
and engagement with other Australians is informed by narratives 
such as that being circulated in the mass media about ‘citizenship’, 
‘belonging’, ‘national identity’ and ‘tolerance’. These narratives 
enable social actors to make sense of daily events, either of a face-
to-face kind (such as in their interactions with teachers or school 
peers) or as they read or watch the news on TV.  As Lal (1995, p. 
423) argues, these interpretative schemas, and the use they are put 
to on a daily basis, are constituted interpretatively and are constantly 
emerging out of the actor’s values and beliefs, which in turn have 
been shaped by their family life, their interactions with their own 
community, and by their education. It is important to stress that these 
interpretative schemas are not just cognitive in character. As Katz 
argues, our ‘moral emotions’, like pride in belonging to a certain 
community, or righteous anger in the face of insults, also play their 
part continuously in everyday situations people confront (Katz 1988, 
p. 423; Lal 1995).  
In the first section of this chapter, I analyse some of the young 
people’s direct experiences of racism – that is, personal experiences 
of various expressions of prejudiced and racist behaviour, which they 
perceived as negative, demeaning and/or as signs of disrespect. I 
then move on to a description and analysis of media
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experiences of racism. In doing this I want to focus on the way these 
young people interpreted their experiences. In the second half of the 
chapter, I examine what I describe as the more ‘positive experiences’ 
young people had in interacting with ‘other’ Australians, which helped 
my interviewees foster a wider sense of community belonging. 
Attention is given to making sense of interviewees’ understandings of 
‘positive’ interactions, namely those interactions and incidents that 
left them feeling appreciated, valued and feeling connected and 
understood by ‘other’ Australians. I start with the face-to-face 
experiences of racism. 
 
 
Face-to-face experiences of racism 
 
Philomena Essed’s (1991) account of ‘everyday racism’ which I 
discussed in chapter one, reflects much of the experiences narrated 
by a number of the young people I interviewed. To re-cap, Essed’s 
(1991, pp. 2-3) concept of ‘everyday racism’: 
… connects the structural forces of racism with routine everyday 
life. It links ideological dimensions of racism with daily attitudes and 
interprets the reproduction of racism in terms of the experience of it 
in everyday life…not all racism is everyday racism… the later 
involves only systematic, recurrent familiar practices…  
‘Everyday racism’ includes the racist practices that can be 
experienced in often deeply personal encounters, when for example 
a person tells you to your face that you do not ‘deserve’ to be in 
Australia because you appear to be a Muslim or an Arab. It can also 
be experienced vicariously in the sense that someone hears about 
this kind of interaction as reported by friends or members or one’s 
family, or in more abstract ways via, for instance, the media (Essed 
1991).  
The following extract from one of my focus groups offers some 
insight into how face-to-face encounters of racism were experienced. 
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This kind of interaction, as in this case between a group of 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslim boys and their teachers, was described 
as a recurrent and familiar practice of ‘Lebos’, and ‘wogs’ more 
generally, being ‘unfairly picked on’.  
Ali: Like teachers and stuff they pick on you … 
Axle: … Cause you’re the Lebo. 
Ali: Like out of everyone in the whole class they just pick on. Mostly, 
like the Lebos and they pick on… 
Salim: They only people who get in trouble is the Lebos. 
Budgie: The wogs. 
Usher: … and the Palestinians. 
Salim: And that’s what causes the Lebo boys to drop out of school. 
Ali: That’s why we all dropped out. 
Many of the young people I spoke with were preoccupied with 
avoiding being ‘picked on’ by virtue of  displaying the visible signs of 
being ‘Arab’, ‘wog’, ‘Lebo’ or Muslim’. It influenced their views of 
‘other Australians’ and had some bearing on their feelings of 
belonging to ‘a wider Australian community’. As Rocky explained, his 
sense of belonging and feeling of personal safety or security 
changed after he left his Muslim primary school and enrolled as a 
student at a Catholic secondary school. As Rocky put it: 
 I went to a Muslim primary school so everyone was the same.  No 
racism, no different culture, everyone would bring the same type of 
food for lunch.  Most of the kids there were Lebanese so you could 
speak Arabic or English and everyone would understand. And a lot of 
people knew each other outside of school because they’d be friends. 
That’s how it was. But in high school it’s completely different because 
in high school the Lebanese people are in the minority because I go 
to a Catholic school and then Lebanese-Muslims are the smaller 
minority. There’s probably six or seven of us in the whole school. So 
all the Arabs in my school stick together – there’s about fifteen/sixteen 
of us… It’s mostly Lebanese and Syrian.  It’s pretty much Lebanese, 
two Syrian… [There are other groups at my school] … there’s the 
Asians, the Italians, the Aussies are friends and so if we break it up 
into a smaller group you get picked on. 
Rocky explained that as a student in a multi-cultural secondary 
school he became more acutely aware of being ‘different’ and part of 
‘a minority group’. This experience led him and his Lebanese friends 
to draw closely with other ASB students. He pointed out however, 
that this was not simply for personal safety but also because they 
shared a wide range of interests. Who was included or not included 
in the group was not so much about sharing a particular racial or 
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religious identity. What was most important for group membership 
was that you were not a ‘racist’ and that you were ‘good’ to the 
people in the group. As Rocky said:   
Everyone thinks we’re racist, that we stick together, but [there are] 
non-Lebanese people that hang around with us … one of them is 
Italian and a lot of them are Aussie… They hang around with us and 
are our friends because every Lebo likes football or soccer; that’s 
something in common we have with them so we go and play at the 
same club and all that.  Because they’re not racist, they’ll be our 
friend, they come into our house and they eat with us, our food and 
we go to their house and be friends.  But then lots of people say, oh 
Lebo’s just hang around with each other; they’re not friends with 
anyone else; they think they’re better than everyone, but it’s not really 
like that. The way it goes is if you’re good to us, we’re good to you, if 
you’re bad to us, we’re worse to you. That’s how it is. 
It is evident that Rocky’s understanding of what was going on was 
influenced by a range of broader cultural discourses. These included 
discourses about ‘multiculturalism’, a policy discourse that in the view 
of some commentators like (Hage 2007), has  shifted over the years 
to a ‘more sophisticated’ version of the old ‘assimilation’ line. Rocky’s 
observation that ‘everyone thinks we’re racist, that we stick together’ 
reveals reflexivity and awareness of the fact that being ‘racist’ is a 
negative quality. It reflects a sensitivity to recent public debate in 
Australia about multiculturalism, which has played on and 
exaggerated public fears about the dangers of ‘ethnic enclaves’ and 
the idea that certain migrant groups ‘stick together’ unwilling to 
‘integrate’ with ‘mainstream Australia’ (Bailey 1995). These critiques 
of multiculturalism typically focus on particular cultural symbols as 
evidence of the existence of these ‘ethnic ghettos’ and the alleged 
refusal by certain communities to assimilate. For example, as 
researchers like Poynting, Noble and Tabar (2001, pp. 72-73) have 
pointed out, a group of boys of ‘middle-eastern appearance’ who 
spend their leisure time regularly in public spaces, like certain streets 
or near public transport and shopping centres, have come to 
symbolically represent ‘ethnic youth gangs’ and a ‘public menace’. 
One of the more powerful symbols of late is the scarf or hijab which 
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many Muslim women wear in public17. The hijab has come to be 
treated as a symbol that stands in for all the ostensibly negative 
aspects of the Muslim way of life and as a sign of the  potential  
Muslims have, by their very presence in Australia, to subvert social 
cohesion (Ho 2007). Those who are easily identified as the ‘Other’, 
like women who wear the hijab, have become obvious targets for 
discriminatory practices (Poynting 2002).  
Ramsaya, one of my interviewees who wears the hijab, spoke about 
how others acted towards her on the basis of the meanings her hijab 
had for them. Ramsaya’s narrative illustrates what symbolic 
interactionists like Blumer (1968, p. 2) refer to when they observe 
‘that human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings 
that the things have for them’. From her experience she has come to 
learn that her hijab is so symbolically potent that it appears to 
obliterate her as a person in the eyes of others. It is as if all of the 
other aspects of her identity, like being a woman or being a young 
person, become invisible. 
It’s the most visible thing [the hijab].  If I wear the hijab and people 
see that, [then] their first reaction [towards] me [is based on what the 
hijab symbolises for them]. They don’t see me… I don’t think they… 
see me as a woman… or as a young woman. They just see me and 
say, “yep, she’s a Muslim”.  
While Ramsaya was proud to wear the hijab, she was also acutely 
aware of the way in which it stigmatised her in the eyes of others. 
The hijab can be understood as a stigma (Goffman 1963). The term 
‘stigma’ for symbolic interactionist Erving Goffman (1963, p. 5) refers 
to: 
 … an attribute that is deeply discrediting… an undesired 
differentness… by definition of course, we believe the person with a 
stigma is not quite human. On this assumption we exercise varieties 
of discrimination, through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, 
reduce his [sic] life chances. We construct a stigma-theory, an 
ideology to explain his [sic] inferiority and account for the dangers 
he [sic] represents…       
                                                 
17
 Hijab is the word used in the Islamic context for the various practices of dressing 
modestly. It is often used, by both Muslims and non-Muslims, to refer specifically 
to a form of headscarf  (Bedar & Matrah 2005, p. 58).  
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Ramsaya understood that her hijab represented a stigma, and some 
people only saw ‘the thing’ (i.e. her hijab) and not her as a person. 
The hijab is a stigma that has come to symbolise ‘Islam’ and ‘the 
foreign terrorists’.  It also carried secondary meanings, such as the 
‘oppression’ of women that is often imputed to ‘Islamic culture’, which 
is understood to represent a clear cultural threat to ‘the West’ (Aly 
2009; Ho 2007).   
Another example of the ways ‘that human beings act towards things 
on the basis of the meanings that the things have for them’ (Blumer 
1968) can be seen in the following account given by some female 
students on their encounters with their ‘white’ gym teacher, who they 
described as acting prejudicially towards Muslim girls, especially 
those wearing the hijab.  
A local non-government organisation, in which I was a volunteer, was 
invited in 2003 by a school year-level coordinator to visit the school 
and conduct a focus group discussion with female Muslim students. 
A group facilitator from the agency and I went to the school and 
conducted a group discussion with some of these students. The girls 
in the group were from different cultural backgrounds (including a few 
who identified as second-generation Australian-Lebanese-Muslims). 
The discussion in this focus group centred mainly on a conflict the 
girls had with their male gym teacher. The students described the 
‘Anglo’ gym teacher as a ‘feeler’ and went on to describe incidences 
that revealed why they labelled him as a ‘feeler’. They said how the 
teacher, under the guise of ‘uniform inspection’, would lift their 
headscarf or shift it around the neckline just a little bit above their 
chest, supposedly to check if they were wearing the correct school 
uniform underneath. He claimed that he was only looking to see if 
they were wearing t-shirts underneath the school shirt. They said he 
would also touch their pants, around their thighs, to check if they 
were wearing the correct school pants. He would also go into the 
girl's changing room while they were changing. The students 
emphasised that there was nothing ‘innocent’ about his behaviour. 
Indeed one of the girls said how she was spared this treatment 
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because she did not wear the headscarf and he gave special 
attention to girls wearing the hijab. 
Using symbolic interactionism, I interpret the gym teacher’s specific 
targeting of student’s wearing the hijab in terms of the meanings 
commonly attributed to this highly symbolic representation of Islam. 
Whist I have not directly spoken to the gym teacher to ask what the 
hijab symbolises for him, it can be inferred, in the context of 
discourses about the hijab (that have come to be common since the 
September 11 attacks)  that this teacher, sees Islam and particularly 
the hijab as representing a way of life and set of beliefs as 
threatening and intolerable (IDA 2007). From a symbolic 
interactionist perspective ‘human beings act towards things on the 
basis of the meanings that the things have for them’ (Blumer 1968, p. 
2). With this in mind I interpreted the gym teacher’s actions as 
reflecting his view that the hijab and those who wore it were a direct 
threat, and thus ‘legitimate targets’ for discriminatory practice. Those 
like the gym teacher, who feel a sense of ‘governmental belonging’ 
assume they have a duty if not a right to punish those who threaten 
their national home and identity (Hage 2000, 2003).   
However, it was not just the sexualised character of the teacher’s 
conduct that upset the girls. They were also upset about what they 
took to be his insensitivity and failure to demonstrate respect towards 
them and their religious beliefs and practices. For instance, when the 
students told the gym teacher, ‘We are Muslims, men are not 
supposed to touch us’, he reportedly responded, ‘I don’t care about 
your religion’. When my colleague who was working with me at the 
time suggested that the girls should report his behaviour, one replied, 
‘The other teachers … they don’t care … they don’t listen’. Another 
said, ‘There’s nothing we can do about it’. The clear lesson learnt at 
this school was that the teacher’s behaviour was acceptable and for 
that reason reporting what their gym teacher was up to was a waste 
of time and indeed was likely only to involve them in more trouble. 
The students said that the only person who seemed responsive and 
sympathetic to their protests was the year-level coordinator. They 
Page 96  
also said to me that she was not in a position of power to do anything 
about it. Given these revelations it became clear why the coordinator 
had contacted us to carry out the focus group with the Muslim 
students. 
Further evidence of cultural and religious insensitivity, and what the 
students described as prejudice on the part of the school, was the 
mandatory nature of certain activities that conflicted with their cultural 
and religious practices. Of particular concern was the compulsory 
mixed gender sport curriculum. The female students described how 
they had refused to play sport with the boys, saying that as Muslim 
girls they were not allowed to have either physical contact with or 
play with boys. In response to their protest the gym teacher would 
give them a detention. When the students complained to other 
teachers, these teachers were complicit, making comments such as: 
Well if you girls had been nice to Mr (X) … and cooperated (i.e. 
played mixed gender sport) then you wouldn’t have gotten a 
detention. 
These experiences made the students feel humiliated, powerless and 
frustrated. Comments allegedly made by the specific teacher to the 
effect that ‘I don’t care about your religion’, and the school’s more 
general refusal to accommodate their needs by providing separate 
gym/sport activities for boys and girls was a major issue. The gym 
teacher’s prejudice and his predatory behaviour were of particular 
concern to them. They were certainly not naïve about his behaviour, 
as their label for him as the ‘feeler’ revealed. 
Racism, in a range of other contexts that went far beyond the school 
gate, was also experienced in other quite personal ways by the 
young people I spoke with. Ramsaya, for example, described the 
hijab she wore as an outward expression of her commitment to 
modesty. She understood, however, that in the context in which she 
lived, many people did not see the hijab in the ways she viewed it. 
Stereotypes about Muslims who wore the hijab that flourished 
following events like the Gulf War of 1991 and the terrorist attacks of 
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2001 had a direct impact on her life. As she explained, it certainly 
affected her prospects of getting a job:  
There’s a lot of jobs that I wanted to go for which a lot of people 
have told me not to [go for] just because I won’t wear a [revealing] 
uniform.  I’d love to be an air hostess but everyone has told me you 
are going to have to wear knee high skirts which I can’t wear, so it 
does stop me from doing a lot of jobs that I wanted to do.   
….  I remember, for the job I’ve got now, the interviewer asked me: 
“Would you be restricted from wearing any of the uniforms”. We 
didn’t have a uniform but he wanted to know if I’d be okay with 
wearing pants or how would I wear my uniform. I think they thought 
… that I might be extra religious the next day and wear the whole 
cover … I think that was what he was getting at … would I ever 
wear that?  So at that point I explained to him “[my religion] doesn’t 
stop me from wearing anything except as long as my body isn’t 
shown I’m happy to wear ... I’ve always made sure that I do look 
professional [and I will wear what] you guys want just as long as I’m 
comfortable with it”.  At that point I thought I may not have got the 
job ...  [but I did get the job in the end].  
I think it’s mainly [in relation to] uniforms that a lot of Muslims do get 
discriminated against.  Also a lot of work with ... I know we have 
several departments in this retail place that I work at, they asked me 
also if I would ever work in men’s wear and I didn’t have a problem 
with that because I didn’t see that there was … I wasn’t ever going 
to be one on one with a guy or ... that I… was going to be unsafe.  
So I said to them, yeah, that was fine but that did trigger something 
… that has stopped me from applying for positions ... I mean, yes, 
this person who was interviewing me had the guts to ask me but a 
lot of people won’t because they’d be afraid to be stepping on [anti-] 
discrimination [laws] and that’s what has stopped me from applying 
for a lot of positions because of questions like that.  
Ramsaya interpreted these questions from her employer as a coded 
way of saying that, while he was ‘okay’ with the hijab, he would not 
employ someone who wore the niqab or the burqa. Nor would he 
employ people whose religious commitments might conflict with 
particular working arrangements, such as working in men’s wear18. 
                                                 
18
 ‘A niqab is a veil that covers the face, worn by some Muslim women as a part of 
the hijab … Two different items of traditional Muslim women’s clothing are known 
as a burqa, (sometimes Anglicized as burka or burqua). One is a kind of veil which 
is tied on the head, over a headscarf, and covers the face except for a slit at the 
eyes for the woman to see through. The other, which is also called a full burqa or 
an Afghan burqa and occasionally called a chador, is a garment, which covers the 
entire body and face. The eyes are covered with a “net curtain” allowing the 
woman to see but preventing other people from seeing her eyes. Both kinds of 
burqa are used by some Muslim women as an interpretation of the hijab dress 
code, and the full burqa was compulsory under Taliban rule in Afghanistan’ (Bedar 
& Matrah 2005, pp. 57-58). 
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Ramsaya’s story illustrates how those who are identifiably Muslim, in 
sites like the work place, experienced their interactions with non-
Muslim Australians as sometimes hostile and/or as distorted by 
misunderstanding. Ramsaya thought that this owed a lot to mass 
media ‘misrepresentations’ of Muslims. As I have suggested in the 
previous chapter, the mass media play a key role in reinforcing 
prejudices about certain social groups. Particular representations of 
Islam and Muslims have been prominent in the press and on 
television since 9/11 (Dreher & Ho 2009; Hussein 2007). According 
to Ramsaya, the mass media and particularly the tabloid press have 
a lot to answer for. She thought the questions put to her by her 
employer were likely to have been informed by ongoing scare 
campaigns promoted by the media. Ramsaya speculated that 
employers may have heard horror stories in the media that tended to 
create anxieties that had nothing to do with the actual lives and 
experiences of Muslim women. There is, for instance, the stereotype 
of Muslim women as ‘oppressed creatures’ and the perception that 
Muslims were inflexible, particularly about their dress or 
preparedness to work in places where men were also employed. 
While Ramsaya was successful in getting a job she found the 
process of being questioned about her religious practices upsetting 
and confronting. This experience, and other similar experiences that 
she has encountered, made her think twice about applying for work 
in ‘certain areas’ because, as she pointed out, ‘Yes … this person 
who was interviewing me had the guts to ask me, but a lot of people 
won’t because they’d be afraid to be stepping on [anti-]discrimination 
[laws]’. 
Ramsaya also spoke of another incident that she says reflected the 
influence of the media in shaping how people imagined Arabs and 
Muslims as ‘Islamic terrorists’ and their association with airplane 
hijacking. As she put it:  
One comment which I’ve gotten twice and it upset me so much … 
I’ve had two friends go for a job at an Arab airline and they have 
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said to me, oh yeah, we’re more comfortable going for this job 
because ... and I’m sure they didn’t mean it to hurt me or to say it so 
racist but it came out really racist … they said, “You know, we’re 
more comfortable flying with an Arab airline because at least we 
know that it won’t be hijacked”. … I thought, yeah, wait a minute… 
the media has played [a] role … it’s made people think that if I do go 
with an airline company, an Arab airline company then it won’t… get 
hijacked… 
Like some of the other young people I spoke with, Ramsaya was 
able to challenge the meanings attributed to certain ‘things’ like the 
hijab by discussing it with people. In doing so, young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims like Ramsaya said she believed she could help 
change, in positive ways, how people acted towards what they saw 
as ‘representatives’ of Islam: 
Now, in my job, I’ve had one Anglo-Saxon woman, who has just 
never met a Muslim before - a physically visible Muslim in her life - 
she didn’t know much about [Islam] actually…  She lives in an area 
[where she doesn’t have the opportunity to interact with Muslims], 
and she really didn’t think much [about Islam and Muslims] until the 
media has come out with [all the stereotypes of Muslims] yeah… 
together we have [been learning more about Islam]… I’ve been 
learning more and she’d ask me questions so I have been telling 
her more and more, I’ve been giving her books to read and stuff, so 
she… understands more about my religion and she’s also opened 
up and thought, okay, so this religion exists and it’s not what… the 
media says it is.   
John’s story and his experiences of prejudice are similar in some 
ways to Ramsaya’s and those of other young people. In John’s case 
he had been teased by his peers at school for praying:  
In my school it’s all Australian people and there’s only me and my 
brother and some other people that are Lebanese… I was praying 
in the classroom during lunch time once and some people started 
laughing at me [when they saw me] through the window. The 
teacher saw what happened and then she told me, “Oh … it’s 
because they don’t know [that’s why they laughed]”.  So the next 
day I actually did a speech to the class and now they know why I do 
it and they’re always asking questions, like how do you pray and 
stuff. 
John reported that the other students stopped teasing him after he 
had given his speech and answered their questions about his faith 
and his religious practices. He said he was really happy because he 
had been able to change the meaning they were attributing to him 
and other Muslims, and activities such as praying. This he said made 
him feel good because he believed he helped change their 
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perspectives and negative attitudes towards Muslims. It confirms 
Blumer’s (1968) point that in the process of changing the meanings 
‘things’ (e.g. the meaning that the practice of prayer has) actions 
towards the people who are associated with these things or activities 
can also be changed. 
Unfortunately, however, not all conflict and tension with ‘other 
Australians’ was resolved so easily. For some of the young people 
who felt they had to deal with conflict and tension in their interactions 
with ‘other Australians’, often the feeling of being marginalised had a 
cumulative effect and it made them feel apprehensive about relating 
to people outside their immediate community. Some young people 
like Rocky went so far as to avoid areas where Lebanese people did 
not have a large and visible presence. As he explained, while a lack 
of confidence, and feeling of separation from ‘the wider community’ 
resulted from direct and personal experiences of racism, 
encountering racism in mediated ways had similar consequences. It 
is to these experiences that I now turn.  
 
 
Vicarious and mediated experiences of racism 
 
Philomena Essed (1991, p. 5) found that a substantial part of black 
women’s experiences of racism were shaped vicariously through 
friends, family members and other blacks, through the media and 
cognitively through heir general knowledge of racism in the system. 
My own research has similarly found that a substantial part of young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ experiences of racism was also 
shaped vicariously. It was experienced quite powerfully when they 
heard about other people’s encounters with racism, particularly when 
they identified with the people who were victims of racism (e.g. other 
Muslims or Australians of Arabic speaking background). They 
reported how they felt when they saw events like the Cronulla race 
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riots, where large mobs of Anglo-Australians were televised bashing 
anyone who appeared to be Muslim or Middle Eastern.  
Most of the people I spoke with interpreted their direct experiences of 
racism as a consequence of negative media representations of 
Muslims and Arabs. Ramsaya, for example, thought that the media 
needed to be restricted in the way they reported on Muslim issues. 
 … I think most of it’s the media’s fault … all the racism today.  
People wouldn’t think about racism if it wasn’t for the media.  I think 
they would have continued to see [Muslims and Arabs as] normal … 
people who live in those Anglo-Saxon areas … if they had come to a 
Arab-Muslim area they … wouldn’t have … this [preconceived] idea 
of Muslims being bad, we need to run away from them, we need to 
convince them… to assimilate more, to be [more] ‘Australian’ … 
They would have just [simply seen], okay, these people are dressed 
[different] but that’s it. But because the media has … slammed Islam 
so much, that people think bad of it and now have got really bad 
thoughts of it. 
Many of the other young people also felt that the hostility shown 
towards them was due largely if not entirely to media reporting. Even 
if they had not personally experienced racism following negative 
media reporting, what they saw happening on the media to other 
Arabs and Muslims affected how they saw themselves and other 
‘Australians’ and how they interacted with members of the wider 
community.  
Rocky was one young person whose interactions with other 
Australians have been affected by his vicarious experiences of 
racism. He reported only a few occasions of direct racism, far fewer 
than most of my other interviewees, who spoke often about ‘in your 
face’ experiences of racism. Yet Rocky seemed to have been far 
more affected by his experience than any other young person, so 
much so, that he referred to a sense of ‘being under siege’ because 
of mediated or vicarious experiences of racism. Rocky illustrated this 
in a story he told about how the media coverage of events such as 
the Cronulla riots and the ongoing ‘war on terrorism’ converged to 
create an environment that he perceived as being hostile to himself 
and his community. Rocky, like many of the other young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims I spoke with were not just upset about the way he 
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and his friends were treated but, as he explained, they were also 
concerned about how ‘the West’, through the media, depicted 
Muslims and Arabs. Rocky, was especially angry at what he 
described as the USA’s hypocrisy and its declarations of moral 
superiority. As Rocky put it:     
The media portrays the Muslim as terrorists … [but the USA Army are 
the ones] killing kids and they’re killing women and they’re killing old 
men and they’re killing injured people and they’re getting honoured for 
that.  And they’re even killing people that are trying to defend their 
country. Like what’s wrong with trying to defend your country? You’re 
defending your country and you’re getting criticised for it… 
All we’re trying to do is live peacefully and the stupid thing is … 
instead of America getting criticised for [the blood shed in Iraq] we get 
criticised for it.  Muslims get criticised for it. Who has all the billion-
dollar weapons? America.  All the Western countries.  Who has all of 
the weapons? Who has all of the things? 
Rocky’s view typified how many of my interviewees interpreted and 
responded to this kind of media reportage. They interpreted media 
reports, like the ones that Rocky described, as racist encounters, and 
referred to these mediated experiences of racism in the process of 
making sense of their interactions with non-Arab and Muslim 
Australians. Like those journalists and commentators responsible for 
those reports, Rocky and many of my other interviewees drew on the 
same ‘us and them’ dichotomy and/or the ‘West’ (them) against the 
‘rest’ (us). As Rocky put it, ‘There’s just two groups: Arabs and 
everyone else’. As he saw it, Arabs (including the Lebanese) and 
Muslims were going to have to stick together in the face of hostility 
from ‘other’ Australians:  
[The Lebanese-Muslims stuck together even before September 11. 
When the Lebanese-Muslim migrants came to Australia they were] 
the minority and we were forced [to stick together] you know. And 
they came out with no money so they had to work together. They all 
went to factories and butchers to work together. And everyone else 
wasn’t really Muslim ...  Nobody understood them. Even you’ve got 
now the older [generation], my grandma and all that, they don’t 
speak English. When you think about they were pretty much forced.  
And all the racism: “go back to where you came from”. 
This suggests how Rocky’s mediated experiences of racism were 
just as strongly felt as any he had experienced face to face. In 
Rocky’s case those media reports were made even more powerful 
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because they resonated with family stories told by members of the 
older generation of Lebanese-Muslims. In this way racism assumes 
an historical character as a form of ‘collective memory’. As Ron 
Eyerman (2004, p. 161) puts it, such collective memory consists of 
recollections of a shared past, which can be passed on from one 
generation to the next. Eyerman (2004, p. 162) writes: 
…what the past means is recounted, understood and interpreted 
and transmitted through language and through dialogue… All 
nations and groups have founding myths, stories which tell who we 
are through recounting where we come from. 
It was evident from my interviews that the young people were 
drawing on the stories told by their forebears to make sense of their 
contemporary experiences as these stories resonate with and are 
transmitted to future generations (Dijck 2004, p. 267). This collective 
memory enabled young people like Rocky to understand his 
relationship to the wider community by drawing on an ‘imagined’ 
common history of Australian-Lebanese-Muslim exclusion from 
national belonging (West 2008).   
These often quite negative experiences, whether of the face-to-face 
or the mediated kind, are closely related to these young people’s 
ambiguous sense of belonging to the national family. Their criticisms 
of the incivility shown by others towards them are intimately 
connected to a desire to be recognised as Australian.   
 
 
On belonging 
 
The idea of belonging can mean different things to different people. 
Linn Miller (2003, p. 216) writes for example that : 
… a minimum conception of belonging might be understood as 
standing in correct relation to one's community, one's history and 
one's locality. 
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Others (Hage 1996, 2000, 2002b, 2002c, 2003; Trudeau 2006) argue 
that the ‘correct’ relation of belonging to the national community, 
history and locality is what is at stake in the often hotly contested 
debates about contemporary multicultural Australia. There has been 
public debate concerning the question of whether certain groups 
such as Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, can make a ‘legitimate’ claim 
to belonging in or to Australia (Dunn, Klocker & Salabay 2007). In 
this debate, ‘White’ or ‘Anglo’ Australians are often positioned as 
having more of a ‘correct’ relation of belonging than other cultural 
communities in Australia  (Hage 2000).  
As Hage (2000, p. 50) argues, a sociological conception of national 
belonging is one that necessarily examines how people experience 
and deploy their claims to national belonging. The people who are 
able to deploy and thereby ‘experience more national belonging’ are 
those who have been able to accumulate more of what Hage (2000, 
pp. 53-54) calls ‘national capital’.  
Hage’s (2000, p. 53) neologism of ‘national capital’ draws from 
Bourdieu’s (1986) concept of ‘cultural capital’. In effect ‘national 
capital’ represents the sum of valued knowledge, styles, social and 
physical (bodily) characteristics and practical behavioural 
dispositions constructed as valuable within the national field. This 
capital can be inherited (e.g. by being born into the dominant cultural 
community) but they can also be accumulated, for example, by 
‘migrants’ acquiring English language skills and an ‘Aussie’ accent 
(Hage 2000). Hage further notes that: 
National belonging tends to be proportional to accumulated national 
capital. That is, there is a tendency for a national subject to be 
perceived as just as much of a national as the amount of national 
capital he or she has accumulated (Hage 2000, p. 53). 
To reiterate, not everyone in Australia has equal access to national 
capital. Accordingly, not everyone has an equal chance to achieve 
wider recognition of national belonging. For example, a migrant of 
English ancestry who has accumulated national capital in the form of 
the dominant linguistic, physical and cultural dispositions is able to 
accumulate more national belonging than say a migrant of Lebanese 
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ancestry, who lacks the physical characteristics and dispositions of 
the dominant national ‘type’ and has not yet managed to acquire 
features like the dominant national accent. This Lebanese migrant 
who has lived for a long time in Australia, however, can yield more 
national belonging than, for instance, a more recently arrived person 
from Lebanon who has not yet learned English.  
The inheritance and/or accumulation of national capital is pertinent to 
the two modes of national belonging identified by Hage (2000), which 
he calls ‘passive belonging’ and ‘governmental belonging’. Hage 
(2000, pp. 45-46) explains these two modes of national belonging as 
follows.   
The nationalist who believes him or herself as ‘belonging to a 
nation’ in the sense of being part of it, means that he or she expects 
to have the right to benefit from the nation’s resources, to ‘fit into it’ 
or ‘feel at home’ with it. This mode of belonging can be called 
passive belonging. The other mode of national belonging, the belief 
that one has a right over the nation, involves the belief in one’s 
possession of the right to contribute (even if only by having a 
legitimate opinion with regard to the internal and external politics of 
the nation) to its management such that it remains ‘one’s home’. 
That is what I call governmental belonging. [Emphasis in original.]  
One reason why I use Hage’s conceptions of ‘passive belonging’ and 
‘governmental belonging’ is because these conceptions are reflected 
in many of my interviewees’ narratives of belonging. For instance, the 
following story told by Bu, one of the young people I interviewed, can 
be treated as an expression of what Hage called ‘governmental 
belonging’: 
We’re born here … 
Why do the Australians’ feel they belong here? They come on boats 
… They were First Fleet, we’re high class. They came by boat, we 
came by plane. We feel like we can belong here if we can stay here, 
but we know that they don’t want us in here … This country is our 
country as much as their country. 
This statement is one that expresses Bu’s belief that he and his 
fellow Lebanese Muslims have a legitimate claim to be included in 
the idea of Australian nationhood by virtue of being born in Australia. 
At the same time he realises that ‘Anglo’ Australians may want to 
claim to have more ‘national capital’ than he and other Australian-
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Lebanese-Muslims. This is because not only were most ‘White’ 
Australians born here but their ancestors were also born here and 
they can claim a closer match to the dominant cultural group. So, 
when Bu says, ‘Why do the Australians’ feel they belong here? They 
come on boats… They were First Fleet, we’re high class. They came 
by boat, we came by plane, he is mounting a discursive challenge to 
‘White’ Australian claims to have more national belonging than he 
and other Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have.  
The second reason I draw on Hage’s conceptions of national 
belonging is that it also sheds light on the forms of racism being 
experienced by young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. My research 
suggests that much of the racism they have experienced is directly 
related to some Australians’ anxieties about ‘Others’ affecting their 
sense of home in some negative fashion. In other words, the racism 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have experienced can be understood 
as the effect of efforts made by those in the dominant cultural 
position to maintain and exercise that dominance by asserting their 
right to operate as the sole managers and protectors of the national 
space. This is an anxiety that possibly grows from observing 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims’ and other minority groups’ 
determination to assert their claim to governmental belonging in 
relation to Australia. Those who have long held the dominant cultural 
position may fear that they are losing control over the character and 
shape of the national space. They see the potential for Australia’s 
newer cultural minorities to shape the political, social and physical 
landscape in such a way that would render Australia no longer the 
place of exclusive belonging long held by ‘White’ Australians. 
The third reason why I draw on this particular conception of 
belonging is that treating the boundaries of belonging as an 
expression of ‘caring for the nation’ is not only a discursive strategy 
that ‘White’ or ‘Anglo’ Australians can deploy. Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims can also feel nationally empowered enough to make claims 
about what kinds of people deserve to belong to the nation. This was 
evident for example when Rocky said, “They [those other Australians 
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who are being racist towards us] don’t deserve to be here”. When 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims make judgements like this they are 
asserting a desire and a claim to belong to the nation (at least as 
much as, if not more than, those they judged as not deserving to 
belong).  
Perhaps it is in this discursive context, where people feel compelled 
to justify how or why they ‘deserve’ to belong in the national home, 
that my interviewee Nuer’s comments can be read: 
The [Australian-Lebanese-Muslim] youth, they use identity as an 
excuse for not getting employment. [They say] I’m Lebanese, or my 
name is Mohammad or my name is Talia and I don’t get 
employment because [my name gives away to the employer that I 
am an Arab/Muslim] they go “Naah, I’m Muslim, I’m Lebanese, or 
I’m a wog. What’s the use of bothering seeking employment”? So 
they have all these sorts of excuses... Melbourne is a multicultural 
state. And I doubt it very much that they [employers] are going to be 
racist against you because of your nationality or something. They 
[the employers] are going to look at maybe your skill, your 
experience. But a lot of them say, “Naah … I’m Lebanese you know, 
they are not going to hire me”. Maybe they don’t have the 
experience, haven’t reached a certain education level all that kind of 
stuff.  
One interpretation of Nuer’s comments is that she is playing into the 
discourses of ‘colour-blind racism’, because it enables her to position 
herself as belonging in the ‘broader national community’. For this 
argument to make sense, we need to recall the notion of ‘colour-blind 
racism and connect it to Hage’s (1998) ideas about how ‘ethnic 
Others’ can accumulate national belonging and present themselves 
as having a ‘correct’ relationship to the national community. 
As discussed in chapter one, the idea of ‘colour-blind racism’ can be 
‘drawn upon to describe mainstream attitudes to issues of race and 
the persistence of racial inequalities’ (Rhodes 2009). For Rhodes, 
‘color-blind racism’ can be described as the ideological armour used 
to downplay the role of racial discrimination in the production of 
social, political and economic inequalities (Rhodes 2009). Colour-
blind racism has four central frames: ‘abstract liberalism’; 
‘naturalisation’; ‘cultural racism’ and the ‘minimisation of racism’ 
(Bonilla-Silva 2003). The frames of ‘Abstract liberalism’ and the 
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‘minimisation of racism’ are most useful for analysing Nuer’s 
comments. According to Bonilla-Silva (2003, pp. 28-29), 
The frame of abstract liberalism involves using ideas associated 
with political liberalism (e.g., “equal opportunity,”…) and economic 
liberalism (e.g., choice, individualism) in an abstract manner to 
explain racial matters…  
Minimization of racism is a frame that suggests discrimination is no 
longer a central factor affecting minorities’ life chances (“It’s better 
now than in the past” or “there is discrimination, but three are plenty 
of jobs out there”.     
Such frames can be used not only by those who are generally 
recognised as being ‘in’ the culturally dominant group (i.e. Whites), 
but also by those who are culturally marginal to argue they too 
belong. Bonilla-Silva (2003, p. 171) in his own research in the United 
States found that: 
… frames and ideas of colour blindness have had a significant 
indirect effect on blacks. For example, the frame of abstract 
liberalism has shaped the way many blacks explain school and 
residential segregation.  
In this way, the frames of ‘colour blind racism’ (e.g. ‘abstract 
liberalism’ and the ‘minimization of racism’) shape young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims understandings of why they, or other young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, experience inequalities – Including 
difficulties in gaining employment.  
Within this framework, the ability to secure employment is seen to 
reflect the ‘choice’, skill level and motivations of individuals and the 
individual’s own efforts to secure employment. Within the terms 
made available by this kind of ‘abstract liberal’ discourse, those who 
do not identify as experiencing systematic prejudice, as a reason for 
the difficulties they face in finding employment, can present 
themselves as having a more authentic claim to belong to Australia.    
In using these frames Young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims, such as 
Nuer, are able to position themselves as having a stronger and better 
connection to the national community than those Australian-
Lebanese-Muslim young people who are represented as ‘playing the 
race card’. This is suggested in Nuer’s comments about ‘other’ young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims who, unlike herself, make ‘excuses’ or 
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blame racism/discrimination for difficulties encountered in securing 
employment.  
Following Hage’s (1998, p. 61) line of argument, Nuer’s comments 
can be seen as a discursive strategy for accumulating national 
capital. That is, by minimising racism as an obstacle to gaining 
employment, Nuer is able to present herself as a ‘good Australian’ 
who subscribes to the ethos of individualism and neo-liberalism. Her 
comments can also be seen as representing a struggle for the 
valorisation of ‘the Lebanese-Muslim’ within the Australian national 
field. This is because she perceives that her ‘Lebanese-Muslimness’ 
operates as a kind of negative capital in the national field (Hage 
1998, p. 61). She struggles to retrieve its value by distinguishing 
‘those' Lebanese-Muslims who use racism as an excuse, from the 
Lebanese-Muslims who (like her) don’t use such excuses for the 
circumstances they find themselves in (Hage 1998, p. 61).  
 
 
Experiences of belonging  
 
If we are to think about ‘belonging’ in the ways typical of those who 
work within the symbolic interactionist approach we can focus on 
descriptions by the young people I interviewed that work to elicit what 
it meant to them to experience a feeling or sense of ‘belonging’, 
rather than trying to construct an argument based on some ‘objective’ 
definition of belonging. The phrases the young people used, like ‘not 
feeling like the odd one out’, ‘fitting in’ and ‘being accepted’, go some 
way to grasping this ‘insider’ aspect of what it means to belong 
(Kellehear 1993, p. 27).  
Any understanding of what it means to ‘belong’ is contextually 
dependent and so the meaning that young people attribute to 
belonging is very much a context-specific understanding shaped very 
much by things like the  debates about multiculturalism and 
assessments about the kinds of people who ‘deserve to belong’ in 
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the imagined national community. As (Hage 2000, pp. 45-46) has 
argued, ‘belonging’ involves having an expectation that a person has 
the ‘right to benefit from the nation’s resources, to ‘fit into it’ or ‘feel at 
home’ within the nation’ and ‘the belief in one’s possession of the 
right to contribute (even if only by having a legitimate opinion with 
regard to the internal and external politics of the nation) to its 
management such that it is ‘one’s home’.’ My discussion of how 
young people experience ‘belonging’ is based on this understanding.  
Five of the thirty-one young people I interviewed, spoke at length 
about their experiences of ‘belonging’. Four of them, including Mia, 
were women. Mia was one of the girls who spoke about experiences 
of belonging. Mia recalled that at the Islamic school she never felt 
uncomfortable when practising her religion. In her new state school, 
however, she did feel uncomfortable and found it challenging to 
practise her beliefs:   
Yeah, definitely [felt more included and felt more of a sense of 
belonging in the Islamic school] because we all wore the same 
things.  Like how beautiful is the head scarf? So we were all 
wearing head scarves. When it was time for prayer everyone would 
line up together … [Whereas in the public school I went to I had to] 
go to a little corner by myself and make sure no-one was looking 
because I was embarrassed.  Everyone was doing the same thing 
[at the Islamic school] and it was just like so relaxed and I felt like 
definitely I belonged, yeah, definitely in that Islamic school. It’s one 
of the best schools. 
Mia, like many of the other young people I interviewed, said she felt a 
strong sense of belonging when others around her shared the same 
beliefs and practices (e.g. ‘everyone was doing the same thing’ and 
‘we all wore the same thing’).  
Such descriptions of belonging are part of what Mulligan et al. (2006) 
describe as a ‘way-of-life community’, one based on shared or 
common attitudes and practices (Mulligan et al. 2006, p. 18). There 
ought to be no surprise that this sense of belonging and community, 
which people like Mia described should be the same kind used by 
‘other’ Australians when they talk about who does and does not 
‘belong’ or why it is that Australian-Lebanese-Muslims do not or 
cannot fit into the ‘mainstream Australian community’ or their ‘way of 
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life’ (Dunn, Klocker & Salabay 2007) As some commentators who 
wrote about the ‘Cronulla riots’ put it, Anglo-Australians were 
protesting against Muslims and Lebanese coming into what they felt 
was ‘their territory’ and ‘their beaches’ (Barclay & West 2006; Collins 
2006, 2007; Poynting 2006b). Those protesters wanted to protect 
‘the Australian way of life’, which they saw as being threatened by 
the apparently quite different lifestyle of Muslims and Lebanese 
people. As an Anglo-Australian resident of Cronulla put it, the 
Lebanese and Muslims did not fit in with an ‘Australian way of life’ 
because: ‘They cover their own women up but come down here to 
Cronulla to perve on ours. They're hypocrites’ (Johnston 2005). The 
Cronulla ‘protesters’ were reportedly also anxious because what they 
saw as the ‘infiltration’ of Lebanese and Muslims into ‘their’ territory 
would mean that their community and their space would no longer be 
theirs; they would no longer feel ‘at home in’ Cronulla (Hage 2000). 
The ‘way of life’ framework of belonging can be ‘exclusive’ in so far 
as people who want to be recognised as belonging to the community 
need to display or exhibit the characteristics that define the ‘way of 
life’ of the imagined community. With this interpretation of what it 
means to ‘belong’, there does not seem to be much space for 
diversity, or room for negotiating how members who do not neatly fit 
with the ‘way of life’ of the community can be accommodated, let 
alone appreciated, for the valuable differences they might bring with 
them into the community. This mode of belonging is defined by 
anxiety. It is based on defending a ‘way of life’ and is focused on 
rejecting those who do not fit with the imagined community.  
This, however, is not the only way that belonging can be understood 
or a sense of community connection achieved. ‘Belonging’ does not 
necessarily have to hinge on members of a community recognising 
each other as being much the same. Instead, what ties this 
community together is a commitment to honouring all its diverse 
members (Hage 2003). Mutual respect and understanding is what 
defines this kind of community. What this kind of community might 
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look like, and how it might operate, is illustrated next by Nuer’s 
account of her experience of growing up in Melbourne.  
Nuer had heard stories about Muslims and Arabs experiencing 
discrimination and feeling marginalised. Nevertheless she found 
these stories hard to relate to because her experience of growing up 
as a young Australian-Lebanese-Muslim in her view had largely been 
a ‘positive’ experience. That positive quality had only occasionally 
been upset by the odd racist remark by another Australian or by 
media stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims. She said: 
I was surrounded by people that were very positive so I couldn’t see 
that sort of … um … point of view and disrespect that a lot of 
Muslims have faced ... the discrimination. [The September 11 
attacks haven’t] affected me … I’ve been very fortunate in that way.  
Before [the September 11 attacks] I was just a kid … I was loved by 
everyone I guess. [When I say I was loved by everyone, I’m not just 
taking about family and friends.] No! Everyone! People from school; 
people from different backgrounds … people in the street you live in 
… They see this little kid like their own people. They [accepted me 
for me]. 
Nuer suggested that her sense of belonging was informed by her 
childhood memories of being ‘loved by everyone’. That is, the 
meaning she gave to ‘belonging’ was based on prior interactions with 
people ‘from school, people from different backgrounds, people in the 
street’ who acted towards her as if she were ‘like their own people’. 
Nuer’s story emphasised a strong sense of connection to the wider 
community, and her feeling of being accepted by other Australians in 
spite of her religious and ethnic differences. She also approached 
her interactions with other Australians with a strong desire to both 
accept the people she met and be respectful of difference, which 
seems to have been encouraged during her years in high school. 
Nuer recalls that there was ‘a little bit of racism’ at her school but that 
this was overcome and more than compensated for by the positive 
experiences:  
[I didn’t go to an Islamic school. I went to a public, mix-gendered 
school]. I went to a very good school … A lot of wogs there as well. 
A lot of people from different backgrounds: Australians, Lebanese, 
Greeks, Italians, people from America, New-Caledonian, you know, 
you had all the nationalities. Which made it a lot easier. Yeah, 
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maybe there was a bit of racism and all that. And you face it. But 
you learn from a lot of people through high school.  
When Nuer says that experiencing this diversity ‘… made it a lot 
easier’, she also seemed to be saying that the diversity made life 
easier for her because she did not feel like the ‘odd one out’. Had the 
school environment been more culturally homogenous she might 
have felt her differences as an Australian-Lebanese-Muslim a lot 
more. It appears that Nuer connected and felt a sense of belonging 
to the school community, in spite of the fact that everyone else was 
not like her: she simply did not need that for a sense of belonging. 
Rather, she felt that she ‘belonged’ because like most of the other 
students at the school she was ‘different’ and, importantly, there was 
mutual exchange and recognition of each other’s differences as well 
as their similarities.  
Nuer also reported that her teachers were approachable, friendly and 
respectful of a range of needs and perspectives, and that this 
contributed again to a positive sense of ‘belonging’. Nuer explained 
how the teachers helped her to feel included:  
You talk to a lot of teachers as well about your religion; about what’s 
appropriate for women when they play sport or girls when they play 
sport because we are not allowed to touch men.  
Most teachers [respected what I had to say]. Especially the physical 
education teachers for some reason. In every school P.E. teachers 
are the best teachers because they are very down-to-earth people 
and they understand, you know? [The teachers and students] ask 
you questions about your scarf and all that and [I explain] we have 
to wear our scarves and we can’t take it off and we can’t really have 
contact with guys… They are sort of pretty cool with that. And they 
say, “Maybe you could try and walk around them”? The boy’s sports 
and girl’s sports were separated. Makes it a lot easier for us. It’s 
always pretty good and it was fun.  
A lot of Muslims were there at my school. Not all of them had scarfs 
on but they [teachers and students] were very considerate of that 
and the religion. Of all the religions, not just Islamic. But we 
[Muslims] are actually sort of limited [compared to the other 
religions]. We can’t be mixing around with guys compared to other 
religions. But they were pretty cool and very understanding which 
made our job a lot easier…So it’s a pretty good school. A very good 
school.  
Nuer’s experiences seem to contrast starkly with the experiences I 
reported on earlier in this chapter, like the story told by a group of 
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young Muslim women about being both discriminated against and 
becoming the object of sexually predatory behaviour by their male 
gym teacher.   
Nuer recalled that it was not only the staff at the school who 
demonstrated respect. Nuer said that many students were also 
considerate of different needs and demonstrated respect for 
differences. This notion of respect was central to Nuer’s idea of what 
constituted ‘belonging’:  
For example… if you are playing with a mixed team you won’t go in 
as hard. You stand back… or you organise a girl’s team or a girl’s 
class… After school. We’re going to play together. Guys can’t touch 
the girls. All that kind of stuff. So you can make up your own rules 
as you go along as well. … The guys did respect [my religious 
beliefs]. They understood that. They were learning heaps. We were 
learning from them as well about their religion as well. Especially 
the Greek Orthodox, we learnt heaps from them.  
Nuer’s stories make the point that different needs can be met, and 
the occasional difficulties involved in living in very diverse 
communities overcome, when there is a willingness to do things 
differently to the way things have been done before, and to do so in a 
spirit of acceptance and of wanting to live and learn from one 
another. Recalling Bauman’s (1989) remarks about the ethical 
response evoked by the discernment of ‘otherness’, we might say 
that both her teachers and her peers interacted with one another in 
ways that evoked a practice of moral responsibility for the ‘Other’.  
Nuer also told me a story that mattered deeply to her. It involved a 
journalist writing an article about her wearing the hijab, playing sport 
and coaching others to reach their sporting goals, which appeared 
subsequently in the local newspaper:  
[An important point in my life was when] I was at TAFE finishing up 
my diploma … [and there was an article in the local newspaper 
about me…]. The article was about me and my religion, me playing 
sports along with me coaching. 
As she explains, a youth organisation then offered her a paid position 
as a motivational speaker. This further bolstered her sense of 
belonging to the wider community and allowed her to pursue her 
passion for encouraging other young people, as she put it, ‘to reach 
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for their dreams’. She told me that she still wanted to help others find 
the courage to be true to themselves, in the same way she had found 
the courage when others told her she couldn’t be herself (e.g. wear 
the hijab as an outward expression of her identity and play sport 
simultaneously). For Nuer this was clearly a ‘critical incident’ that 
strengthened her sense of belonging to the wider community. Nuer’s 
story points to a record of positive encounters with other Australians, 
like the journalist who wrote an article about her, and the skills she 
developed with the support of a youth organisation. This record 
seems to have given Nuer the ability to approach difficult situations 
and hostile interactions with other Australians in a ‘positive’ way:  
 [A staff member from a youth organisation read the article and] she 
got me through the article. She got all my details and all that and 
she interviewed me and said, “yeah, you will be a good role model”. 
[So she employed me as a motivational speaker and I got training to 
and support to do public speaking]. [Not only was I helping others 
through this work it] sort of helped me out as well… Speaking to 
kids. Teaching them [required] learning [more about] myself and 
applying [what I taught] to my life as well… No point in telling them 
what to do if you don’t do it yourself. You got to sort of live that 
example.  Pretty much religion [has helped me to take the positive 
out of very negative situations]… Religion tells you that it’s not worth 
sort of pondering [about the] bad times, you’re not going to achieve 
anything. You got to sort of translate that into a positive thing and go 
from there... 
Nuer told me that she generally acted towards ‘other Australians’ with 
strongly ‘positive’ feelings developed in the course of a series of 
‘positive’ interactions. Her positive sense of belonging seems to have 
been the product of both her experience and her own capacity to 
transmute ‘bad times’ ‘into a positive thing’.  
Coco, another young person I spoke with, also believed that school 
and education could play an important role in fostering a sense of 
wider community belonging. She said schools could play a major role 
in combating discrimination and enable people to participate in 
processes that transformed the experiences of ‘difference’ and 
‘togetherness’. She emphasised that this required multicultural 
education to go beyond simplistic approaches to understanding 
cultural differences. Coco said it required people to engage with each 
other at a ‘deeper level’: 
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Oh yeah, we had a multicultural [day]. They wanted us to get 
different food… that’s all it meant to them. That’s all they knew. 
That’s my culture: get them my tabouli and my hummus and they 
were happy with that. They don’t look beyond that. It stops there. 
[Multiculturalism is more than eating different foods. It is] trying to 
understand what the culture is, not just what you see. 
Like at Greek weddings they throw glass plates … we don’t know 
what it means because we haven’t [been taught about it]. All we 
know is they throw glass plates. 
I would like to have an actual subject within school actually talking 
about different – like I know they talk about Captain Cook and 
ancient Egypt and they never look too much at the population – like 
they look at what they import or export. It is never what you really 
want to know. [If we learnt more about different cultures and 
religions, then] if they saw someone who is Jewish and they were 
doing something weird if I had learnt about it I would have been 
more accepting. I think they need to implement it more in 
classrooms and that’s the only reason why I’m majoring in sociology 
so I can make a bit of a difference in other kids like try to teach them 
more than computers and just about earthquakes and just like main 
topics. That’s all I remember from my learning about ancient Egypt 
and Captain Cook. I would rather learn about Aboriginal art and they 
never really taught us the truth, I never learnt it until last year. It was 
shocking to know all this stuff and all these stories and it is how they 
are trying to make it seem like Aborigines....  I think to this day 
[Aboriginals are not] accepted, because a lot of people just assume 
we’re multicultural, we’re accepting. 
Coco was critical of what she believed was the general assumption 
that simply by virtue of living in a ‘multicultural’ Australia that this 
therefore meant that ‘Australians’ were now generally either 
accepting of or respectful of cultural and religious differences. This 
assumption, she pointed out, allowed people to ignore or downplay 
the disadvantages and ‘colour-blind’ racism that groups such as 
Indigenous Australians were still confronting. Academics like Hage 
(2000, p. 77 & 84) have similarly argued that racism and tolerant 
‘multiculturalism’ can coexist – and that tolerant ‘multiculturalism’ is 
not necessarily the antidote for prejudice. Coco argued that 
Australian multiculturalism as a mode of living with and learning from 
different people’s beliefs, cultures and perspectives needs 
reinvigoration. She said that what was needed was an education that 
went beyond surface level meanings and dug deeper. She said this 
was necessary if only in order to offer alternative interpretations of 
the way communities like her's was understood or represented, 
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hopefully so that people could act towards one another on the basis 
of new understandings: 
At [my] school half the school population was Muslim and yet they 
didn’t try to teach the other kids about Islam. They could have 
taught them about the different religions, they could have been 
more accepting.  Some people absolutely hated Muslim people…  
They thought they were more superior to those Muslims. I think if 
they had understood [more about Islam] … had been actually taught 
[about Islam, then they wouldn’t have hated Muslims or thought of 
them as inferior].  It also comes down to the parents, what their 
parents teach them. If they’re telling them: ... “those Aborigines … 
they’re drunks” or “don’t look at those Muslims – they’re terrorists” 
or “don’t play with them” [well] the kids [who have been taught these 
prejudices] are going to believe what their parents tell them. It 
comes down to education and teaching your kids. 
Hage’s (2002a) conception of ‘honourable belonging’ seems 
especially relevant here for understanding Coco’s story about her 
school and how it had failed to ‘recognise’ its sizable Muslim 
population. According to Hage people need to have their existence 
both acknowledged and valued by others if they are to feel a sense 
of belonging to that community. Coco’s account points to a school 
that had a sizable Muslim population, but neither recognised its 
Muslim students nor acknowledged let alone dealt with the conflicts 
and tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim students. Coco’s 
experience contrasts with Nuer’s story of a school which worked as 
an inclusive place.  
Mia, another interviewee, also believed that educating people about 
different faiths and cultures would be an important step towards 
fostering a sense of belonging in a community with a sizable 
population of people with quite different belief systems. Mia told me 
that, as part of a class presentation, Mia shared her religious beliefs 
with her peers and found it an empowering experience that 
strengthened her sense of belonging in the school. She said it helped 
her feel accepted in the classroom and that it helped her fellow 
students have a better understanding of her community and why, for 
example, she wore the hijab. Having an opportunity like this to talk 
about her religious practices and beliefs was one important way that 
Mia felt that she was being acknowledged and respected, even 
honoured.  As she told me:  
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I did my oral on the [banning of hijab in schools in France] because 
at my school [there was a lot of talk about the hijab]… Like it didn’t 
make sense to me why they were doing that because… what’s 
[preventing girls from wearing the hijab] going to do? It’s not going 
to make the education better. So that’s what influenced me to do 
something about that and … Yeah, because they don’t really know 
all my side of the story… [What they heard in] the media that’s the 
only thing that they heard, that’s what they believe so I wanted to 
tell them why we wear it and how something that we have to have 
and by banning it ... [then that may prevent] young girls [getting] 
educated. Because I’m pretty sure they’re not going to take it off. 
[Those who were listening to my presentation] they felt really bad 
and they [said] “Oh I never knew…” 
Yeah, which was really nice.  It was a good response … I always 
had to hide why I [wore the hijab] and now I can tell everyone.   
In Australia today there is a real potential to foster a national 
community not founded on ‘paranoid nationalism’ (Hage 2003) but 
instead based on a mode of togetherness, where moral responsibility 
for the ‘Other’ is promoted actively (Bauman 1989). Mia’s story 
suggests that such a mode of togetherness is possible especially 
when there is a commitment from community members to learn from 
each other, to hear different voices and to respect all its members 
(Hage 2003).  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that some of the young people I spoke 
with interpreted their experiences with ‘other’ Australians as negative, 
especially when they felt they were not being understood, valued or 
else were being treated as if they truly were the Other. The negative 
experiences that these young people reported on were sometimes 
based on personal and face-to-face encounters with ‘other 
Australians’. I gave several examples of how this kind of racism was 
experienced, including the example of a group of young female 
Muslim students wearing the hijab subjected to demeaning and 
racially charged treatment by their male gym teacher.  
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Equally, racism could be experienced vicariously in all sorts of 
mediated ways. This could include hearing stories in the media, 
having friends and family members tell stories of their experiences or 
simply being exposed to various expressions of collective memory. In 
these ways the young people I spoke with made sense of their 
relationship to ‘Australian society’ as an ‘imagined community’ in the 
course of their daily encounters and their judgements about how they 
ought to act towards ‘other Australians’. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly some of the people I spoke with had a 
precarious sense of belonging to the wider Australian community. 
Some went so far as to  avoid interaction in certain spaces or certain 
places in which ‘people like them’ were a minority, so that they could 
feel safe and avoid being seen or treated as Other. Some of them 
said that they felt a strong sense of belonging only when they were in 
communities where there were other Muslims and Arabs, such as in 
their Islamic school. I noted how this ‘way of life’ notion of belonging 
was also exclusionary. It was the same notion of belonging that 
enabled ‘other’ Australians to argue why Muslims did not fit in with 
their ‘Australian’ way of life. I suggested that perhaps a way of 
belonging that is less exclusive and more embracing of difference is   
based more on understanding and negotiating the symbolic 
meanings attributed to different cultures and beliefs. It is also a way 
of belonging that does not create such a large breathing space for 
racism as ‘the way of life’ notion of belonging, and is associated with 
more ‘positive’ experiences such as feeling understood, valued and 
respected. Several examples of positive interactions in communities 
that had a more inclusive mode of belonging were offered, as I 
attempted to spell out what it was about these interactions that made 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims feel good. Interviewees 
reported that belonging is characterised by feelings of being: listened 
to and valued for their input; having opportunities to negotiate needs; 
having the space to have an open dialogue, to hear what others had 
to say in a civil and friendly way and to gain from new and different 
understandings; and importantly being accepted for who you are. 
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They said that encounters were positive when their ‘moral worth’ was 
acknowledged and when they felt they were being respected. 
In the next chapter, I look at what these young people did with their 
experiences of racial prejudice.   
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Chapter Four: Young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslim’s Responses to Racism 
 
Then I go, “I’m Lebanese”. And he goes, “you probably eat [dogs] in 
your country”.  And I’m like “actually we don’t…” and then he started 
criticising Muslims and saying, “you don’t belong here” and I’m like 
“excuse me, my parents came here rightfully I don’t know what your 
descendants are they’re probably criminals or something, you look 
like one”. And then he started insulting this girl who was sitting 
there, she’s an Aussie, and not because she’s Muslim, and he 
started calling her a lesbian. And she’s like, “I am engaged to a 
guy”. She goes, “not that I need to justify myself and not that these 
young ladies…need to justify themselves to you”. And he just kept 
on swearing at her and calling her all these names and “you’re 
probably a slut”. And she’s just sitting there thinking, out of the four 
people that were sitting there he was the dirtiest, he was in his 
scruffy clothes. I am not trying to, well actually I am judging him 
because he was wearing ugly dirty clothes and he’s sitting there 
judging us assuming he’s superior to us because he’s Australian 
and we’re not.  And I’m like, “get off the train with your dirty dog”. 
      
Coco, female interviewee 
 
 
 
The fact that racism is both a ‘belief system’ and a ‘set of practices’ 
highlights something of the strange character of racism (Miles 1989; 
Shipman 1994). Studies on racism, such as by Essed (1991), 
suggest that specific events of unfair treatment or experiences of 
discrimination may not be categorised as racist (even if others 
observing this same event might identify it as racist). This is partly 
because general knowledge of racism is an important source of 
information when interpreting specific events and labelling it as racist 
(Essed 1991, p. 3). Furthermore, once an event or interaction is 
interpreted as racist, how that experience is responded to can vary 
greatly amongst social actors. The authors of a Canadian study 
exploring how South-East Asian refugees coped with racism make 
the point that: 
Although racism has been a long-standing preoccupation in 
political, ethical, and social science discourse, health researchers 
have only recently begun to investigate its effects on individual well-
being (Jackson, Brown, and Kirby 1998; Krieger 1990; Salgado de 
Snyder 1987; Williams, Lavizzo-Mourey, and Warren 1994). Yet 
most studies do not illuminate how individual members of racial 
groups respond to the experiences of discrimination (Noh et al. 
1999). 
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In this chapter, acknowledging both the need to catch the peculiar 
qualities of racism and the need to fill the research gap identified by 
Noh et al. (1999) I establish how young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims dealt with the sometimes hostile interactions that occurred in 
the wake of events like the ‘Sydney gang rapes’ and the ‘Cronulla 
riots’. Events like these mobilised highly charged sentiment against 
Muslim and Lebanese young people. In this chapter, I address my 
second research question pertaining to how interviewees dealt, in 
some fashion, with their experiences of racism. 
I argue that the young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims I spoke with had 
found a variety of strategies to deal with their treatment. Drawing on 
similar studies to my own research, including that done by Essed 
(1991) and the ‘Isma’ report by the Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunity Commission (HREOC 2004), it seems that there are 
some commonalities to be found on how people cope with racism. I 
suggest that the common strategies employed by my interviewees 
can be included within the following three broad themes: ‘avoidance’ 
(which also includes strategies for minimising the effects of racism), 
‘fighting back’ and ‘constructive engagement’. 
I begin this chapter by looking at practices that can be classed as 
‘avoidance’, which include avoiding places or situations where the 
likelihood of conflict is high. It also includes limiting interactions with 
those who are perceived as very different to themselves. I draw on 
the literature produced by academics such as Bauman (1989), White 
et al. (1999) White and Wyn (2004) to suggest some of the dynamics 
at work here. Classified under the umbrella of ‘avoidance’ also are 
strategies that ‘minimise the impact of racism’. This is done, for 
instance, by laughing about a racist remark, or interpreting a 
particular event as something other than racism, so that it has a less 
distressing impact on the Self. I then discuss those actions taken by 
interviewees that can be broadly understood as ‘fighting back’. I 
explore the extent to which ideas like ‘moral emotions’ (Katz 1988), 
‘resistance’ (Hall & Jefferson 1976), ‘capitalising on Othering’ 
(Jensen 2009) and resilience (Ungar 2004, 2005b, 2008) are useful 
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concepts for understanding actions that can be classified as fighting 
back – actions such as arguing with someone who has just made a 
racist comment through to  ‘bashing’ those perceived as racist. 
Finally I look at those strategies that involve ‘constructive 
engagement’, undertaken in an effort to engage other Australians in 
dialogue and in an attempt to move towards mutual understanding 
and respect – to address what interviewees believe are the root 
causes of racism, such as misunderstanding and fear of the ‘Other’.  
I use the work of Michael Ungar (2004, 2005b, 2008) and Peta 
Stephenson (2008) to explore this way of dealing with experiences of 
racism.  
Classifications like ‘avoidance’ or ‘constructive’ may be problematic 
because they are overly reliant on a range of moralising assumptions 
rather than deep ethical insights or practices of the kind Bernstein 
(1997, p. 397) talks about when he calls on us to resolve to act in 
such ways that ‘however much we are committed to our styles of 
thinking we are willing to listen to others without denying or 
suppressing the otherness of the other’. 
In all classifications, including those used by botanists attempting to 
place a particular plant in a species, there is always an issue of 
porous boundaries given that many human interactions can be 
placed in more than one category and, as Harre and Moghaddam 
(2003) have argued, there are various positions in which people who 
are engaging with each other can adopt. For example, talking back to 
someone who has just made a racist comment could be treated as 
an example of ‘fighting back’ or of ‘constructive engagement’. It might  
be understood as ‘fighting back’ in the sense that the person is taking 
a stand against the aggressor and letting them know that their racist 
comment will not be accepted passively. It might also be considered 
‘constructive engagement’ because arguing back can be an initial 
step towards reasoned argument and dialogue, allowing some 
understanding to be arrived at and perhaps some stereotypes or 
assumptions broken down in the process of that dialogue. This 
example also illustrates how the term ‘fighting back’, which often 
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carries negative connotations, can instead be seen as constructive – 
which the term ‘constructive engagement’ implies. Despite the 
limitations in the use of these typologies, it nevertheless seems to me 
to be a useful way of exploring how some young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims deal with racism. 
Given that there is a variety of ways young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslims engage with other Australians, I then go on to establish the 
sense of belonging they have in respect to the broader Australian 
community. I propose that one of the key ways that young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims develop a sense of belonging to Australia is 
through actions typical of ‘constructive engagement’. These are 
actions such as volunteering in a community project that enables 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims and members of the broader 
Australian community to come to know one another.  
I start by exploring some of the responses to negative interactions. 
 
 
Avoidance  
 
I have already indicated that some of the young people I spoke with 
interpreted both their own direct experiences and their more vicarious 
experiences of racism by placing that experience in a history of a 
long-standing and deep division between ‘them’ and ‘other’ 
Australians. They also believed that this division was continuing to be 
fuelled by persistent media ‘mis-representation’, which had got under 
way at the start of the twenty-first century. Some of these young 
people felt that, given some of the ways they were perceived and 
treated, they were better off ‘sticking together’ by associating mostly 
with people who shared ‘their way of life’, and the best thing to do 
was to avoid places and interactions with ‘other’ Australians likely to 
involve them in challenging or hostile interactions. This way of 
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dealing with racism Bauman (1989) has  pointed out, is typical in an 
environment where people feel collectively excluded and Othered. It 
makes sense that those who feel marginalised would draw support 
from and seek friendship with others who share similar experiences, 
and simultaneously keep their distance from those who they either 
feel to be very different or believe are stigmatising them.  
Even though some of the young people like Rocky had a clear idea 
of who ‘the enemy’ was, and claimed to understand the basis of the 
differences between ‘the enemy’ and ‘his’ community, the striking 
dualism this understanding implied could sometimes be blurred in 
their ordinary interactions with each other.  
Rocky gave an example of this blurring of differences. During a 
school excursion to a theme park, Rocky and his friends were rowing 
a boat when suddenly the boat started filling up with water. When he 
and his friends cried out for assistance it was some Anglo-Australian 
students (with whom Rocky and his Lebanese friends were involved 
in conflict in their school) who put their differences aside and came to 
their aid: 
We were nearly under the water. And so then we were screaming 
out ‘help’ … and then the funny thing is the people who are our 
rivals in school came to our aid. [Our rivals are the other group in 
the school] …  There’s just two groups: our group and the other 
group.  Arabs and everyone else.  They came to our aid and … 
they’re helping us take out the water...  
Aside from rare instances like this example of a quite positive 
interaction, Rocky and his peers generally neither wanted nor sought 
out many opportunities to get to know people from different cultural 
backgrounds. As Rocky put it, this certainly included those they 
thought, rightly or wrongly, to ‘be against them,’ namely ‘White’ 
Australians:  
[People ask] why do Leboe’s just stick together? But when you think 
about it we’re forced to stick together because everyone else is 
looking down at us; everyone is just looking down at us pretty much 
and making us stick together.  
The disposition to ‘stick together’, to protect oneself and others in the 
group from various kinds of vilification while seeking support from 
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others who have shared experiences, is not an unusual way of 
coping in the face of a hostile environment. Researchers like Collins 
et al. (2000) and Barker (2005) have demonstrated how this coping 
strategy is used by other minority groups, particularly other young 
marginalised men, in the face of persistent social, cultural and 
economic exclusion. However, bonding with people like themselves 
may not by itself do all that much to prevent or diminish the 
experience of vilification. By ‘sticking together’ young men like Rocky 
may well feed off and affirm each other’s identity as ‘victim’ and as 
the object of  injustice, but this may also reinforce the process of 
exclusion – and reinforce social containment (White & Johanna 2004; 
White et al. 1999). People do not necessarily have to personally 
experience racism to form a view about racism and what to do about 
it. Furthermore, when they hang around ‘people like them’ they 
become even more visible targets for racial and religious 
discrimination, and when they are targeted as a group it serves to 
confirm their sense of exclusion (White & Johanna 2004).  
Perhaps that is why some of the young people I interviewed opted to 
avoid interactions with particular people or places they believed were 
likely to be hostile to them. Nuer, for example, told me how she had 
avoided leaving the safety of her own home for a few days after the 
terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001. She 
took this course of action partly because she said she was afraid of 
being attacked, but also because she was worried about how she 
would react to any hostility that she encountered. She was 
particularly worried about reacting to hostility in ways that might 
exacerbate the negative image that Muslims had. Nuer wore the 
hijab and she knew that any thing she did could be interpreted by 
other Australians as typifying the thoughts and actions of ‘the 
Muslim’. Taking all of this into consideration Nuer decided that it was 
best to try to avoid such a situation and stay at home until the ‘moral 
panic’ about Muslims had died down. She told me: 
… you hear stories. The story that I heard I thought was about my 
cousin but it was false, it wasn’t her, it was some other sister. She 
got kicked out of the bus because she was wearing the scarf. So 
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you know it’s like, oh my god what’s happening? When that 
happened, I didn’t go out. Parents and brothers said don’t go out 
because it’s pretty bad. A lot of Muslims are getting harassed on the 
streets. So I stayed in the house for a couple more days to see how 
things go.  
So I didn’t go out. Sometimes it’s like. It’s like fear is like, what if it is 
you? You are going to go out where people that are going to harass 
you and then you’re going to go psycho at them? Then what kind of 
impression are we sort of leaving about Islam?  
Nuer’s decision to stay at home and avoid going to places where 
people might harass Muslims did not stem from any personal 
experiences of racism. Rather it reflected the fact that she had heard 
stories of other Muslims being harassed on the streets. Hers was a 
vicarious experience.  
A report to The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission by 
researchers Greg Noble and Scott Poynting (2004) revealed similar 
findings to my research. The authors of this report made the point 
that ‘the starkest feature in the landscape of fear and incivility … [is] 
when people actually fear for their lives or are afraid to leave their 
homes’ (Poynting & Noble 2004, p. 16). That report pointed to the 
way ‘victims of racism’ dealt with personal experiences and the 
resulting insecurity and anxiety by withdrawing from the wider 
community: 
Mushrid, a middle-aged Muslim man of Indonesian origin, says, ‘I’m 
scared to go out from the house’. He is awaiting a response from 
the Department of Immigration to his visa application, and is fearful 
of being provoked in public into a retaliation that will be damaging 
for him.  
Aladdin, a 40 year-old tradesman of Lebanese Muslim background, 
explains that after his wife and daughter were violently assaulted in 
a racist attack in a shopping centre, ‘we started to delay the shops 
for once a month, for example, we go to the shops and get all what 
we need  (Poynting & Noble 2004, p. 16).     
Another response to racism that can be treated as ‘avoidance’ was 
highlighted in the course of a discussion among members of a focus 
group made up of young men. This group discussed whether 
ignoring racist comments and/or walking away from those being 
racist was a good idea or not. Axle and Valentino, two of the young 
men in the group believed, for example, that a ‘non-violent’ approach 
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when confronted by overt racism was the best course of action to 
adopt: 
Axle: One weekend I was in the city with the boys and this group of 
Aborigines … And they were like … “you fucking wogs!” We were 
just walking down the street. “You fucking wogs. You fucking wogs”. 
What do we do? We could have talked back but we just kept 
walking. We could have smashed them all out. 
Valentino:  Naah … he done the right thing by walking away. See, if 
it was someone else he would have gone, “Oh you wanna cause 
trouble? All right, let’s go … let’s go”. But he done the right thing by 
walking away, by just ignoring them and walking away. 
Deciding to ignore racism has been used by others in the face of 
hostility. Research by Liv Newman (2004) on African-American 
experiences of coping with racism in the United States found for 
example that ignoring racism was a common strategy. Newman 
(2004, p. 57) writes:  
When black Americans ignore the racist speech and/or behaviour 
that are cast at them, they are undermining the threat. By not 
acknowledging the threat as important, black Americans can avoid 
some portion of the harm that racism inflicts.  
Such a strategy might not be considered avoidance but might instead 
be conceived of as actions orientated towards minimising the impact 
of racism (i.e. to take the “sting out of the racist experience”) and as 
an attempt to control victimisation. Strategies to this effect that were 
narrated by interviewees included laughing about the racist 
encounter (i.e. making light of a bad situation) or laughing at or about 
the person who made the racist remark. Mia explained how laughing 
at someone’s racist remark or laughing about a racist experience 
helps her, especially psychologically, to deal with the stress of 
racism. 
Mia: … I had to like sort of make myself understand that I 
can’t take everything in, so every time someone says 
something, like I didn’t take [it too seriously] I’ll laugh 
because that’s how I’ve trained myself to become, just to 
block those things out and see the funny side of it. Even 
when [someone was saying some really hurtful things 
about Islam or my culture to my face] I’ll look at them and 
I’ll laugh. I’ll see [something funny in that situation] and 
that’s how I sort of make myself be. If you take 
everything to heart then you’re not going to live a very 
happy life, you’re going to be miserable and [quest
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why me? Why me? ... so I had to make that decision and 
you know…  
 Kavindi:  That’s really interesting how you said you find humour in 
what   they say. 
Mia:  Yeah [I would see the funny side in] what they’re saying 
and how they’re reacting, like their facial expressions … 
like they’re really angry… but as they were saying it 
looked really funny on them [the facial expression they 
had on were so funny and I couldn’t help but laugh out 
loud]. 
Mia’s use of humour to relieve the stress of dealing with racism is 
recognised by other academics such as Samuel Juni and Bernard 
Katz (2001, p. 120) as a common strategy adopted by those 
experiencing racism as an attempt to control victimisation. Seeing the 
funny side is useful in the face of a threat to identity posed by, for 
example, someone’s attempt to ridicule or put down. The threat can 
be modified or even removed by laughing at the aggressor and their 
attempt to cause hurt (Mealyea 1989). Studies, such as that 
conducted by Liv Newman (2004, p. 57) on how African Americans 
cope with racism, reveal similarly to my study that a sense of humour 
is used to cope with racism and to buffer its harmful effects.  
“I just tune it out because that’s their ignorance. My mom and dad 
taught me that everybody is equal,” said Phyllis. This quote is an 
example of how black Americans deal with racism, by ignoring it. “I 
laugh it off,” states Walt. Sam advises, “Don’t look at it personally.” 
When asked how Sam reacts to discriminatory treatment he said, 
“I’m a slow person to respond to things that actually happen to me. 
I, cause I, don’t really let stuff get to me that often.” Ignoring racism 
means more than just not acknowledging it. Ignoring racism means 
to undo some of its harmful effects by casting it as “nonsense” or 
buffering one’s emotions against it. 
My interviewee Mia, and Newman’s interviewee Phyllis, can reframe 
a racist encounter that potentially positions them as victims, by 
seeing the funny side to the racist encounter. Aided by humour, they 
can reinterpret the meaning of the interaction in a way that is not so 
damaging to their self-concept (i.e. 'it is just their ignorance').  
Humour is not the only strategy used by my interviewees to frame or 
interpret a certain situation (e.g. being told by a stranger ‘to go 
home’) as something other than as racism. For instance, my 
interviewee Nuer (who says that racism is not an ‘issue’ in her life) 
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explains why a situation in which she found herself being 
discriminated against was not a manifestation of racism but instead a 
revelation of an individual’s ignorance.   
I didn’t say he was racist. He was just ignorant. He knew nothing 
about the faith, the religion. And mostly he knew nothing about the 
game. The rules of the game. And that was one of the sad things. 
Given that he was in the area, his position as a top referee for 12 
years… you expect them to know the rules. That was upsetting. But 
you can’t. That’s the thing. You can’t let these sort of people tell you 
that you can’t play [sport] with a headscarf. These people are the 
kind of people you need to ignore, just throw them away, put them 
aside, just keep going. Because that’s the only way you are going to 
achieve and the only way you are going to be happy in life. To this 
day I don’t understand why he said that.  
As Nuer suggests here, framing the incident not as racism but 
instead as ignorance (i.e. a problem with him and therefore not with 
her) enables her to not let that particular event affect her too much. 
When she says, “you need to ignore, just throw them away, put them 
aside, just keep going,” I interpret this as her suggesting that we 
should also ignore and ‘throw’ the idea of being victims of racism 
‘away’, so that we can ‘just keep going’ with our lives and not let it 
affect what we want to achieve or our happiness.  
Essed (1991, p. 78) has similarly found, in her study of African 
American women’s coping with racism that, while all the women she 
interviewed could recall specific events of unfair treatment and 
discrimination, some of the women did not categorise these 
experiences as racist events. She writes: 
From a social psychological point of view, it would seem that the 
best way to explain inconsistency in accounts of racism would be 
within a framework of cognitive consistency theories. The reason is 
that the object of discrimination may be a problematic experience, 
which may cause psychological inconsistency between previous 
cognitions and the interpretation of new experiences. In sociology 
the phenomenon is known as self deception (Douglas, 1976) and in 
social psychology as cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957/1976). 
[Festinger] … contends that people tend to feel uncomfortable with 
cognitive dissonance; therefore, they are motivated to reconstruct 
their perceptions in a way that reduces dissonance. People tend to 
reduce dissonance in particular when situations are felt to be a 
threat to the self-concept, for instance, in situations seen as 
negative and inevitable at the same time (Aronson, 1980).  
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There are other ways to understand the inconsistencies in accounts 
of racism, and an alternative interpretation is offered in the next 
chapter. For now it suffices to say that dissonance theories are 
useful, at least to some extent, for understanding why interviewees 
like Nuer may not readily categorise instances of discrimination or 
unfair treatment as racism. In other words, downplaying the 
significance of racism was a strategy used by some people like Nuer, 
as it helped her to avoid the traps of having a ‘victim mentality’, is 
psychologically protective; and enables her to step out of the 
language of ‘us and them’ (unlike some of my other interviewees who 
more readily identified racism in their everyday lives). It is, however, 
doubtful that such an approach is very useful for challenging or 
confronting more systematic everyday racism, as it promotes 
ignoring or minimising the significance of racism instead. 
It should be noted that not everyone agreed that avoiding racism or 
downplaying the significance of racist comments was a good option. 
Some of the young men I interviewed were especially critical of their 
peers who advocated non-confrontational ways of dealing with 
racism.  
 
 
Fighting back 
 
Some young people dealt with the often challenging and hostile 
interactions that followed events like the 11 September 2001 attacks 
and the ‘Sydney gang rapes’ by talking back or even ‘fighting back’ 
physically. Coco explained to me that while she was unlikely to 
physically fight back she would at least fight back verbally. Coco 
thought that to be silent in the face of abuse and injustice would be to 
send a message that racism was acceptable. She argued that if the 
abuse was responded to immediately then the perpetrators were less 
likely to think they could just get away with it:  
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With me I am not a very violent person but anger builds up in me 
and I feel like I have to have a word or something just to get it off my 
back.   
… I would say something back but I wouldn’t get into a punch-up or 
anything. 
[For example] If someone said something to my mum and I’d feel 
like – mum wouldn’t be able to defend herself, my mum speaks 
English but not that good and if I don’t defend her that person is 
going to go to that next person and think it’s all right to abuse them. 
So by letting them get away with it he is going to do it to somebody 
else. He probably thinks we’re not allowed to talk while we’re a 
Muslim and we’re supposed to keep our voices low and not be too 
loud but still I am going to defend my religion, my culture, my family. 
I feel like we’re obliged to, you can’t just let it go by. 
... Some people take it – like I said they had a big punch-up and it 
was on the news and this and that but I wouldn’t go to that extent.  
I think once I was with my mum and [this other Australian said] 
something about the scarf and I’m like – they just had something 
against her and I’m like, “what’s it got to do with you? It’s on my 
mum’s head. If she is wrapping it around you and dragging you 
down along the street kind of thing [then] you have a right to say 
something”… I go, “you are allowed to dress however you want to 
dress, and you walk down the street and no-one comments on you; 
what gives you the right to harass me just because we choose to be 
modest and cover our head”? 
‘Talking back’ is one way young people like Coco dealt with their 
encounters with racism or more specifically hate speech. Some 
writers such as Nat Hentoff (1992) have argued that arguing back is 
an effective way of dealing with hate speech. Richard Delgado and 
David H. Yun  (1994, p. 877) say that advocates for ‘free speech’ 
(like Hentoff) claim this strategy is preferential to anti-racism 
regulations that deal with hate speech with legal processes because:  
Racism is a form of ignorance, dispelling it though reasoned 
argument is the only way to get at its root. Moreover, talking back to 
the aggressor is empowering. It strengthens ones own identity, 
reduces victimisation …  
Delgado and Yun (1994, pp. 877-888) counter this claim by arguing 
that ‘talking back is rarely a realistic possibility for the victims of hate 
speech’ and may even be a dangerous option. This is why a few 
young people, fearful both for their safety and the safety of the 
families and friends, did not talk back as Coco has done. Instead, 
they walked away from their aggressor, choosing to ignore the verbal 
assaults or to take other avoidance strategies.   
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One of the key points that might be made about Coco's story of 
fighting back (at least verbally), in the face of racism, is that she 
indicated that it was driven by a moral impulse to defend her culture, 
religion and family. Equivalent moral impulses motivated some other 
young people to take more ‘violent’ actions against those who 
insulted their faith or culture. They were more inclined to fight back 
physically if the aggressor had initiated the abuse.  
Typically, when young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims have been 
reported in the media as ‘bashing/fighting’ other Australians, their 
action has all too often been framed minimally as ‘violent’ and 
possibly even as ‘criminal’. Causal links are drawn with their cultural 
or religious background or some other defect like the idea that these 
particular young people have ‘anger management issues’ (White & 
Wyn 2004). Rarely if ever are their actions understood as honourable 
or justified, nor is much effort made to elucidate why they have 
engaged in the conduct that has attracted a good deal of adverse 
attention.  
This is one of the ideas that make the work of Jack Katz (1988) so 
important. Katz work is intended in part as a critique of conventional 
positivist criminology, which he argues has too often been: 
Preoccupied with a search for background forces, usually defects in 
the offenders’ psychological backgrounds or social environments, to 
the neglect of … those aspects in the fore-ground of criminality that 
make its various forms sensible, even sensually compelling…(Katz 
1988, p. 3) 
Katz (1988) argues that those who are defined as ‘criminal’ and who 
are understood conventionally to have committed acts of ‘violence’ 
may commit ‘violent’ acts for precisely the same kinds of reasons as 
those people who conventionally are understood as non-criminal, like 
police, military and security personnel or even householders 
defending their house. That is to say, applying the category ‘criminal’ 
to some acts and not to others has the effect of obscuring what may 
well be common motivational factors. One set of such common 
factors are what Katz talks about as ‘moral emotions’.   
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Moral emotions are those highly affective states of mind that involve 
feelings like anger, revenge, or a desire to command respect, elicited 
in order to protect family, friends and oneself (Katz 1988, p. 3). 
Bessant and Watts (1993) have drawn on Katz’s (1988) work when 
they suggest that ‘violence’ may more often be a morally and 
emotionally driven experience than an action conventionally 
understood in criminal law terms as an ‘evil act’ driven by a 
conscious desire to do a wrong, which is understood by Anglo-
American law and conventional criminology alike as the ‘guilty mind’ 
component of a ‘guilty act’. Bessant and Watts (1993, p. 112) have 
argued: 
Moral emotions [include] pride, honour, loyalty, the ‘instinct’ to 
protect one’s own family, one’s cultural identity, protection of 
territory motivate nations to war. They are … often the same 
motives that drive young people to acts of violence. 
They make the point that, when young people engage in acts of 
violence, they often do so on the same moral motivational basis as 
those who are seen as more authorised to engage in violence (e.g. 
the police when they use force to subdue protesters or the state 
when it declares war on another nation). The key difference is that, 
when those in authority engage in violence, they have the power to 
legitimate their actions and so these actions are more often 
perceived as warranted and even honourable. When young people 
engage in violence, they are more likely to be labelled deviant, 
delinquent, ‘at risk’ and in need of adult supervision, punishment and 
intervention (Bessant & Watts 1993).  
Michel Foucault’s (1997) thesis on the relationship between “truth” 
and “power” is useful for understanding the construction of social 
categories such as ‘youth violence’. Foucault  (1977, p. 208) argued 
that what is deemed ‘true’, in a particular cultural and historical 
context, reflects power relations, and the capacity of certain groups 
and institutions to wield more power than others (e.g. young people) 
in developing and sustaining particular discourses or truths. 
Furthermore, certain interests (.e.g. political and economically driven 
interests) are vested in the construction of particular “truths”, such as 
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the categorisation of particular behaviours and actions as ‘socially 
legitimate’, ‘criminal’ or ‘deviant’ conduct.  
Carol Bacchi (1999) and  William Ryan (1976) similarly argue, that 
what is needed is a critical assessment of who has the power to label 
particular kinds of responses as ‘violent’ and ‘criminal’, or 
alternatively as ‘necessary and legitimate force’. They urge us to 
question whose interests are served in the way particular social acts 
and social groups are framed.  
Young people like Rocky are intuitively disposed to ask such critical 
questions and to delve into the power dynamics at work in the 
process of labelling people and their conduct. Rocky said he was sick 
of Lebanese people being labelled as ‘trouble makers’ and Muslims 
being labelled as terrorists when others (i.e. White Australians and 
Americans) take similar ‘violent’ actions but are more often forgiven 
for their violence: 
... We’re the trouble makers - that’s our tag in Australia: Lebanese 
people are trouble makers. How we’re the trouble makers if they’re 
the ones that said go back to your country? If that report was on the 
news then they’re not going to say that they said that, all they’re 
going to say is the Lebanese people started arguing and fighting 
with these Anglo people ... That’s what they always say, the 
Lebanese this, Lebanese that.   
Why do they tag [the activities of Muslim groups such as those 
fighting against US invasion in Iraq as] terrorism? It’s not terrorism, 
they [the West/ the USA] just tagged it terrorism. It’s like, that’s a 
tree, right, and they tag it firewood. It’s a living tree! They’re just 
defending their country but [no] they’re [labelled us] terrorists. It’s 
like someone comes up to me now and punches me in the face. 
Don’t I have to defend myself? Or, like, is about to punch me in the 
face and then I block it and I start hitting him. That’s self-defence. 
As Rocky put it, the right to self-defence and the right to protect 
oneself or family and friends are often considered morally 
acceptable, except when the conduct is enacted by individuals or 
groups deemed to be outside some social or legal norm. This 
presumably was the point Max Weber made about states securing 
unto themselves a monopoly over ‘legitimate violence’. Indeed 
Weber (1978 pp. 54-56) made it the sine qua non that defined the 
existence of a state that it be an entity ‘if and insofar as its 
Page 136  
administrative staff successfully upholds a claim on the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of violence in the enforcement of its order’.  
I encountered another example of morally driven justification of 
violence in another group interview where the participants were 
discussing why fighting to maintain respect and dignity in the face of 
racism was understood to be honourable:   
Usher: I remember this happened a year ago when they see a lady, 
like a Lebanese lady with a scarf. They used to like say “take that 
fucking shit off!” 
Axle: Naah bro. It happened a lot. It happened in shopping centres.  
Egor: But then I think we got our respect back by telling them off 
and stuff. 
Axle: By bashing the fuck out of them. 
Kavindi: Hey, Egor, so you were saying you got your respect by 
telling them off? So if you tell them off you get more respect?  
Egor: Oh yeah. 
Kavindi: Yeah? 
Axle: He means like full on scaring them and shit and they never 
want to open up their mouth again. 
Kavindi: What do you mean scare them? Like, how would you scare 
them? 
Muly: Threaten them. 
Egor: Naah … like whatever. Whatever it takes. 
As this conversation makes apparent, some of the young men in this 
group saw ‘fighting’ as an effective and sensible way of dealing with 
behaviour that they took exception to, either because they thought it 
was racist or was an act of incivility towards them or others (e.g. 
Lebanese women) whom they felt they needed to defend. As Axle 
put it, ‘full on scaring them’ might effectively discourage those who 
had been disrespectful to them and prevent them from making further 
offensive comments. In the face of disrespect, ‘full on scaring them’ 
by whatever means available (and this seems to have included 
‘bashing’ the perpetrators) allowed these young men to win back 
respect by showing that they were not weak and not prepared to put 
up with deeply offensive behaviour in a display of meek submission. 
Another interviewee, John, who I spoke with in a focus group 
process, was another young man who saw immediate and desirable 
effects from ‘fighting back’. For John the imperative to ‘fight back’ 
Page 137  
was not a violent reaction grounded in blind hate or aggression. It 
was, as John says here, a response designed to ‘just to teach [the 
perpetrator] a lesson not to do it again’: 
Well, this kid at school, a Year Seven kid, he keeps on teasing me.  
I was in year nine and then I hit him and then he stopped. Oh …  it 
wasn’t a hit like – it was just teach him a lesson, it’s like a warning, 
sort of.  It wasn’t like [I wanted to] land him in hospital. It was just a 
little warning to stop it, just teach him a lesson not to do it again. 
[It’s] not that I wanted [to really bash him badly] – because even 
other people started to get annoyed because he was saying bad 
stuff. 
However, not all the young men I spoke with agreed that ‘fighting 
back’ was the most effective way of dealing with racism, let alone 
morally acceptable. Valentino, one of the young men in the focus 
group discussion, went against the general consensus in his group 
that the best way of dealing with racism was to ‘fight back’: 
Naah, Naah … but if you keep arguing and answering back to 
whatever they’re saying then it’s actually just going to get bigger 
and bigger. Rather leave it small and walk away. 
David, in another focus group, preferred ‘avoidance’ strategies, 
saying that ignoring racist comments and walking away from 
someone who is hostile was the best strategy to adopt:  
You just ignore them and they’ll get over it sometimes. If you ignore 
them, they’re going to get bored by saying the same thing if you 
don’t react to it and they’ll stop. 
Anthony in another group discussion agreed. He reported that he and 
his friends did not fight back when they were faced with racist 
comments. They just had a laugh about it amongst themselves:  
Anthony: Oh, yeah, I did [experience racism]. You know in the city 
where the immigration centre is? … Well, on that road, I think it was 
on that street. [Me and my friends] we all had beards, some of us 
had really big [beards], you know, and we’re walking, walking, and 
we stopped at a light and then this man came, Australian man, he 
had a beer in his hand and all tattoos and we were talking …  
talking a bit loud and we’re just having a laugh and then he came 
and he stopped us like that, and he looked my Sri Lankan friend in 
the eye and the next thing [he said] “I heard you back there talking 
about bombing the London bridge”, yeah, no, the London tube, the 
London tube, I think that’s where the train, that’s where the 
explosion happened in London? ... My other friend and me, we 
looked him in the eye and then he looked us in the eye and he 
started like, he started saying that we were going to bomb the 
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London tube and I heard you talking back there and one of youse 
are with Bin Laden, I’m going to call the police now. 
  Jack Black: If our friends were there, he would have copped the 
biggest belting.  
Anthony: No, there was police right before us. See where Nando’s 
is? There was police over there. 
Jack Black: He still would have copped the biggest belting. He want 
to call the cops. He’s saying that we’re going to bomb the London 
Bridge. 
Anthony: No, but we just ignored him. He goes, ‘I’m going to show 
you where the immigration centre is, if you want to come, you follow 
me’ and then he just went. That’s it. And he done it in front of a lot of 
people. 
Kavindi: How did everybody else react? They just kept quiet? 
Anthony: They just stood there looking and they kept quiet, that’s it.  
Kavindi: How did you and your friends react to that? 
Anthony: We had a laugh, a little bit of a laugh and that’s it. The guy 
was drunk, that’s why he was just… We ignored it, that’s it. We 
spoke a bit about what the London tube is, we spoke a bit about 
what he said and then, and then [we asked each other if anyone 
else has] said it before, like, everyone said, ‘no, we didn’t’. And I 
didn’t even know the London tube, so yeah, that’s about it and then 
we had a laugh and then that’s it.  
Kavindi: So you didn’t talk back to him? You didn’t say anything in 
response like, ‘we didn’t say that’? 
Anthony: I went up close to him and looked him in the face and then 
I think he got scared so he just went – because there was like nine 
of us and we were all taller than him so we were all staring him in 
the face and then he was like, ‘oh, I’m going to go and show you 
where it is’ and he went. He didn’t come back.  
The way in which Anthony and his friends dealt with this particular 
incident could be treated as a form of ‘avoidance’ because they did 
not physically or verbally fight back. However, the act of going up 
close to the aggressor, looking him in the face and affectively scaring 
him off, could also have been categorised as ‘fighting back’. This 
particular response sent the same message that a physically or 
verbally assertive response would have signified, namely that we are 
not willing to passively accept abuse and will not be intimidated by it.  
Whilst Anthony and other young men tried to avoid violent actions in 
response to the racism they encountered, the interviews and 
discussions indicated that some young men ‘felt pressured’ to deal 
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with racism by resorting to ‘violence’. For instance, when Valentino 
said that it was best to ignore racist comments and walk away from 
those making trouble he was teased by some of the other boys, 
particularly by Axle.  
Axle [referring to Valentino]: But with a little kid like him they’re not 
going to [try and pick a fight with him coz they know he won’t be 
able to fight back. That’s why he says just walk away [Because he 
can’t fight]. 
Comments such as this could also be interpreted as an expression of 
‘hegemonic masculinity’. While I will be drawing on and discussing 
this concept in detail in chapter five, I offer a brief account here for 
the purpose of analysing Axle’s response to Valentino. 
‘Hegemonic masculinity’ can be defined as a pattern of practices that 
has allowed men’s dominance over women to continue, and is 
‘distinct from other masculinities, especially subordinate 
masculinities’ (Connell & Messerschmidt 2005, p. 832). It embodies, 
within a particular historical and cultural context, the most honoured 
way of being a man.  For a particular masculinity to be considered 
hegemonic it needs to be more socially central, or more associated 
with authority and social power, than other forms of masculinity 
(Connell & Messerschmidt 2005, p. 846). The concept also presumes 
the subordination of non-hegemonic masculinities. Connell 
recognises that there is diversity in masculinities and femineities and 
defines ‘gender in terms of standard rather than normative behaviour, 
that is, as something that does not precede but is constituted in 
human action’ (Demetriou 2001, p. 340).  
According to Connell and Messerschmidt (2005, pp. 832-833), 
hegemonic masculinities come into existence in specific 
circumstances, and are open to historical change. Thus, older forms 
of masculinity might be displaced by new ones in the struggle for 
hegemony.  
The concept of hegemonic masculinity has received a number of 
criticisms. Jo Goodey (1997, p. 404) for instance writes: 
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In presenting a hierarchy of masculinities, hegemonic masculinity is 
I danger of being interpreted as a bounded catalogue of 
masculinities which fit neatly on top of one another. The beauty of 
social groups is that they defy any such categorisation.  
Stephen Whitehead (1999, p. 58) similarly argues: 
… hegemonic masculinity can only explain so much… its own 
legitimacy is weakened once we stress the fluidity, contingency and 
multiplicity of masculinities – and identities.  
On the same theme, Dimitrou (2001, p. 354) maintains that 
hegemonic masculinity needs to be understood as constructed not in 
opposition to other masculinities (e.g.  gay masculinities) but instead 
as a reciprocal and dialectical appropriation/marginalisation of a 
variety of masculinities.  
Despite the criticisms, many have found ‘that a nuanced 
understanding of the concept is useful when interpreting 
masculinities in diverse cultural settings (Connell 1995, 1996, 2000; 
Phoenix and Frosh, 2001; Edley and Wetherell, 1995; Cornwall and 
Lindisfarne, 1995)’ (Lee 2003, p. 81).  Such an understanding has 
helped me make sense of comments made by interviewees such as 
Axle, who as mentioned earlier, teased another young man in a focus 
group who did not support ‘fighting back’. Axle, like many men 
(Connell 1995), was disposed to value ‘violence’ and aggressiveness 
highly, and to treat it as an honourable aspect of ‘masculinity’, 
especially when confronted by the expression of racial abuse and 
vilification or when dealing with attacks on one’s own moral status 
(such as when other Australians evinced disrespect to the young 
people’s culture, religion or family).  
Of course avoidance and fighting back are not the only ways in which 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims engage with other Australians. 
As I found through my interviews and field work, a number of young 
people responded to racism, and experienced a sense of wider 
community belonging, through practices of ‘constructive 
engagement’. 
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Constructive engagement 
 
I argued earlier in this thesis that a range of factors contributed to 
young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims developing a sense of 
belonging to the wider Australian community. Some of the factors 
that contributed to this feeling of belonging included when they felt 
they were being both listened to and valued for what they had to say. 
It could also involve being given opportunities to negotiate the terms 
of belonging; being allowed and enabled to achieve what they 
wanted; being empowered to make a contribution to the social, 
economic and cultural life of the wider community, or simply having 
access to a space in which to have an open dialogue. They told me 
that they certainly felt a sense of belonging when others in the 
community ‘shared a way of life with them’. Sometimes it was all 
about having an experience that suggested they had ‘moral worth’ 
that was acknowledged in the wider community.  
Some of the young people I interviewed dealt with often challenging 
and hostile interactions by moving to engage people who were 
vilifying or Othering them, with strategies designed to develop mutual 
understanding and respect. Sometimes this included one-on-one 
actions aimed directly at aggressors. On other occasions it involved a 
process of community engagement focusing on projects that 
encouraged inter-cultural understanding, that helped to break down 
stereotypes of Muslims, or that were intended to facilitate mutual 
understanding and inter-action.  
One example of how young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims tried to 
engage with other Australians at a one-on-one level, and in doing so 
tackle racism indirectly, was provided by Ramsaya:   
I’ve had more questions now in my job. I’ve had one Anglo-Saxon 
woman who has just never met a Muslim before, a physically visible 
Muslim, in her life and she has just bombarded me with questions … 
and I just thought, oh my God! Because I’m still learning up to now 
about my religion, I cannot say that I’m a hundred per cent know 
about everything, in my religion because I haven’t read that much. 
But she bombarded me with these questions and that’s when it really 
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hit me that “oh my God! I don’t know anything and I need to start 
learning more”. 
She really didn’t think much [about Muslims or Islam] until the media 
has come out with the ….  Yeah, no, together we have [been learning 
more about Islam] …. I’ve been learning more and she’d ask me 
questions so I have been telling her more and more. I’ve been giving 
her books to read and stuff. So she… understands more about my 
religion and she’s also opened up and thought, “okay, so this religion 
exists and it’s not what, this religion is not what the media says it is”. 
So it’s good. And one of the books she loved was Does My Head 
Look Big in This? She just loved that.  Which I think is a good 
illustration of what a lot of Lebanese-Muslims or Arab-Muslim girls go 
through, we do fall in love, we do have …. I would love to go climbing 
and do not stick out like a freak. Yeah, I really would just like to just 
…. It’s just everything in that book is exactly what …. 
I have shown in this chapter that one way that the young people I 
spoke with developed a sense of belonging was by undertaking to 
engage with other Australians. As Mia’s story illustrates, actively 
participating in projects such as Youth Parliament, where there was 
an opportunity to engage in dialogue with other Australians and have 
one’s ‘moral worth’ recognised, was a very important way that young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims could begin to feel valued and to 
develop a sense of belonging: 
Being able to participate in things [such as] the Youth Parliament I 
felt a sense of belonging because I was able to voice my opinions 
and because everyone else was the same [as in we were all in it to 
make a positive difference] … I remember [Youth Parliament] was 
pretty much one of the main things that boosted my confidence and 
made me the person I am now because everyone was just so 
encouraging and we were in it together, you know, and they were so 
understanding and I just felt like I belonged, you know, and yeah, 
like I really did. 
[I felt a sense of belonging because] I was heard and I didn’t have to 
pretend to be someone else… I was just free to be myself and not 
have to worry about, oh [what if I act like or make a mistake, will 
they think all Muslims are like this]. You know, they were so 
supportive and I felt like, wow, people actually accept me for who I 
am and it just felt so good. I belong. Finally. 
Being ‘in it together’ is one of the notable phrases articulated by Mia. 
It captures the point that through wider community participation by 
working together towards a common goal those involved in the 
activity can share a sense of ‘being the same’, and in that way carve 
out a sense of belonging. It is a bit like the ‘way of life’ notion of 
belonging, only not so exclusive, because sharing the same goal still 
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allows for diversity (i.e. different beliefs and ways of living). There is a 
unifying point (i.e. the idea of ‘being in it together’) but in working 
towards a common goal there is more interest in hearing different 
voices and accepting all those in the group for who they are and 
embracing what they each bring to the table.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that there are three key ways that the young people I 
interviewed dealt with the often challenging and hostile interactions 
that emerged following events such as the 9/11 attacks and the 
‘Sydney gang rapes’. The three key ways identified I called 
‘avoidance’, ‘fighting back’, and ‘constructive engagement’.  
Actions that fitted the category of ‘avoidance’ included strategies 
such as avoiding places where they were more likely to encounter 
challenging and hostile interactions, and limiting interactions with 
those perceived as very different, ignoring racist comments and 
walking away from aggressors. It also included strategies aimed at 
minimising the impact of racism, for instance by using humour to 
make take the sting out of racism, and interpreting what could be 
counted as racism as something else.  
The second key way they dealt with racism was through actions that 
can be understood as ‘fighting back’, which is essentially verbally 
fighting back or physically fighting back but can also include other 
actions of resistance.  
The third key way that the young people dealt with racism was by 
what can be understood as ‘constructive engagement’. This included 
actions at a more immediate one-on-one level of interaction with 
other Australians, or broader community-level involvement. These 
actions are typified as ‘constructive engagement’ when the 
interaction is anti-racist in nature, and incorporates goals such as 
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developing mutual understanding and respect across difference and 
tackling misunderstanding. I proposed that interviewees who were 
more involved in actions that can be perceived as ‘constructive 
engagement’ tended to report a greater sense of belonging to the 
wider community. At least more so than interviewees who more often 
adopted actions that can be classified as ‘sticking together’ or 
‘fighting back’ in an effort to deal with their experiences of racism. 
More research however, is required to explore the relationship 
between wider community belonging and participating in activities 
that might constitute as constructive engagement. Further research is 
needed looking into other factors that might contribute to a sense of 
wider community belonging. That is, factors like having more positive 
interactions with members of the wider community than negative 
interactions (as has been suggested to be the case in my study). 
In the next chapter, I examine how some other young people of 
Arabic-speaking backgrounds dealt with racism, using the digital 
technology ‘YouTube,’ to create new public spaces, which they were 
able to use to invoke a sense of collective place and belonging.  
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Chapter Five: Digital Politics: Counter Racism 
and the Internet 
 
 
… the predominant representations of young people as passive 
objects upon which the criminal justice agencies impose their own 
images and control mechanisms… Young people use subcultures 
as one way to forge the category of ‘youth’ and its attendant 
images. They do this by taking on, latching onto consuming and/or 
inventing artefacts that express their feelings or define their stance 
in relation to the world … By definition the active nature of this 
expression almost invariably brings them into conflict with the world 
… the stage is set for an intergenerational war of resistance…   
(Omaji 2003, pp. 40-41) 
 
There is little doubt that, like so many young people, many Arabic 
Speaking Background (ASB) young people have become ‘digital 
natives’ and have actively engaged with many forms of the so-called 
Web 2.0 (Blanchard, Metcalf & Burns 2007; Carrie et al. 2009; Lange 
2008). Media commentators such as Gibson (2007) and Bolt (2009) 
have deemed problematic the ways in which some of these young 
people are using the internet. They have given particular attention to 
the way ASB young people in Sydney and Melbourne have turned to 
the production of videos for posting on YouTube (Houlihan & 
Cameron 2008; Tinkler & Hastie 2007). Gibson (2007) for example, 
commented as follows:  
A YouTube video that glorifies notorious gang rapist Bilal Skaf shows 
there's a small, antagonistic sub-section within the Lebanese Muslim 
community, Prime Minister John Howard says. Mr. Howard today 
described the video as a "shocking exercise".  "It's a reminder that 
there is undoubtedly within a section, a small section of the Lebanese 
Muslim community, a group of people who are antagonistic to the 
values and the way of life in this country," Mr. Howard told the Nine 
Network. A YouTube user today removed from the website several of 
the controversial videos, including the Skaf one, called Lebo thugs, 
and another that shows a man being bashed by a gang  … 
The videos have generally been interpreted by the mainstream 
media commentators as: expressing and inviting ‘anti-Australian 
sentiment’, celebrating ‘gang culture’ and a ‘we will do as we please 
in Australia mentality’ (Bolt 2009; Gibson 2007; Tinkler & Hastie 
2007). The concern has extended to the suggestion that some of 
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these videos were designed to incite violence (Gibson 2007; Tinkler 
& Hastie 2007). In observing the various responses to this matter, it 
appeared that some journalists, community leaders, police, and 
those working closely with ASB young people, were making certain 
assumptions about the young people involved in the production and 
broadcasting of the videos (Gibson 2007; Tinkler & Hastie 2007). 
While some of this expression of concern is in a sense ‘predictable’ 
and not always well-informed, some service providers working with 
young Lebanese Muslims also began voicing concerns about the 
young peoples’ use of YouTube. In 2008, while I was working for 
Victorian Arabic Social Services (VASS), the staff were advised by a 
young person that several YouTube videos were being produced by 
‘gangs’ of young men who, like him, came from Arabic speaking 
backgrounds. He told staff at VASS that the YouTube videos were 
being created to ‘stir up’ rival gangs and even to schedule ‘fights 
between gangs’. In coordinated exercises involving VASS and the 
police, some of the offending videos were removed from YouTube 
and several planned fights were prevented.   
My own encounter with these videos between 2008 and 2010 
suggested that, while some of this concern was warranted, a number 
of YouTube videos created by young Lebanese-Muslim and other 
ASB young people, seemed to point to other more interesting 
dynamics at play. I decided that this body of video material deserved 
some detailed attention even though this involved extending the 
parameters of my research to include non-Lebanese-Muslim ASB 
young people. I therefore accessed and analyzed a number of these 
YouTube video postings to address one of my key research 
questions, namely how do some young Lebanese-Muslim Australians 
(as well as other ASB young people) deal with often challenging and 
hostile interactions that followed the mobilisation of  racist sentiment 
against Muslims after 2001? I was also interested in exploring the 
YouTube content to see if it revealed anything about these young 
people’s sense of belonging to the wider community. An analysis of 
some of the content enabled me to address the related questions of 
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whether YouTube might also be understood as a medium for young 
people to create a sense of belonging and to deal with their 
experiences of racism.   
I begin by looking at what the literature says about young people’s 
use of the Internet. As will become clear from my review of the 
literature, young people from a range of different backgrounds use 
the Internet for a variety of reasons, and this includes using it to 
create new and distinct political spaces. In the process they can be 
said to create what deserve to be called ‘spaces of belonging’.  
Drawing on the analytical categories developed in the previous 
chapter, I analyze a few YouTube videos that can be classified as 
‘fighting back’ against racism. I also examine to what extent concepts 
such as ‘capitalizing on Othering’ (Jensen 2009), ‘resilience’ (Ungar 
2004, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2008; Ungar et al. 2008; Ungar et al. 
2007) and ‘ethnicised protest masculinity’ (Noble, Poynting & Tabar 
2003) are useful for interpreting these videos. Next I look at the 
YouTube videos that can be categorised as ‘constructive 
engagement’. I argue that these YouTube videos are being created 
and used by Lebanese and Muslim young people, and by others who 
engage with these media, to ‘constructively’ deal with their 
experiences of racism and to negotiate their sense of wider 
community belonging.  
 
 
Young Peoples’ Use of YouTube 
 
There is plenty of empirical evidence that young people are 
increasingly appropriating and using online communication media. In 
2008 the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA) 
reported that 15 to 17 year olds went online on average for two hours 
and 24 minutes per day (ACMA 2008, p. 4). Sixty-four per cent of (8 
to 17 years old) young people’s total Internet time was spent on 
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social networking and online communication activities (e.g. on sites 
such as FaceBook, MySpace and YouTube). Even more interesting, 
ACMA found that over 80 per cent of young women aged 14 to 17, 
and 65 per cent of boys aged 15 to 17 had their own material online 
(e.g. an online profile or a video uploaded by themselves).  
The use of online sites like YouTube points to the attractions of 
interactivity and a shift away from the older norm of passive 
consumption of media (Blanchard, Metcalf & Burns 2007; Carrie et 
al. 2009; Lange 2008; Stuart 2001). YouTube is an Internet portal 
site that, as researchers note, ‘allows thousands of audio-visual 
content creators and gatherers to upload, at no cost, clips and video 
blogs’ and offers the ‘opportunity for communication between video-
posters and viewers through textual and video responses as well as 
video rating systems’ (Milliken et al. 2008, p. 1). According to one 
Australian study of young people’s use of information communication 
technologies, YouTube was one of young Victorians’ favourite 
websites (Blanchard, Metcalf & Burns 2007). The study argues that 
online communication provides an opportunity for young people, 
through sites such as YouTube, to both explore who they are and 
develop a sense of identity. The authors argue that identity 
production takes place: 
… on the web: young people are documenting, informing and 
engaging in online conversations to make sense of who they are. 
Increasingly it is in an online context that young people are 
developing a sense of self in relation to their broader social context, 
making sense of social issues and social boundaries (Blanchard, 
Metcalf & Burns 2007).  
The authors of the 'Good Play' project report (Carrie et al. 2009) add 
that the Internet provides young people with various opportunities to 
‘play’ with their identity. It also greatly increases the opportunities 
they have to participate in public discussion or political processes 
and in the creation and distribution of knowledge and information 
(Carrie et al. 2009). These authors point out that young people are 
often limited when participating in ‘real world’ contexts because of 
constraints like the implicit or explicit standards of behaviour required 
in formal spaces like schools, which are often created and enforced 
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from the top down by those in positions of authority (Carrie et al. 
2009, p. 68). They argue that in:  
… such settings roles, responsibilities, and sanctions for rule 
violations are typically explicit’ which limits young people from 
participating in ways outside of the parameters set by adults. Also, 
young people’s ‘amateur creations’ (such as writings, music, and 
photography) can be shared locally in offline contexts but are not 
easily distributed to a broader audience (Carrie et al. 2009, p. 68).  
For reasons such as these, young people might not feel they have a 
voice with regard to public issues in the offline realm (Carrie et al. 
2009, p. 68).  
Other researchers (Bell 2001; Dodge & Kitchin 2001; Smith & Kollock 
1999), who have explored the way young people use online media, 
agree with that assessment. They argue that the Internet can provide 
opportunities for people who may be experiencing discriminatory 
behaviours, or who are the object of stereotypes, to experience and 
enjoy being freed from social markers such as gender, ethnicity and 
age, or even the suburbs in which they live. The anonymity that going 
online offers can therefore assist those experiencing marginalisation 
to transgress the stigma and discrimination they face in their 
everyday face-to-face relationships. Further to this point, Philippa 
Collin (2008), Judith Bessant (2000), and Richard Hil and Judith 
Bessant (1999), argue that young people have been able to use the 
Internet to create new and distinctive political spaces. Cyberspace 
provides opportunities and resources for new forms of public spaces 
that can enable young people to organise socially, culturally and 
politically. For many young people, cyberspace offers unparalleled 
access to boundless information, as well as the capacity for collective 
action based on anonymous and presumed equality (Giroux 1997; 
Rash 1997; Whittle 1997). As Hil and Bessant  (1999, p. 48) put it: 
The ability to communicate quickly, to retrieve vast amounts of 
detailed information at relatively low cost has a democratising 
influence in terms of the dissemination of information and extending 
the ability of young people to shape knowledge-bases and 
discussion… access to an electronic medium like the Net allows 
young people to respond to certain representations of themselves, 
and others, such as those found in the mainstream media … 
Access to the Net allows young people to participate without their 
age, or relative inexperience being identified or becoming a barrier.  
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Others (Blanchard, Metcalf & Burns 2007; Wyn et al. 2005) are 
equivalently optimistic about the opportunities the Internet gives 
young people, especially marginalised young people, to explore new 
ways of engaging their social context. Wyn et al (2005, p. 19) claim 
that the Internet provides:  
… a medium through which dispossessed or marginalised young 
people, who are not necessarily connected in physical space, can 
create a sense of belonging and identity, drawing on and 
appropriating cultural representations (e.g. texts, images, music). 
This use of ICTs is an extension of the use that marginalised groups 
of young people have traditionally made of popular culture to 
construct political identities and a sense of belonging.   
However, some academics like Alecia Wolf (1998) and Karen Evans 
(2004) are much more sceptical about the ‘opportunities’ that the 
Internet provides. Evans (2004, p. 13) for instance argues that:  
… many of the problems which plague physical community are 
present in their virtual counterparts. This is hardly surprising given 
that virtual communities are forged and maintained by people living 
in the material world and that their users will bring problems, 
prejudices and limitations experienced in the physical world into 
their cyber-communities. 
Wolf (1998) and Evans (2004) along with Jessie Daniels (2009) and 
Yaman Akdeniz (2009) contest the now largely conventional utopian 
view that the Internet is a new social space that enables those who 
go into the virtual world the opportunity to escape racism, sexism or 
other forms of discriminatory behaviour. They argue that the Internet 
has instead simply added new avenues for people who want to 
promote or disseminate racist views. It is clear that the Web, unlike 
other media, presents unique ways to disseminate hate messages, 
facilitated by factors such as the relative anonymity it offers to users 
and the fact that the Web is currently far less regulated and policed 
than most other mediums of communication (Akdeniz 2009; Daniels 
2009). Young people from a Muslim, Lebanese or Arabic-speaking 
background, as well as experiencing racism in their offline 
encounters, are also likely to experience it online on sites such as 
YouTube. This is well illustrated by responses to a video clip posted 
on YouTube by some young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims from 
Sydney, who had been discussing the Cronulla riots.  
Page 151  
In the video titled ‘Lebanese Boys Speak the truth about Cronulla Riots 
part1’ (cronullariots 2007) two young men, who introduce themselves 
as Ahmad Sabra and Ahmad Said, begin their video by saying: 
Ahmad Said: We are here to discuss, what we have discussed 
previously. 
Ahmad Sabra: About being Arab-Australian and about the Cronulla 
riots. 
Ahmad Said: And the revenge attacks. 
Ahmad Sabra: Most of you have watched [the videos we have 
made previously] and we have received an overwhelming response. 
Numerous comments.  
Ahmad Said: We got a few of them here that we are going to put 
forth to you guys. Um we got over here for example, Dry River [who 
made the comment]: 
I wish everybody were like that brother. I hope racism ends 
but I know it won’t. Anyways nice effort guys. Count me in 
for fight against racism.” 
 What do you reckon? 
Ahmad Sabra: That’s a good comment. And that’s the message we 
are trying to send out you know? To fight racism. To go against it.  
Ahmad Said: Oh but hold on, he goes “I hope racism ends but I 
know it won’t” what do you think of that? 
Ahmad Sabra: I mean it’s true. Racism is always going to exist no 
matter where you go or where you are. It’s always going to be there.  
Ahmad Said: I don’t believe so. 
The discussion continues like this, between the two men. They 
discuss and debate the comment made by YouTube video poster 
‘Dry River’, and other comments about previous video postings made 
by other online users.  
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Above image is still from the video entitled: ‘Lebanese Boys Speak the 
Truth about Cronulla Riots part1’ (cronullariots 2007) 
 
This video elicited strong responses from YouTube users as the 
examples included below suggest. One response by ‘JSMyst’ who 
said he had an Arabic background, wrote:    
… u know what I am an arab u fuking moron and my whole family 
was killed by that disgraceful pathetic religion u call islam. Fuk u, fuk 
ur religion my family has been in Australia for 2 generations and u 
people are fucking it up for every1 (JSMyst 2010). 
 
Another calling himself ‘TynanH72’ from New Zealand posted:   
JSMyst I totally agree with you 110% Arabs and Muslims ruin the 
Earth.  Hell look at London, I was there 3 months ago. They are the 
ones who Carry out Knife attacks on innocent People. Fuck You 
Arabs and Muslims.   We don’t have em on the Coastal cities in NZ. 
Our councils ban everything From them (TynanH72 2010). 
The comments in response to this video posting suggest that it is not 
only someone like TynanH72, who was happy to indulge in virulent 
anti-Muslim and anti-Arab commentary, but also people like ‘JSMyst’, 
who identified as an Australian of Arabic (Egyptian) Christian 
background and was willing to target Muslims with hate speech. 
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There were of course other comments posted by those identifying as 
‘wogs’, ‘Lebs’, Arabs or Muslims who made equally vitriolic 
observations about Anglo-Australians. This reminds us of  the 
importance of directing anti-racist educational campaigns at 
communities outside the Anglo-Australian mainstream as well as 
towards White Australians (Hage 2003, p. 119). As Hage (2003, p. 
119) writes, ‘Often some very virile racism flourishes in spaces that 
are seen not to be in need of anti-racist ethos because they are 
subjected to white racism.  
Hage asks us to keep in mind, that while ethnic minorities do hold 
racist attitudes and engage in racist practices, ‘White racism’ 
continues to be more important than other kinds of racism. White 
racism is more significant for reasons such as the unequal 
distribution of political, cultural and economic resources that are 
implicated in the pre-eminent position of Anglo-Australians. The 
dominance of ‘White racism’ was reflected in my observations that 
the ‘anti-White’ comments posted on YouTube by Arabs and Muslims 
were drowned out by the sheer volume of anti-Muslim, anti-Arab and 
anti-Lebanese postings. Hage (2003, pp. 118-119) points out, that 
while Australia’s ethnic minorities such as Greek and Aboriginal 
people can and do engage in racist sentiment and behaviour:  
… their power to activate their racism and use it for discriminatory 
purposes is not the same as the power that some Anglo-Australian 
have. Furthermore, white racism is entrenched in the very make-up 
of Australian institutions – other racisms remain individualised and 
scattered. But let us be clear about this. This does not mean that 
migrant and other forms of racism exist in a power vacuum. Asian 
business owners have power within the space of their business, and 
can use this power to discriminate against their employees if they 
are so inclined … migrant working-class kids can also develop a 
micro spatial power within their neighbourhoods or their schools and 
can use this to discriminate against other people. However, 
regardless of these micro-spaces, the salient point is that macro 
Australian public national space remains a space where whiteness 
gives one most power to discriminate …  
This acknowledgement is important because it makes us realise 
that the primacy given to white racism ‘is based on a political 
critique, not a moral critique, of white people…’ (Hage 2003, p. 
118).  
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With this in mind I turn now to several different kinds of ways young 
people from an Arabic background have used YouTube to claim back 
some cultural space for themselves. 
 
 
Fighting back through YouTube 
 
One of the more common elements in the representation of young 
men of ‘Middle-Eastern appearance’ has been a preoccupation with 
Lebanese gangs. It has proved to be a theme susceptible to any 
number of prejudicial treatments. In one typical news article, Herald 
Sun reporters Chris Tinkler and David Hastie (2007) pointed to the 
problem they believed was represented by Lebanese gangs 
fomenting violence, gang warfare and even murder:   
Freely available on the internet phenomenon YouTube, the images 
and messages are contained in homemade videos that depict ethnic 
gang warfare, violence and gun-toting. The videos incite racial 
attacks -- even killings -- and bait Melbourne police. A video posted 
last week, titled DA nEW AUS, shows Lebanese youths posing with 
firearms, footage of bashings and robbery and illicit drug use. The 
screen shows the slogan, "This is our new home and there's nothing 
you can do about it", all to the tunes of gangsta rap... 
A cursory survey of YouTube content suggests that there are many 
videos posted on YouTube that appear to celebrate gangs, violence 
and promote anti-white sentiments. A question that is worth asking is, 
‘why’? Assuming for example that the videos in question are 
projecting violent even possibly criminal intentions, we might first ask, 
why are these being broadcast to the world?  Parenthetically this 
raises the question of how we should think about the idea of gangs. It 
is unlikely that the young people featured in the videos, or creating 
the videos, are part of some highly structured, organised and 
criminally motivated gangs associated with, for example, the supply 
of amphetamines. Furthermore, organised criminal gangs would not 
be making so visible their identities and illegal activities to the police 
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and others via the Internet. As Santina Perrone and Rob White 
(2000, p. 1) have argued: 
American style criminal gangs are not prevalent in this country… the 
phenomenon of “criminal youth gangs” is largely a media myth… 
While “youth gangs” as such do not constitute a significant social 
problem, there is nevertheless evidence that young people on the 
street are engaging in activity that occasionally includes anti-social 
behaviour, criminal activity and group conflict.  
Second, and granting the point made here by Perrone and White, 
why are ‘gang’ related identities being projected to a wider audience 
through video posts on YouTube by young ‘Middle-Eastern’ and 
Muslim men? Third, and assuming that the projection of ‘gang’ 
identity is to be taken seriously, what does ‘gang’ membership mean 
for these young men and what needs can it meet for these young 
men?  
Working within a tradition of cultural studies influenced by the 
Birmingham School, Cheryl Simpson and Richard Hil (1995) argued 
that behaviour labelled as delinquent (including ‘gang activities’ such 
as graffiti tagging ‘gang names’ in public spaces and property) can 
be understood as acts of political defiance, resistance or reassertion. 
Rob White (2007a) has likewise argued that many young people 
either form or join a ‘gang’ as one way to overcome marginalisation 
and alienation by affirming their social presence.  As White (2007a, 
p. 71) says: 
From this vantage point, gang membership is significant, not because 
of its presumed criminality, but because it is a way of valorising their 
lives and empowering the young men in the face of outside hostility, 
disrespect and vilification. Not all young people who experience 
marginalisation or who engage in violence end up in street gangs, but 
these do have a major bearing on gang formation and membership. 
Drawing on a social ecological approach to resilience Michael Ungar 
(2008) similarly contends that young people’s forming or joining a 
‘gang’ need not be viewed as maladaptive behaviour. Instead it can 
be seen as collective project in which young people are finding a 
resourceful way to deal with threats from others: it can be viewed as 
a sign of their resilience. As Ungar (2008, p.27) puts it:  
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In the case of immigrant and other youth who experience systemic 
prejudice because of race, ethnicity, or class, gang membership may 
actually resolve some of the tensions caused by their marginalisation. 
This interpretative framework indeed seems to catch something of 
the expressive value of the videos posted on YouTube by Lebanese 
and ASB young people. Like graffiti, some YouTube videos created 
by young Australian men from ASB and Muslim backgrounds, which 
project ‘gang’ affiliated identities, can be seen as ‘assertions of a 
right to be-in-place’, representing resistance to exclusion (Bruno & 
Wilson 2000, pp. 42-43). The screen shots featured in the following 
two pages (extracted from the YouTube video created by a user who 
goes by the name ‘Aussiekillaonstandby’) captures this notion of 
resistance and ‘claim to space’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The image (above) depicts the ‘gang name’ Broady Boys’. It is 
overlayed with several photos of ASB boys ‘taking over’ various 
local places and spaces including train carriages and local 
shopping centres. This image can be read as projecting a claim to 
local spaces (i.e. the suburb of Broadmeadows). 
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The young men featured in these videos and the creators of the 
videos, who may or may not be part of ‘gangs’ (understood as a well-
defined criminal organisation) are, however, fashioning themselves 
as ‘gangs’ who control ‘their territories’ (e.g. the western and northern 
suburbs of Melbourne) because there are certain benefits that come 
with this identity performance. 
On the face of it these young men seem intent on constructing a 
threatening appearance by displaying ‘symbols of terrifying evil’, for 
example, weaponry and posing in fight stances (Katz 1988, p. 115). 
In ways such as this, the young men present themselves as rulers, or 
as Katz (1988) puts it, as ‘street elites’. Katz suggested that groups 
of young men in his studies of American inner city ‘gangs’ 
constructed the appearance of being ‘street elites’ in an attempt to 
The image (above) inserted in Aussiekillaonstandby’s (2008a) 
YouTube video, was taken from the Herald Sun newspaper article 
entitled ‘Melbourne’s Gang Menace’ (Houlihan & Cameron 2008). 
The creator of the video is using this image in his video montage 
to associate his video with the ‘Gang Menace’. That is to say, the 
creator of this video ‘Aussiekillaonstandby,’ is capitalising on the 
stereotypes and discourse of young ‘Middle-eastern’ men ‘taking 
over’ and terrorising Melbourne’s suburbs. 
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claim sovereignty over certain places (such as their local 
neighbourhoods) through physical intimidation.  
The ‘gang names’ of the various ASB and Lebanese youth gangs in 
Melbourne’s northern and western suburbs certainly suggest a desire 
to be seen as rulers, and as a ‘force’ or a ‘power’ not to be argued 
with. Some of the gang names appearing on the YouTube videos 
include, ‘Broady Boys’, ‘Crazy Arabian Knights’ (C.A.K), ‘Newport 
Lebo Crew’ (N.L.C) and ‘Brotha Hood  Soldiers’ (BHS)  
In this respect YouTube can be understood as a medium for 
projecting a ‘fantasy’ of ruling over certain local spaces that these 
young people can then claim as their own. Here I use ‘fantasy’ in the 
commonsense meaning of the term: something one yearns for, but 
which is considered to be either unrealistic or difficult to achieve 
(Hage 2000, p. 68). 
 
(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
 
As you can see here, the video created by Aussiekillaonstandby 
(2008a) has been titled in honour of one the various Arab and 
Lebanese ‘gangs’ in the western and northern suburbs of Melbourne.   
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Some (Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2003) may argue that it is precisely 
because these young people don’t ‘rule’ places such as 
Broadmeadows (or even the Broadmeadows shopping centre or the 
train station) that it becomes important for them to find ways of 
somehow making this fantasy more real or at least credible. ‘People 
tend to resort to such ideology precisely when they do not 'rule’ and 
when they resent being ruled over’ (Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2003, p. 
142). It might be supposed that those who rule – who have power 
that is legitimate and relatively secure – are typically more confident 
in their rule and do not have to brand it as their territory, or constantly 
remind others who threaten their rule that they are in control.  
An alternative perspective with a good deal of backing by scholarly 
research might, however, suggest that these young people’s 
persistent attempts to assert control and rule over place, is quite like 
the police use of ‘governmental technologies’19 – like traffic lights, 
CCTV camera and billboards about speeding and drink-driving. 
These are the technologies by which police power and control over 
place is signalled and asserted. Equally, the point made by ‘realist’ 
scholars in the international studies area is that even states are 
engaged in an endless project designed precisely to brand and 
defend their territorial integrity (Molloy 2006). This need to assert 
control and rule over place comes with the recognition that places 
are always contested spaces, and different actors (especially those 
who have peripheral identities) challenge, subvert and resist power 
relations and strategies of governance (Mitchell & Kelly 2010). Hence, 
even if young ASB or Lebanese men truly do believe they control 
places like Broadmeadows and even the nation, they still need to 
assert their power and control, through means such as graffiti tagging 
their ‘gang’ name in the places that they vie for power with others.  
                                                 
19
 The concept of ‘governmental technologies’ is used by Nikolas Rose and Peter 
Miller (2010, p. 281), who draw on the works of Michael Foucault to refer to the 
‘strategies, techniques and procedures through which different forces seek to 
render programmes operable, and by means of which a multitude of connections 
are established between the aspirations of authorities and the activities of 
individuals and groups’. In other words, ‘governmental technologies’ refer to the 
means by which people are regulated and made governable.   
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The video screen prints in this page and in the next 
(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008b) illustrate the sorts of images used by 
young men to further their status, sense of power and desire for 
social respect, through the manipulation of fear and the threat of 
violence.  
 
The boys in the YouTube videos draw on the power of fear to assert 
their rule and control over place. Symbols of fear and power used by 
the young men include images, like the ones shown in the next page, 
of the young men toting weapons, standing and posing for pictures 
wearing masks and looking like dangerous ‘gang’ members or 
‘suburban terrorists’.  
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As can be seen from looking at the image above and in the previous 
page, these young men are linking symbols of ‘Lebanese pride’ (for 
example by depicting the Lebanese flag and the Lebanese national 
emblem of the cedar tree) with symbols of masculine power (by 
inserting images of the young men holding weapons and posing 
menacingly for the camera). The editing of these videos emphasises 
the conjunction of ethnic identity and powerful masculinity, enabling 
them to achieve a sense of social power via respect gained through 
fear (Noble 2007, p. 331). Linking back to my discussion on Othering 
in Chapter One I argue that these symbolic practices can be viewed 
as a means by which the young men are able to embrace and 
capitalise on their position as Others (Jensen 2009). In this way, 
these young men, who are often positioned in the national field as 
marginal to the dominant Anglo-Australian cultural majority, can 
Above: The guns, the Lebanese flag and inscriptions such as 
‘Lebo Soldier’ are associated to project a cultural identity that is 
powerful and threatening.    
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project and fashion an identity that capitalises on a fear and 
fascination with the ‘Other’.  
It is not a coincidence that many of the YouTube videos that vividly 
represent a certain antagonism to ‘White Australians’ were posted on 
YouTube by young ASB and Muslim Australians not long after the 
Cronulla riots. There are several YouTube videos that represent this 
antagonism and are worth taking some time to interpret. 
One example of anti-White racism communicated on YouTube after 
the Cronulla riots is the YouTube video entitled ‘AussieDiss 2 – Thug 
Love’ (Aussiediss69 2010). The video has no images other than that 
pictured below. The soundtrack features a rap song and the hip-hop 
beat of their song is accompanied by sounds of gun shots. It is the 
kind of video clip that was ideally suited to be selected and subjected 
to commentary and criticism on Australian current affairs programs, 
radio-talk back shows, or featured in news articles: it seems almost 
designed to encourage reporting on the antagonistic ‘nature’ of 
young Arab and Muslim Australians towards ‘mainstream 
Australians’. Some of the lyrics from the song are provided in 
Appendix C.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Aussiediss69 2010) 
 
 
It has been well established that rap music of this kind is imbued with 
a cultural politics that, according to Ian Angus and Sut Jhally (1989, 
p. 2), is: 
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… the complex process by which the whole domain in which people 
search to create meaning about their everyday lives is subject to 
politicization and struggle … the central issue of such a cultural 
politics is the exercise of power in “both institutional and ideological 
forms” and the manner in which “cultural practices” relate to this 
context. 
We can take this conceptualisation of cultural politics and apply it to 
the ‘Aussie Diss’ rap song. This process of interpretation involves 
placing the song in the context of events such as the Cronulla riots – 
which the song explicitly refers to. As one of the lines from this rap 
asks, ‘You Aussie Mutha Fuckerz, Why you always got to hate for?’ 
This is a context in which the dominant narrative of belonging is one 
that discursively positions Anglo-Australians as rulers and managers 
of the national space and relegates young ASB and Muslim 
Australians, at best, to the margins of belonging.  
As Tricia Rose (1991, p. 277) argues, ‘Ideological power and 
resistance is exercised through signs and language’. When viewed in 
this frame the ‘AussieDiss’ rap can be seen as discursive resistance 
to those who lay down a prior claim to being authentically ‘Australian’ 
alongside claims to ‘governmental belonging’. As the lyrics say, 
‘Don’t call it your own. God put us here, so this is my home! …  ‘This 
aint your country, It’s mine too. Deal with it, you Faggots’.  
The young rappers also position themselves as having more 
‘governmental belonging’ than ‘white Aussies’, with words such as 
‘just stop the racism, then you might just last in this land’. Read in 
one way, this line in particular, suggests that young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims might actually have the power to exclude (and 
perhaps even extinguish) ‘white Aussies’ from the nation. This 
fantasy is not dissimilar (even if it is more fantastical) than the 
traditional White-Australian fantasy of controlling and managing 
‘Others’ in their national space: of ‘containing the increasingly active 
role of non-White Australia and in the process of governing Australia’ 
(Hage 2000, p. 19). 
Just as some White Australians have threatened to get rid of those 
who do not abide by their criteria for ‘belonging’, like having or 
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demonstrating a commitment to ‘Australian values’, these young 
rappers advance the political claim to be managers of the national 
space through their rap. This threat is communicated with lines such 
as ‘Coming out of Bankstown killing Aussie Mutha Furkerz…’. and 
‘Just stop the racism and then you fucken’ might just last in this land’.  
The lyrics of this rap also suggest, as Sune Qvotrup Jensen (2009, 
pp. 25-26) has argued, that these young men are ‘capitalising on 
their Othering’ as a form of cultural agency and empowerment. That 
is, if we apply Jensen’s interpretative point, this would suggest that 
the rapper’s lyrics are actually using ‘Aussie’ fears of Arabs and 
Muslims and the typical claim made by critics of ‘Islamic culture’ that 
it is a violent culture with little respect for ‘Aussie’ women. That is, 
these young men are ‘accentuating those dimensions within the 
ambivalent gaze of the majority which can be ascribed value’ 
(Jensen 2009, p. 20). Being perceived as dangerous is one of the 
few culturally available identities that these young men can advance 
a sense of their self with, and which can then be used to confer a 
certain amount of power and cultural capital.  
This way of ‘fighting back’ and ‘capitalising’ on the status of ‘Other’ is 
also reflected in other videos that have been posted on YouTube and 
that ostensibly celebrate ‘gang culture’. Indeed, I have found some 
videos featuring ‘gang names’ such as ‘Newport Lebo crew’ and 
created by YouTube users who go by pseudonyms such as 
‘Aussiekillaonstandby’. This notion of YouTube videos being used to 
project identity (including gang-affiliated identities) to affirm social 
presence, as way of fighting back and as a means to overcome 
marginalisation, is explored next.  
It seems that the producers of these videos want to both tease and 
play on White Australian anxieties. They seem well informed about 
the historical legacy of ‘White Australian fears, and capitalise on 
these fears by playing up contemporary concerns that certain 
minority groups like the Lebanese have become too prominent and 
that ‘White’ Australians are in danger of losing their capacity to 
secure their borders from external threats like terrorism, Islamism or 
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drug imports (Hage 2003). These videos play on ‘White’ fears while 
making claims about being respected or being feared (Jensen 2009). 
Images such as the ones shown below and in the next page indicate 
that YouTube is being used by people who may feel they have been 
pushed to the margins, to re-imagine themselves at the centre of 
belonging and as having some kind of sovereignty in the national 
space.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 (Puls3 2006)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ibi2nv 2007) 
Above: mock newspaper article features the headline, ‘Australia is 
now owned by ArAbs!’ 
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(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a) 
 
 
The YouTube video screen prints, shown above and in the previous 
page, make their own semiotic point. In the video, produced by ibi2nv 
(2007), there is a picture of the Australian flag re-styled with images 
of the Lebanese cedar tree. There is also a picture (presumably) of 
the flag’s artist that has been incorporated into the flag, to project the 
fantasy of Lebanese-Australians (which include the identity of the 
artist himself) as central to the nation’s cultural identity. In another 
video (pictured above), the Australian map has been overlaid with the 
Lebanese flag and the words ‘Under New Management’ emblazoned 
across it. The images in the previous page and on this page depict a 
claim to governmental belonging, which is about the belief that one 
has certain legitimate claims over the management of the national 
space. This includes a right to control and shape the national 
character such that it feels like one’s ‘home’ (Hage 2000). 
In short, through their lyrics and their images these young men have 
made quite bold claims as they project themselves via the medium of 
YouTube to both belong and be taken seriously. Yet this 
interpretation hardly begins to exhaust the interpretative possibilities.   
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Protest masculinity and male identity insecurity 
 
Apart from the overtly public and political dimensions of the signs and 
significations of these videos, many of these videos also work to 
make a different point about identity in which quite basic questions of 
gendered identity are at stake. One of these dimensions involves 
what has been called ‘protest masculinity’. According to Raewyn 
Connell (1995, p. 114): 
Protest masculinity is a marginalised masculinity, which picks up on 
themes of hegemonic masculinity in the society at large but reworks 
them in the context of poverty. 
Connell’s notion of protest masculinity draws on what Alfred Adler 
(1927) called the ‘masculine protest’, which is a form of exaggerated 
masculinity associated with anxiety over childhood powerlessness in 
which the dynamic at work is a form of overcompensation. Connell 
distinguished her concept of ‘protest masculinity’ from Adler’s more 
psychologistic concept of ‘masculine protest’. The difference for 
Connell is that the masculine protest is a ‘collective practice and not 
something inside the person’ (Connell 1995, p. 111). According to 
Connell, some marginalised young men respond to their 
powerlessness, defined for example in terms of  their class and 
economic position, by claiming a gendered position of power via 
exaggerated displays of stereotypical ‘masculine’ behaviour such as 
‘gay bashing’, binge drinking, or participation in ‘street machine’ 
culture (Connell 1995). Through interaction in a social milieu, with 
tensions created by poverty and an ambience of violence, young 
marginalised ‘men put together a tense, freaky façade’, making a 
claim to power where there are no real resources to power’ (Connell 
1995, p. 111).   
Greg Noble, Scott Poynting and Paul Tabar (2003) have reworked 
Connell’s theory to develop the concept of ‘ethnicised protest 
masculinity’. They argue that young people, who are positioned as 
marginal ‘others’ (i.e. because of their cultural, religious and status 
position in relation to the ‘mainstream’) fulfil desires and achieve 
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needs such as respect, visibility and a sense of power, by engaging 
in displays of exaggerated masculinity. Noble (2007) explains how 
young marginalised men meet their desires and needs:  
The strategy for achieving respect through intimidation entails 
performances of exaggerated masculinity that demand attention, 
especially through ‘tests of identity’ in which they are recognised by 
significant others - peers, police, shopkeepers - as a threat.  
However, as Polk (1995, pp. 183-185) argues, ‘contests of honour or 
reputation’ can have dramatic consequences that make them central 
to male criminal behaviour. Like other forms of youth sub-cultural 
activity, they involve strategies of visibility that seem to challenge 
social hierarchies of respect and offer alternative codes that entail 
their own hierarchy of respect (McDonald 1999, pp. 145, 151). 
The image from the YouTube videos featured in this chapter can be 
read as signs of an ‘ethnicised masculine protest’. The young men 
attempt to achieve human needs and desires, such as sense of 
power, respect, visibility and belonging, by performing an 
exaggerated masculinity, including holding weapons and posing 
menacingly for the camera. As Noble (2007) says, it is through such 
expressive performances that the young men are able to achieve a 
sense of social power via respect gained through fear. Another 
notable way in which the young men featured in the YouTube video 
perform ‘ethnicised masculine protest’ is by showing off their bodies 
in ways that seem to embody their potency, even their sexual value.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (Call911ifucme 2008) 
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The young men in these videos seem to be preoccupied with their 
bodies, especially their musculature, and this can be seen as tied to 
their identity: how they see themselves and how they want to be 
seen by others. In short, their sense of identity is at stake.  
Anthony Giddens (1991, p. 75) has argued that a feature in all 
cultures, to varying limits, is the value placed on the individual’s 
ability to build/rebuild a coherent and rewarding sense of identity. He 
argues that the relatively modern obsession with mastery over the 
body, through practices such as dieting and exercise, is an extension 
of a ‘reflexive-self’ project.  Giddens (1991, pp. 77-78) says:   
...we are not who we are, but what we make of ourselves ... the 
reflexivity of the self extends to the body, where the body is 
something to be worked on ... ‘Experiencing the body is a way of 
cohering the self as an integrated whole, whereby the individual 
says ‘this is where I live’. 
The rise of various bodily regimes or practices like dieting, buying 
clothes, body building, aerobic exercise or repeated use of cosmetic 
surgery suggest the value of Gidden’s observation. Women 
diagnosed as having anorexia nervosa, can be treated like body 
builders, as being obsessed with achieving mastery over their body 
by way of a process of strict and persistent disciplining of their body. 
Gordon Tait (1993), has attempted to shift the focus away from 
individual pathology when making sense of young anorectic women’s 
fasting practices. He argues that the young women who are 
restricting what they eat, can be understood as exercising their 
personal agency and self-governance, in the project of ‘shaping 
themselves both ethically and physically’, in certain ways and for 
certain ends’ (Tait 1993, p. 16). Exercising self-control, personal 
agency and self-governance are most often viewed as not only 
acceptable but highly valued and admirable qualities. In the case of 
anorexia nervosa (because it is pathologised) these self-governing 
practices are instead seen as ‘deviant’ rather than ‘normal’.  
Body-building, like anorexia, illustrates how the body is seen as a 
reflexive project, ‘operating around an axis of self-identity and bodily 
appearance’ in which being seen as masculine, in control and tough, 
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plays a preponderant role (Giddens 1991, p. 105). Giddens (1991, 
pp. 106-107) explains that anorexia can be seen as a form of protest 
where the individual, rather than simply despair at not naturally 
having the ideal body, by adopting an ascetic body regime that, 
although extreme (such as engaging in long hours of exercise with 
little food), can bring on a sense of achievement and empowerment. 
In a similar vein, Wiegers (1998, pp. 147-148) argues that body-
building: 
 …has become a popular means by which people, particularly men, 
can assert their self-identities… body-builders are able to make 
powerful public and personal statements about who they are. 
Social changes which strip individuals of real power may lead to the 
denial of powerlessness in which flamboyant displays of cultural 
symbols such as muscularity offer some men compensatory means 
by which they can construct and validate a particular masculine 
identity. 
We can say, drawing on Wiegers (1998), Tait (1993) and Giddens 
(1991), that the young men pictured in the YouTube videos I have 
been analysing are showing off their muscles in order to state their 
mastery over their bodies. In doing so, they and are making a 
statement about who they are – that they are not to be trifled with. 
Considered semiotically the message is that they are ‘hard’ enough 
to withstand the injuries of a racist society. The sexual connotations 
for men of being hard are possibly also being referred to. By working 
on themselves to develop their physique they can project the 
idealised body form as ‘hard’ men and by extension they are able to 
imagine themselves as commanding respect and as achieving a 
heightened sense of power. This reflects Wiegers’ (1998, pp. 159-
160) thesis that body-building enables men ‘to construct a superior 
identity … premised upon ideals of hyper masculinity including 
power, authority and domination’. This imagining can be sourced to 
certain cultural views of masculinity that ties the mesomorphic form, 
and the ideas of sexual virulence, to notions of men being ‘powerful, 
strong, competent and in control of their environment’ (Wiegers 1998, 
p. 2). In the self-reflexive project of creating a more muscular build, 
these young men portrayed in the videos are also building a self-
identity and projecting this self-identity.  
Page 171  
Like those body-builders interviewed in studies of masculinity, the 
young men pictured in these videos are able to feel more self-
assured in commanding attention and respect by showing off their 
mastery over their bodies (Wiegers 1998, pp. 153-155). In some 
ways the ‘desire for muscles reveals men engaged in a passionate 
battle with their own sense of vulnerability’ (Wiegers 1998, p. 7). As 
Pleck (1982, p. 106) says, body-building is ‘perhaps the archetypal 
expression of male identity insecurity’.   
From a sociological perspective, it can be argued the body is a text 
on which culture and the struggles for social power are inscribed.  
The body, as Kevin McDonald (1999, p. 158) has argued  is ‘a 
symbol and instrument of communication’. With this perspective in 
mind we can read the muscular male body ‘texts’ displayed on the 
YouTube videos as communicating certain ideas of masculinity 
(Wiegers 1998).  
Another cultural stereotype these young men have embraced in the 
song ‘Aussie Diss’ (which I discussed earlier) is the stereotype of 
young Muslim and Arabic men as sexually potent or dangerous. This 
motif draws on the long-standing European fetishism and 
sexualisation of the ‘dark stranger’ imbued with big genitals or 
unlimited sexual potency, combining fear and fascination (Aly & 
Walker 2007; Jensen 2009, p. 211; Redmond 2007, p. 345). Drawing 
on this theme, the rappers attack Australian White masculine pride 
by suggesting in their lyrics that Aussies are sexually perverse (e.g. 
by calling them ‘Aussie Mutha Fuckerz’ and ‘faggots’). They also 
attack ‘Aussie’ masculine pride by attacking the honour of ‘their’ 
women. To add insult to injury they add that, as Lebanese and 
Muslim men, they are more sexually desirable than ‘Aussie’ men 
(even in the eyes of ‘their’ white women). These points are illustrated 
in the following lines from the rap: 
Don’t start on your women. They all know they want us. Maybe if 
you circumcised your dick and lost your beer guts, you might just 
get some. 
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Other images illustrate how protest masculinity can literally be 
inscribed on the body. Take, for example, the following image from a 
YouTube video created by Aussiekillaonstandby (2008a). The words 
‘Cop Killer Just 4 U’, coupled with pictures of a machete and a gun 
inscribed on the young man’s back, carry a clear message of 
antagonism towards the police. This anti-police sentiment is not 
uncommon among young men, especially those who experience 
(often unjustified) persistent targeting by police (White 1996). 
 
  
(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A young ASB man shows off his ‘battle scars’ for the Today Tonight 
(Noonan 2010) video documentary about the ‘Middle-Eastern youth 
gangs’ of Melbourne. The scars, which this young man acquired 
through physical altercations with others, symbolically represents’ his 
toughness – suggesting that he has suffered and survived pain. The 
scars communicate his fearless masculine identity and his status as 
fearsome.  
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Dutton (1995) and Inckle (2007) claim that body-marking (of the kind 
depicted in the images above) is gendered, and carries symbolic 
messages that can function to denote membership of a particular 
group or status within that group. For men, tattoos and body-scarring 
can be public assertions of masculinity (Inckle 2007, p. 177).   
We can also see in these videos quite overt forms of political 
resistance and it is to this aspect that I turn next. 
 
 
YouTube as a medium for protest  
 
The images in this page and the next, extracted from YouTube 
videos, can be viewed as a form of resistance to racist policing, 
reflecting anger at racial profiling (see image 2 and 3), but in 
contradictory terms there is also a sense of pride and achievement in 
creating fear and in developing a larger profile of themselves in the 
community (see images 1 and 4). Pride in being seen as criminally 
notorious is illustrated by the video clip image which features a 
newspaper article about the gangs (see image 1). One of the videos 
even displays the creation of a newspaper article headlined with the 
group’s ‘gang’ name (see image 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 1 – above: (Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a)  
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Image 2 - above: (RoxyBloodz 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3 - above: (lebosouljah 2007)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 4 – above: (Fisher86 2008) 
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The question is, how can we make sense of these seemingly 
contradictory representations of identity? The answer can be drawn 
from Anna Yeatman’s (1990) thesis that our identities are never 
coherent because identity itself is both a performative matter and the 
consequence of what she called ‘interdiscursivity’. The point 
Yeatman is making is that identity is never a singular matter 
grounded in only one dimension, like ethnicity, age, sexuality, 
gender, religion or the like. As Yeatman (1990, p. 164) says:  
… each subject is positioned across several discourses, and this 
positioning provides multiple points of identification and discursive 
differences which ensure that the tendencies for a discourse to 
become a genuinely as distinct from an illusorily closed system are 
never realised. The subject’s interdiscursive position ensures that 
when he or she speaks within a particular discourse contradictions 
and incompatibilities are introduced which reflect the position, and 
which change the discourse.  
Applying Yeatman’s argument to the interpretation of YouTube 
images shown in the previous two pages, we can say that the 
creators of these video clips are positioned across at least two 
discourses. One discourse reflects anger at police targeting of young 
people of a certain appearance. This discourse signifies resentment 
directed at instances of state-sponsored racism. The other discourse 
they inhabit is one that reflects the practices of protest masculinity. 
Within this discourse the young men can position themselves as 
dangerous and as a threat to social order by capitalising on 
representations of young people of their background as intimidating 
and menacing ‘Others’.  
The anti-police messages and the symbols of mixed pride and anger 
in being represented or treated as ‘criminal’ are amongst some of the 
most common themes at work in YouTube videos created by young 
Lebanese, Muslim and ASB young men. These repeated themes can 
be interpreted in light of the fact that these young people use 
YouTube for the same reasons as other young people.  
One of the motivations they and other young people have for using 
this site is to maintain and build social networks by sharing their 
videos with friends, including those they meet in cyberspace as well 
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as in their regular face-to-face encounters. Like other social 
networking media, the YouTube site can be used by these young 
people to comment on each other’s videos. They can also include in 
the videos, materials intended to appeal to their shared affinities 
(Lange 2008). Apart from connecting on the basis of sharing a 
certain anti-police sentiment and pride/anger in being identified as 
‘criminal’, the other more obvious of these shared affinities is a sense 
of ethnic pride. Australian-Lebanese users appeal to the ethnic pride 
of their social networks (which include other ASB users) by including, 
for instance, Iraqi, Assyrian-Chaldean and Lebanese cultural 
symbols in their videos. Some examples of these are provided next 
from a video created by Aussiekillaonstandby (2008a).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The image: Aussiekillaonstandby has copied a Herald Sun news 
article about the YouTube gang problem into his own YouTube 
video. The newspaper article has used images from YouTube 
videos such as the Lebanese and Iraqi flags, knifes, and the text 
from the videos such as ‘Fukk the South Boys’.    
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(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a) 
 
The creators of these videos appeal to ethnic pride in their footage 
because it is a point of connection within their social networks. Let 
me take the example of the YouTube video entitled B.H.S FT 
A.S.A.D AND C.A.K. It can be inferred from the images used in the 
video that the creator of the video (who goes by the name 
‘Aussiekillaonstandby’) is a young Australian of Lebanese-Christian 
background who lives in the suburb of Broadmeadows. I have made 
this inference from observing the range of images included in his 
video, such as Christian symbols (e.g. images of the cross, pictures 
of Jesus and rosary beads) Lebanese cultural symbols (e.g. images 
of the cedar tree and the Lebanese flag) as well as images that refer 
This image features the Australian map. In the centre of the 
map is the symbol of the clothes brand logo (Kappa), which is 
popular amongst young people who identify as ‘wogs’. The map 
is surrounded by the flags of nations that are included in the 
new national imagining dubbed ‘Wogsville’. 
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to an identification with the suburb of Broadmeadows (e.g. with 
pictures of the Broadmeadows shopping centre and the 
Broadmeadows train station). Whilst ‘Aussiekillaonstandby’ identifies 
as a Lebanese-Christian who lives in Broadmeadows, he wants to 
both appeal to and be inclusive of a far wider audience who fit into 
the cultural category of ‘wogs’ and who reside in the northern and 
western suburbs of Melbourne. As these images indicate, those 
included under the banner of wogs are, for example, young men of 
Iraqi, Assyrian-Chaldean and Greek ancestry. It does not include 
(White) Aussies or those ‘wogs’ who live in, say, the eastern suburbs 
of Melbourne.         
Other materials that are included in the young men’s YouTube 
videos, to promote a sense of connection, are images of Tupac – a 
Black American rapper who was murdered in a gang-style drive-by 
killing in 1996 and whose music everyone in their network connects 
with. Points of connection (with those who are regarded as part of the 
‘in-group’) are also made by inserting in the video images of ‘street 
machines’,20 and symbols such as the Playboy bunny, which is 
overlayed with the Lebanese flag in order to communicate the 
message that young Lebanese men are ‘real’ men (i.e. not ‘faggots’) 
and sexually desirable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Street machines are more than just cars. As Katz explains, ‘All cars are literally 
machines for transportation over streets, “street machines” are especially designed 
for the challenges of drag racing and are figuratively “bad” ’ (Katz 1988).    
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The images in this page and in the next are from the YouTube 
video created by Aussiekillaonstandby (2008a). The picture 
above features legendry rapper Tupac. Also featured in this 
picture are the ‘gang names’: Broady Boys, YBS and CAK, 
along with pictures of the ‘gang’ members.  
 
The above image, of the Playboy Bunny symbol overlayed with 
the Lebanese flag, has been featured in many YouTube videos, 
communicating a sexualised ethnic identity. 
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As Linda Forrester (1999, p. 27) has proposed, ‘Street machines 
are cars that have been reconstructed to represent a person’s 
character and they change the street from bitumen to theatre’.  
In this theatre, young men stage themselves as reflections of their 
car’s power and style. What they are doing by ‘showing off’ their 
street machines to others is ‘performing identity’.  
The car pictured here, draped with the Lebanese flag and with the 
number plate ‘RACIST’ can be read as a symbol of ‘ethnicised 
protest masculinity’ (Noble, Poynting & Tabar 2003). It 
communicates the owner’s pride in his Lebanese cultural identity 
and that he is not ‘tolerant’ of certain (most likely White 
Australian) ‘Others’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Unconstructive vs. constructive use of YouTube? 
 
 
As I highlighted earlier in this chapter, there are some who are 
worried about young Muslim Australians’ use of Internet sites like 
YouTube. Acknowledging that young people today are ‘the digital 
generation’ (Buckingham 2006; Livingstone 2003, p. 148) and that 
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they represent the future, they are, however, also ‘seen as 
vulnerable, at risk from new information and communication 
technologies (ICT)’ (Livingstone 2003, p. 148). Some journalists, 
politicians, service providers and the police, for instance, are 
concerned that some of these young people are using the Internet as 
a vehicle for propagating anti-white sentiments and for celebrating 
deviant lifestyles or violence. My analysis and discussion so far in 
this chapter has been designed to grasp the more complex 
intentionalities at play as well as to go beyond pathologising these 
young people. In particular, I have tried to show how these videos 
work as creative platforms enabling young people to fulfil needs for 
respect, enjoy a sense of power or to express and explore a sense of 
belonging.    
I do, however, recognise that so far I have focused on videos that 
might be considered by some people as ‘unconstructive’. It might of 
course be objected that the very idea of constructive/unconstructive 
is an unhelpful binary. The creators of these videos, for example, 
might not see what they have done as ‘unconstructive’. They may 
even ask the more pertinent question: who gets to decide what is 
constructive? Granting this, it is still possible that there are other 
YouTube videos created by Australian Muslim and Lebanese young 
people that would be more widely recognised as socially acceptable 
– as providing an instance of constructive engagement. I turn now to 
look at these ‘constructive’ YouTube videos. 
 
 
Constructive engagement through YouTube 
 
One instance of constructive engagement might, for example, include 
videos conceived of as part of an anti-racist campaign. Such videos, 
created in the spirit of fighting racism, include those posted by Salam 
Café, a Muslim-produced television show that was available to view 
on public access television on channel 31 between 2005 and 2007 
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and then on SBS for a brief period in 2008. Some segments from the 
show are also available to view on YouTube.  
Peta Stephenson (2008, p. 2) has written about Salam Café, arguing 
that the program uses humour to ‘humanise Islam’, to dismantle 
many of the myths and clichés that are currently circulating about 
Muslims and Islam, while giving an insight into the lives of young 
Muslim Australians. She argues that Muslim youth-initiated projects, 
such as the Muslim hip-hop group ‘the Brothahood’, stand-up 
comedy performers ‘Fear of a Brown Planet’, and ‘Salam Café’, are 
‘creative and positive community-building strategies … that they play 
a valuable role in breaking down the “us and them” rhetoric’ 
(Stephenson 2008, p. 2). ‘Salam Café’ actors and presenters, and 
‘Fear of a Brown Planet’ comedians, use mainly satire, sarcasm and 
irony to break down stereotypes. As Stephenson (2008, p. 6) points 
out, ‘irony breaks down binarisms because it attacks every literalist 
point of view’ (Stephenson 2008, p. 6). So by ‘taking extreme points 
to the extreme’ (whether they come form hardline Muslim clerics or 
right-wing Anglo nationalists) stereotypes are undermined 
(Stephenson 2008, p. 6). This is done not by attacking or opposing 
them, but by adopting and inhabiting stereotypes (Stephenson 2008, 
p. 6). Phong Kuoch (2005, p. 38), discussing the strategy of sarcasm 
and irony, writes: 
Sarcasm, which traditionally has been viewed as oppressive due to 
its sneeringly and sharply cutting qualities, can ironically function 
progressively here. Often satirists utilise sarcasm not for silencing 
and suppressing, but rather for emphasizing and highlighting well-
hidden injustices. The rawness and bluntness of sarcasm are 
effective for stirring up controversies, subsequently opening up 
doors for discussion and debate.  
Salam Café’s mocumentary about ‘Uncle Sam’ (a fictitious Imam) 
campaigning for the position of mayor of Camden illustrates how 
satire can be used to ‘emphasise and highlight hidden injustices’ 
(Kuoch 2005, p. 38) by ‘taking extremes to the extreme’ and by 
‘adopting and inhabiting’ stereotypes (Stephenson 2008).  
The Salam Café episode that features Uncle Sam’s campaign to 
become the mayor of Camden has had over 62,428 YouTube views 
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between 28 May 2008 to 28 May 2010 (salamcafe 2008). The 
mocumentary is a spin-off from the furor that began in 2008 following 
publicity about a proposal to build an Islamic school in Camden. As 
the ABC Lateline program on the issue revealed, many residents in 
Camden were fearful that their town was being ‘Islamasised’ 
(Iggulden 2008). The next page has some quotes from the Lateline 
program transcript, which highlights some of the resident’s concerns 
and anger (Iggulden 2008). 
CAMDEN RESIDENT 2, CAMDEN RESIDENTS' GROUP: We just 
don't want…Muslim people in Camden, we don't want them not only 
here, we don't want them in Australia. 
CAMDEN RESIDENT 4, CAMDEN RESIDENTS' GROUP: My kids 
can't read Islamic, how are they going to go to that school? It's all 
crap, next thing there will be a mosque, then there will be the little 
town that comes with it. It's not appropriate for the area at all. 
Stills from the mocumentary by Salam Cafe, as shown below, clearly 
poke fun at some Camden resident’s (disproportionate) fear that the 
proposal to build an Islamic school in Camden is a sign of Muslims 
trying to make the town ‘Islamic’ (salamcafe 2008). The ‘funny’ side 
of Islamaphobia is given useful satiric treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, it should be acknowledged that while comedy can be used 
as an anti-racism tool as the Salam Cafe example suggests, it can 
also be used by racists to mobilise hate. Sometimes the line between 
anti-racism and just plain racism can blur. Some would say Salam 
Café and the Fear of a Brown Planet, on occasion, smudge the line 
between providing a critique of Whiteness and that of just criticizing 
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white people. The difference is that the former (a critique of 
Whiteness) is ‘based on a political critique, not a moral critique, of 
White people’ (Hage 2003, p. 118). Take for example the Salam Café 
episode about a visit to the Melbourne suburb of Frankston (lugzlebo 
2006). Characters from Salam Café such as the show’s presenter 
Nazeem Hussein and Uncle Sam interview ‘ordinary’ Frankston 
residents to gauge their understanding and attitudes towards Islam 
and Muslims. (See Appendix H for some transcript from that 
episode.) It could be argued that this particular episode is antiracist in 
that it exposes white racism as well as cultural and religious 
ignorance – which are too often assumed to be no longer a problem 
in Australia. On the other hand, representing white Australians 
(especially those who live in Frankston) as ‘redneck’, ignorant and 
racist, does not necessarily serve an anti-racist agenda. Therefore, it 
could be argued that, although it does provide a political critique of 
Whiteness, this particular episode swings more towards a moral 
criticism about white people, and this particular representation of 
‘Aussies’ serves to demonise ‘them’ and further cement a dichotomy 
between ‘us and them’.   
There are of course plenty of other young Australian Arab and 
Muslim comedians who are sharing their experiences of Othering 
and challenging the assumptions made about them via YouTube. I 
have only discussed two of the most popular Australian Muslim 
comedy acts – Fear of a Brown Planet and Salam Café – whose 
work is being widely circulated on the YouTube website21. See 
Appendix D for another example of comedy used for ‘constructive’ 
engagement. In this appendix I discuss Maysa Abouzaid’s comedy. 
Although her comedy is not being circulated on YouTube, I thought it 
important to examine her comedy style, because, although her 
comedy tact is not as controversial as Fear of a Brown Planet and 
                                                 
21
 For instance, Aamer Rahman (one of the comedians in Fear of a Brown Planet) 
developed a skit about conducting a workshop for white people has had over 9415 
views between 18 January 2010 and 4 October 2010 (foabrownplanet 2010). The 
Salam Café episode featuring Uncle Sam’s bid to become the mayor of Camden 
has had over 69, 233 views between 28 May 2008 and 4 October 2010.  
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Salam Café, she nevertheless manages to use humour as a tool to 
share and explore her experiences of Othering, as well as a vehicle 
to encourage her audience to think more critically about the 
assumptions they make about Others.   
It is not only Australian Arab and Muslim comedy that is challenging 
and exploring stereotypes. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, hip-
hop is another creative anti-racism tool that is being embraced by 
these young people in their online and offline realities. Earlier in the 
chapter, I discussed the rap song circulated on YouTube entitled 
‘AussieDiss’. I argued that the AussieDiss rap song could be 
interpreted as a medium used by young marginalised men to meet 
their needs and desires, by capitalizing on Othering. That is to say, 
the young men, through their rap lyrics, were imbuing value onto their 
position as Others (i.e. by fashioning themselves as sexually 
powerful and willing to assert their right to national belonging through 
violence). This capitalisation of Othering was used as a means by 
which to resist and subvert White racism, assert governmental 
belonging, and gain respect and power, via intimidation and fear. I 
also mentioned that this kind of rap song would not be considered 
widely as socially acceptable. There are, however, other rap songs 
being produced by young ASB Australian Muslims, and being 
circulated on sites such as YouTube, that are more widely accepted 
as a constructive way to deal with experiences of racism and 
exclusion.     
Australian-Muslim hip-hop group ‘The Brothahood’ is one that would 
fit the ‘constructive engagement’ category. The Brothahood MySpace 
website (TheBrothahood 2006) makes a clear and articulate 
declaration about its political and cultural objectives: 
The Brothahood are five young Australian conscious rappers who 
use hip-hop as a tool to smash down stereotypes and 
misconceptions of ‘Muslims in the West’. They created a whole new 
theme to the Australian hip hop scene whilst maintaining hip hop’s 
core essence: taught and intelligent rhymes and production skills 
that are sharp and always on point.  
Disillusioned with modern hip-hop’s celebration of gun play and 
misogyny, the Brothahood tracks are reflections on real life and on 
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the struggles of real people who are deemed ‘outsiders’ by their 
society.  
The results are socially conscious tracks such as The Silent Truth – 
which topped the JJJ Unearthed Hip Hop Chart in 2007 – in which 
Brothahood members Jehad Dabab, Moustafa Dabab, Ahmed 
Ahmed, Hesham Habibullah and Timur Bakan describe everyday 
life in Australia post-September 11 and Cronulla: From beer I refrain 
/ Prayers I maintain/ Can’t get on a plane without copping all the 
blame/ People can’t ya see that we are all the same? / Children of 
Adam but playing the blame game.  
The Brothahood are resisting racism not by embracing stereotypes or 
capitalising on stereotypes like the AussieDiss rappers. Instead of 
reifying the ‘us and them’ binary, they try to break it down with lyrical 
rap lines such as: ‘People can’t ya see that we are all the same? 
Children of Adam but playing the blame game’ (TheBrothahood 
2006).  As articulated on the group’s MySpace website 
(TheBrothahood 2006) and in the SBS documentary about them 
(lugzlebo 2008), The Brothahood use hip-hop as a tool to break 
down stereotypes and misconceptions of ‘Muslims in the West’ 
(TheBrothahood 2006). As the lyrics from one of their most popular 
song ‘The Silent Truth’ indicate (see Appendix E) their rap is also a 
way of fighting racism and sharing their experiences of being treated 
as outsiders in the country they call home: Australia22 (lugzlebo 
2007). 
As the lyrics of ‘The Silent Truth’ indicate, The Brothahood members 
have a strong sense of belonging to Australia, but they express their 
connection and assert their right to place differently to the way in 
which the AussieDiss rappers communicate theirs. Needs such as a 
desire for respect and feelings of belonging are being met by both 
the rappers of AussieDiss and The Brothahood through the creative 
process of developing and sharing music but, while AussieDiss 
embrace Othering, The Brotherhood rejects it.   
                                                 
22
 I have included only some of the lyrics from the song in Appendix E. There are a 
few lines, which I haven’t included in the appendix, that do emphasise (rather than 
challenge) the “Us and Them” binary. The video clip for the song, and full lyrics to 
the song can be accessed from the following URL: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9dqmnewbeTY 
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Conclusion 
 
 
There has been some persistent concern about the way some young 
Australian Muslim and ASB people use the online video sharing site 
YouTube. Yet, to date, no research has been conducted on the 
question of whether some of these videos might be being developed 
and uploaded onto YouTube, as a way for these young people to 
respond to and negotiate their experiences of racism, and to carve 
out spaces of belonging. My study has made a contribution to filling 
this research gap. 
An analysis of YouTube videos created by these young people 
reveals that they are using YouTube to meet a range of needs and 
purposes. In the first few sections of this chapter, I argued that 
YouTube was being used by some young people to achieve respect, 
The picture above taken from The Brotherhood’s website 
(TheBrothahood (N/A)) features The Brotherhood’s album cover 
title ‘Lyrics of Mass Construction’. The album title semantically 
plays on ‘President Bush’s rhetoric regarding Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction’ (Hartnett & Stengrim 2004, p. 152). The title 
signals The Brotherhood’s intention of making a mass 
‘constructive’ difference on their society through the ‘weapons’ of 
their rap lyrics. 
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feel a sense of power and express and explore their feelings of 
belonging. They were also using it as a way to resist and subvert 
White racism, to fashion and project identities (including ‘gang’ 
identities) and to affirm their social presence. It was also apparent 
that YouTube was being used by some young people to play with 
power relations, particularly in relation to contested spaces such as 
governance over the national space, as well as more localised 
spaces, indicated by their claim to ‘rule’ the northern and western 
suburbs of Melbourne. I argued that insights into the ways these 
young people have met various needs and desires, via YouTube, can 
be gathered by applying analytical concepts such as ‘ethnicised 
protest masculinity’ as well as the notion of capitalising on or 
embracing ‘Othering’, which is a concept that has been used to 
interpret the experiences of Muslim young people in Denmark, but up 
till now has not been applied to the Australian context. By applying 
these concepts, I have found that young people’s YouTube videos 
can be viewed as a sign of their resilience rather than as indications 
of pathology. They can be interpreted as a creative medium to meet 
needs and desires, such as the opportunity to be seen, heard and to 
create a new politics of belonging, which they may have more 
difficulty achieving in their offline realities.  
I acknowledged that such videos, in which young people style 
themselves as gangs, promote or express hostility to white 
Australians and to police personnel, and reflect ‘ethnicised protest 
masculinity’ and ‘a capitalisation of Othering’ are unlikely to be seen 
widely as socially acceptable. Furthermore, these aren’t the only 
kinds of videos that deserve attention. There are, for instance, 
YouTube videos that resist racism, explore and share experiences of 
racism and belonging but do so in more ‘constructive’ ways, 
exemplified in YouTube videos of Salam Café, Fear of a Brown 
Planet and The Brothahood. By examining the differences between 
these ‘constructive’ videos, and the previously analysed ‘un-
constructive’ videos, I found some similarities and some differences. 
Through this analysis I found that both ‘un-constructive’ and  
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‘constructive’ videos met needs such as standing up to racism and 
challenging accusations such as White nationalist’s claims that ASB 
and Muslim Australians don’t ‘deserve’ to belong in the nation. 
However, these same ends can be achieved in different ways using 
different approaches. For instance, the creators of the 
‘unconstructive’ videos generally emphasised their Otherness and 
attempted to gain respect via fear and intimidation and by employing 
an ‘ethnicised protest masculinity’. The creators of the ‘constructive’ 
videos generally took a different approach. They instead tended to 
challenge the construction of ‘them’ as ‘Others’ and attempted to 
break down the binaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’.      
The next chapters explore how youth workers might employ these 
research findings, as well as several of my other research findings, in 
their youth work practice.   
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Chapter Six: Research into Action 
 
Yeah, you get looks and you get greasies and people saying 
something under their breath. You ignore it. You don’t make it a big 
deal or nothing. You just keep walking, and keep your head up high. 
     Nuer, female interviewee  
 
 
Michael Ungar (2001, 2004, 2005b, 2005d, 2008) is a leading 
international researcher exploring what enables young people to be 
resilient when confronting major challenges to their health and 
wellbeing. Ungar has identified the kinds of resources, both personal 
and collective, that young people draw on when facing challenges 
thrown up by experiences like poverty, ill health, family stress, social 
injustice and cultural marginality. Ungar’s work belongs to a tradition 
that emphasises the social-ecological character of resilience. This 
means that Ungar does not treat resilience as an individual or 
‘psychological’ quality, but rather emphasises the social relationships 
and social habitat including the role played by the people and 
organisations found in any community available to support young 
people to rise to these challenges. Ungar’s (2004, 2005b, 2008) work 
has been useful to my research in a number of ways. It has helped to 
point to the need to reflect on how research can be used to inform 
the development of practical services and programs that will resource 
young people. 
Putting ‘research into action’ is important because, as Ungar 
observes, academic research often remains disconnected from the 
work of service providers and policy makers. Ungar (2008, p. 18) 
laments that those who do research or develop theory may fail to 
reflect on how their work might inform practice: 
The grunt work of bringing about change is left to lay community 
members, frontline professionals, policy developers or, worse, 
politicians. Busy schedules and client demands often prevent these 
people from delving deep into academic literature of outcome 
studies and theory-driven discussions of what should work and why. 
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As ideal as it would be to ensure robust theories inform 
interventions and policies, more often they remain disconnected.  
Mindful of this problem, I explore here how my research findings, in 
conjunction with the literature on young people and resilience, might 
be used to assist young Australians who have experienced prejudice 
and cultural marginalisation. How might my research findings be 
used to inform the development of programs and projects designed 
to strengthen young people’s sense of belonging in ways that go 
beyond their immediate community? 
I begin the chapter by reviewing the literature on ‘resilience’ and the 
‘strengths-based approach’ to youth work. The remainder of the 
chapter is divided in to three sections, each of which links to one of 
my key research findings. In the first of these sections I consider how 
some young people draw on their faith to give meaning to and deal 
with what they describe as ‘negative’ interactions with other 
Australians. I discuss how religious beliefs of young people can be 
drawn on by youth workers and used as a resource in their practice. 
In the second section I refer to my finding about how some 
interviewees used violence to deal with racism.  Here I question why 
they ‘chose violence’ and suggest that youth workers have an 
important role to play in promoting alternatives to violence.   
In the last section I focus on the finding that young people are 
developing creative ways to deal with racism and describe how they 
are carving out their own spaces. I suggest how youth workers can 
support and build on these developments in ways that promote anti-
racism and strengthen young people’s connections to the wider 
Australian community. 
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From a resilience perspective 
 
There is a large and expanding literature on resilience and young 
people (Abbott 1998; Delfabbro & Harrvey 2004; Kowalenko et al. 
2002). However, as Bessant, Sercombe and Watts (1998, p. 270) 
have argued, youth studies and youth work historically have not paid 
as much attention to young people’s voices as they might have, 
meaning that the history of youth work: 
... is a history of well meaning adults deciding that some children 
and young people have problems, that they need help and that 
some kind of organisation and service delivery will address that 
need. This is really a version of welfare work with a foundation 
originally in charity work. 
Michael Ungar (2004, 2005b, 2008) has also been critical of some of 
the dominant ways of responding to ‘marginalised’ young people or 
young people identified as problematic in one way or another. The 
value of listening to young people and empowering them to build on 
their capacities is highlighted by academics such as Ungar as one 
way of helping young people to deal with the problems they come up 
against, such as experiences of racism and exclusion from the 
national community. As Bessant, Sercombe and Watts (1998) and 
Ungar (2008, p. 138) have argued, too often mainstream approaches 
to thinking about or responding to ‘youth problems’ has relied on a 
mixture of medical and deficit models which end up affirming the 
value of a ‘blaming the victim’ approach (Ungar 2005b, p. 5; 2008, p. 
138). While these models remain a dominant feature of much of the 
recent ‘risk’ paradigm, we have also seen a number of attempts to 
move away from the pathologising discourses that have been so 
popular in professional practices such as youth work, social work and 
allied disciplines.  
These alternative initiatives have paid attention to young people’s 
perspectives, which has resulted in the emergence of alternative 
explanatory frameworks and practices (Ungar 2005d) including what 
can be generally described as a ‘strengths-based’ approach or a 
resilience perspective. If nothing else this approach signals the 
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evolution of a more humble disposition based on the principle that 
there is value in listening to insider accounts, and that experts may 
learn a great deal from young people if they choose to. According to 
Ungar (2005b, p. 138) the premise of the ‘strength-based’ approach 
is that young ‘people possess inherent strengths, or assets, that hold 
the key to their ability to cope with stress and trauma’. Instead of 
‘discovering’ deficits, often without even talking with young people, 
and then prescribing ‘treatments’ or policies, those who work from a 
strengths-based perspective have a different approach. They help 
young people to identify what they already do well and what their 
strengths and supports are, and then help them work out ways of 
building on those capacities.  As Ungar  (2005b, p. 138) explains: 
Such strengths include not only internal attributes but also supports 
from the social environment. Thus an important aspect of strengths-
based practice is the identification and mobilization of natural 
supports. 
Dennis Sallebey (2000, pp. 127-128) agrees: 
The work of the strengths approach is the work of empowerment – 
helping individuals, families and communities see and utilise their 
capacities; recognise the options open to them; understand the 
barriers and scarcities they face; surface their hopes and 
aspirations; and align them with their inner and outer resources to 
improve their quality of life.  
The strengths based perspective recognises the capacity people 
have to live positively, to understand and make sense of their 
environment and to triumph over difficult circumstances (Stewart & 
McWhirter 2007, p. 489). It recognises that many young people who 
face ‘risk factors’ such as illness, poverty and abuse, cope with these 
adversities and in some cases even flourish. It makes sense to pay 
attention to what enables people facing adversity to cope with the 
risks they face (Ungar 2005b, 2005d). By paying attention to young 
people’s stories of resilience (and this includes the stories shared by 
young people who have been labelled as dangerous, delinquent, 
deviant and disordered) we can build on the strengths inherent in the 
young person.  
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Ungar (2005d) warns that concepts such as resilience can be used 
by professions such as youth work to inadvertently reproduce social 
values that are opposed to enabling young people to flourish. For 
instance, young people who find ways of coping that are not socially 
acceptable (in a particular historical and cultural location) may be 
categorised as vulnerable, while those who find ways to cope in 
socially approved ways are labelled resilient. Unger (2005d, p. 91) 
writes that the arbitrary categorising of young people as either 
resilient or vulnerable: 
…overlooks how both populations employ the same generic 
strategies to cope with difficult life events (i.e. spending time with 
friends, exercising control over aspects of their lives, seeking 
meaningful involvement in the community, attaching to others, 
avoiding threats to their self esteem.   
One difference may be that those usually labelled as ‘vulnerable 
young people’ may be achieving resilience in ways that are not 
generally approved of even though it involves drawing on the same 
kinds of social resources as everyone else. For example, young 
people defined as ‘vulnerable’ may spend time with friends doing 
things that are not ‘socially approved’, such as bullying others, using 
drugs or doing graffiti. As Ungar (2005d, p. 91) explains: 
Both labels of ‘resilient’ and ‘vulnerable’ can be thin descriptions 
that are unhelpful when they cast the helper into the role of agent of 
social control, applauding only the child’s conformity rather than 
unique pathways to survival.  
Ungar’s point is not that service providers adopt an ‘anything goes’ 
framework, but that we need to be more attentive to the actual 
qualities of the social networks available to young people, and to 
value a wider array of social resources than has been common.     
For youth workers, who see their role as empowering and advocating 
for young people, the challenge offered by the strengths-based and 
resilience model of youth work is to listen carefully to young people’s 
accounts of how they have coped with stressors in their life and 
achieved a degree of personal and social power (Ungar 2004, p. 13).  
Rather than looking for the deficits in the young person and focusing 
on so-called ‘pathologies’ in their lives, the point is to see the young 
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person’s strengths and the resources they have access to in their 
community, and to ask how they can be harnessed to help them live 
a good life. This requires youth workers to think critically about 
conventional categories (like ‘anti-social conduct’ or ‘delinquent 
behaviour’) and to see that in certain contexts, and from the 
perspective of the young person, that recourse to socially frowned on 
behaviour might actually be a reflection of the young person’s 
strength rather than a sign of their pathology. This requires the 
practitioner to take a ‘post-modern’ perspective, to accept that his or 
her way of seeing the world is just one truth and those who are being 
helped are likely to explain their world in other ways (Ungar 2004, p. 
30). For instance, some young men I interviewed spoke of ‘bashing’ 
those they described as being racists. When asked why they bashed 
the racists, one interviewee, John, explained: ‘He pissed me off so 
then I hit him’. Other interviewees who spoke about why they bashed 
or ‘told off’ racists had the following to say: 
Egor: I think we got our respect back by telling them off and stuff. 
Axle: By bashing the fuck out of them. 
Kavindi: Hey Egor, so you were saying you got your respect by 
telling them off? So if you tell them off you get more respect?  
Egor: Oh yeah. 
Kavindi: Yeah? 
Axle: He means like full-on scaring them and shit and they never 
want to open up their mouth again. 
Kavindi: What do you mean, scare them? Like, how would you 
scare them? 
Muly: Threaten them. 
Egor: Na like whatever. Whatever it takes. 
As these narratives reveal, some young men responded violently to 
people they saw as racist for reasons that may be described in terms 
of moral emotions, which include anger, honour and dignity. The 
explanation they gave for their actions was that they ‘wanted to get 
more respect’ and to discourage those who were harassing and 
taunting them from doing so. So, how can youth workers respond to 
such stories?  
While those working with young people cannot and ought not 
condone dangerous and violent  acts (Ungar 2004, p. 203), there is 
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nonetheless an obligation on practitioners to respond to young 
people in a ways that are respectful. This includes listening to them, 
and hearing from them why they do what they do, and how they see 
the world. This can mean joining with them in finding alternative ways 
of achieving their needs, but in ways that do not bring harm to 
themselves or others (Liebenberg & Ungar 2008, p. 14). In taking this 
perspective, practitioners can talk with young people about the 
consequences of their actions. In this way they can work with young 
people to develop alternatives to violence as a way of dealing with 
racism. This can involve identifying the range of options, the 
consequences, the costs and the benefits. I now turn to a discussion 
about how this might be achieved, by drawing on my research and 
specifically material that came from the focus group discussions I 
had with young men. 
In group discussions, some of my interviewees identified what they 
saw as the benefits of fighting back. They said that violent responses 
worked to discourage further attacks and abusive comments. It also 
made them feel strong because they ‘stood up’ for themselves and 
their culture and this helped restore a sense of self-respect.  Not 
everyone agreed. Some of the young men I spoke with did not think 
fighting was a valid response to racist attacks. One reason for this, 
they argued, was because it could easily escalate into more violence. 
Some of the young men who expressed this concern said there was 
a real risk of retribution. They said that those who were bashed might 
return later with a group of their mates. They would seek revenge on 
their friends and family. They also warned that stories of such 
violence would spread and will be used to stereotype young people 
and Muslim and Lebanese communities more generally. This they 
said would lead to even more discrimination.  
How might the research literature on resilience, and insights offered 
by these glimpses into the life-world of my interviewees, assist 
practitioners who work with young people? To begin, I suggest they 
provide a basis for appreciating what can be gained by listening to 
young people and by reflecting on our own assumptions. Specifically, 
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I refer to importance of thinking critically about the taken-for-granted 
assumptions and responses many youth experts have to the ways 
young people manage difficult situations, which typically involves 
immediate condemnation and censuring followed by instructions on 
how to respond ‘properly’. As Ungar has argued, there is value in 
having patience and in not being so eager to judge and label and 
condemn actions like stealing and fighting. By listening carefully to 
the way young people are fulfilling (or trying to meet) their needs with 
the resources they have at hand, youth workers can better tap into 
young people’s capacities and, if needed, identify alternative ways to 
meet their needs.  
Establishing a respectful relationship and dialogue with the young 
people is critical. This provides a basis for identifying their capacities, 
and is an important first step because often the strengths that young 
people have are not recognised as such by them (or others). Naming 
their capacities and discussing how they can draw on them is one 
insight that comes from my research and the relevant literature. 
Further discussions about the nature of their context, which includes 
naming and reflecting on the actions of others and the suitability of 
their own ways of seeing and feelings and conduct, is what I would 
suggest as the next step. This includes working together to develop 
good judgment and to establish whether there are alternatives ways 
of responding.  
Some of the participants in this research project argued that they 
would never fight or at least tried not to resort to violence because 
such a response was counter to the teachings of Islam. In the next 
section of this chapter, I turn to my research finding that some young 
people drew quite heavily on their religious beliefs to help make 
sense of racism.   
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Faith as a resource 
 
Research has documented that spirituality and religiosity is one of 
the many cultural-psychological resources that people can draw on 
when facing adversity and the stress of prejudice and societal 
marginalisation (Bryant-Davis 2005; Koeing 2006; Mattis 2002; 
Mellor 2004b; Shorter-Gooden 2004). As Thema Bryant Davis (2005, 
p. 153) has argued, religion can be a ‘positive source of coping, 
inspiration and hope’. Similarly, my research has found that some of 
the young people I spoke with drew on their faith to help them deal 
with experiences of racism in ‘constructive’ ways.  
A number of the young people I spoke with were keen to point out 
that one of the key tenets of Islam is the value of peace. They said 
that their actions as Muslims ought to reflect the ethics of non-
violence and cooperation central to Islam. Thus, when confronted 
with racism some interviewees tried to think of how to respond by 
thinking about how the prophet Muhammad (PBUH23) would act in 
the same situation and how their actions would be judged by God. 
Some of the young people referred to stories about the prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH) as a guide to how they could deal with racism. 
One of the stories they referred to is a story about the Prophet 
(PBUH) and his Jewish neighbour. John, one of my young male 
interviewees told me the story: 
…about the Prophet (PBUH) and this Jewish neighbour. Everyday 
this neighbour would throw rubbish on his doorstep. Then the 
rubbish stopped appearing and the Prophet (PBUH) found out that it 
was because his neighbour was ill. He immediately went to visit his 
neighbour to make the neighbour feel better. This story tells us that 
even if someone is mean to you that you should show kindness to 
them.   
Stories about the Prophet (PBUH), and Islamic teachings from 
sources such as the Koran, were used by some interviewees as a 
guide for how they should live their life. This research finding 
                                                 
23
 PBUH is an abbreviation of “Peace Be Upon Him” and is a common blessing 
given to him by Muslims (Bedar & Matrah 2005, p. 8). I will be using the 
initials (PBUH) following the mention of the Prophet Muhammad’s (PBUH) 
name in this thesis, out of respect.    
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parallels research by Jacqueline Mattis (2002, p. 316) who found that 
forty-three per cent of the African-American women involved in her 
study indicated that they: 
Live within a set of religious and/or spiritual informed principles (e.g. 
being non-judgemental, forgiving, and compassionate) that guide 
their behaviours. These principles helped women to navigate 
between expedient choices and spiritually responsible or 
appropriate choices… 
Interviewees like Nuer reported that they found their religious faith 
particularly helpful. Like many of my interviewees, Nuer said that 
Islam informed the way she related to and interacted with others and 
approached life’s problems. Nuer believed that her understanding of 
Islamic teachings was central to her ability to develop intercultural 
and interfaith understanding and to develop caring relationships with 
people different to her. She explained how Islam played a key role in 
her life: 
Islam has made me the person I am now … Islam doesn’t allow you 
to judge people. It teaches you: don’t judge a person because of his 
family background, because they could turn out to be a totally 
different person. You don’t judge them because of the culture...  
Islam teaches all that and I think the way I am now is because of the 
religion and how I am practising [my faith] now… 
I’m not going to not help you because you’re not a Muslim. That’s 
not how it works with me. Islam itself doesn’t work like that as well. 
We have to help our neighbours. We have to help our family and 
friends. You have to show the beauty of Islam. Be a respectable 
person. In your heart, you know? Be a good friend at the same time. 
Nuer referred explicitly to her faith when she talked about how she 
wanted to lead her life and how to respond in constructive ways to 
difficult experiences. She said to me: 
… religion tells you that it’s not worth sort of pondering around 
saying, that’s bad times, you’re not going to achieve anything. You 
got to sort of translate [negative experiences] into a positive thing 
and go from there. 
In a similar way to the African-American women in Mattis’s (2002) 
study who drew on their religion, Nuer also explained how her 
religious beliefs helped her to see racist experiences as an 
opportunity to achieve personal growth. According to Mattis (2002, p. 
314) fifty-seven per cent of the participants in her study said that: 
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… In times of adversity spiritualty functioned by highlighting a 
crucial set of questions, answers and life lessons … However 
stressful events also may reveal lessons that are intended for 
others. Efforts to discern who the lessons are intended for, what the 
lessons are, and how to actualise them mark religiosity/spirituality 
as interpretive enterprises.    
Other young people in my research spoke about how Islam taught 
them the importance of being patient, especially when dealing with 
other people who were being intolerant of them as Muslims. They 
believed that they were responsible for teaching others about the 
‘beauty of Islam’. As Nuer said, this did not necessarily mean 
preaching to others but rather required them to lead by example and 
answer questions when asked, so that those around them had a 
good impression of Muslims and therefore of Islam. Nuer spoke 
about some of the dominant images of Muslims: 
Women with scarfs. A lot of people think we are oppressed. 
Isolated. Got no freedom. That’s really a big problem at this point. 
You’ve got people looking at you from top to bottom. Feeling sorry 
for you. And it’s like “I don’t want your pity”. … If you ask us Muslim 
sisters, “Why do you wear it? Do you choose to wear it”? Then I’m 
sure you’re going to get a beautiful answer … That’s probably one 
of the main reasons why I’m out there trying to educate people as 
well. Being a Muslim, playing soccer … girls with scarfs can play. 
We are not isolated. We are not oppressed at all. We do have the 
freedom like you do to achieve our goals. So yeah … that’s the 
message I want to get across to a lot of people.  
A number of the young people I spoke to make a slightly different 
point. They said that, after the terrorist attacks in the US, and the 
subsequent intensification of prejudice directed at Muslims, they 
became more conscious of their own behaviours and the impressions 
they made. They said that they been sensitised to the problem that 
non-Muslims might judge their behaviours as representing Islamic 
teachings and Muslims more generally. An example of this 
heightened consciousness of being representatives of Islam and the 
Muslim community is illustrated in the following extract from an 
interview with Anthony, who explained that some of his friends 
wanted to ‘bash’ a person who was being racist towards them but he 
dealt with this situation peacefully by drawing on the teachings of 
Islam: 
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That’s why me and my friends didn’t [bash the guy who was being 
racist] – they wanted to – some of us wanted to – but then I said 
‘no’… because that’s not what Islam teaches. And then if we were to 
do that everyone around us will perceive Muslims like that [as 
vengeful and violent people] so I said ‘no’.… [Violence is] not what 
Islam teaches. Violence is a big no. So either take it in the face and, 
you know, just settle everything down or that’s it, you’re not allowed to 
use violence. 
An even more interesting example of how the Islamic framework 
reflected a source of resilience occurred when one of the young men 
instructed a friend of his about the proper Islamic view of violence. 
This occurred in the course of a discussion between Jack Black, 
Anthony and me. This extract from that conversation captures the 
point nicely:   
Jack Black: … there was these Pakistani-Muslims and this guy, he 
came up to them and he goes, “Have you heard the Muslim jokes”? 
and they go, “no, tell me”. [The guy said:] “What do you call a Lebo 
that’s drunk”? He goes “hammered” and then they [my Pakistani-
Muslim friends] started laughing … Then he goes, “what do you call 
a Lebo that’s more drunk”? and he goes, “More-hammered, 
Mohammed”. And then he goes, “you know the new aluminium 
inventor”? He goes, “Allah-minimum” and then he started laughing 
[and that’s when we got angry and we bashed him and ended up 
hospitalising him]. 
Kavindi: So you and your friends were okay with the first joke but 
the second and the last joke were really not okay?  
Jack Black: Yeah. That’s what triggered them to hit him. Because 
they couldn’t take anymore. [My friends] they were religious. 
Anthony: No, they weren’t religious. 
Jack Black: They weren’t religious? 
Anthony: No, because Islam doesn’t teach that.  
Jack Black: They were religious and they go, “we can’t hear that, we 
can’t hear that”.  
Anthony: But you’re not allowed. In Islam you’re not allowed… you 
can call the authorities. Let them handle it. But you’re not allowed. 
That’s totally wrong to do that.  
Jack Black: No, no. I didn’t know that. I didn’t know that.  
Kavindi: Oh, you didn’t know that [Islam does not allow you to 
retaliate in those kinds of situations with violence]? 
Anthony: Yes, you did. What do you mean? That’s common 
[knowledge]. 
Kavindi: So you didn’t know that? 
Jack Black: No. 
Kavindi: But even if you did know that, would you still do that? 
Jack Black: No. No I wouldn’t hit him. No.  
Anthony: If those friends… if they like the Prophet… if they love the 
Prophet and the Prophet saw them do that, the prophet would be 
disgusted. I don’t think they’re religious because if they were 
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religious they would not hospitalise the guy. Because if everyone 
wants to do that, then no-one will be safe. True? Because if 
everyone wants to react the same way, imagine what the world 
would be. It wouldn’t be a nice place. 
In this discussion Jack Black ended up concluding that if he had 
known that violence was forbidden in Islam then he would not have 
condoned his friends punching another person who was making 
jokes that were not very respectful of Islam. This ‘rethink’ on the part 
of Jack Black occurred because Anthony provided a way of 
interpreting Islamic teachings about how to deal with bigotry. Jack 
Black agreed that violence should not be used to deal with bigotry 
even or especially when invoking Islam. This conversation illustrated 
how some young people drew on religious teachings to help them 
work out how to respond to difficult situations by engaging in 
processes of ethical reasoning.  
For welfare organisations concerned about young people getting into 
fights, particularly in response to racism or religious discrimination, 
my research suggests that religion can provide a framework of 
guidance for young people. It can help them think about and deal 
with conflict in ways that are more likely to produce positive 
outcomes for themselves and for others. If young people like Jack 
Black are motivated to be ‘good Muslims’, and if one consequence of 
this is that they become ‘good citizens’, then it makes sense for 
welfare organisations to draw on this intrinsic motivation. Islam is a 
source of identity and a framework for thinking well, which enables 
young people to deal with difficult situations and live flourishing, 
ethically competent lives. Other researchers such as Philip Gilligan 
and Sheila Furness (2005) and Leola Dyrud Furman, Mari-Anne Zahl 
and Perry W. Benson (2007) similarly argue that there is value in 
service providers being respectful of their clients’ beliefs, particularly 
if religion is central to their lives. Gilligan and Furness (2005, p. 617) 
write:  
Social workers need to be able to respond appropriately to the 
needs of all service users, including those for whom religious and 
spiritual beliefs are crucial. ‘Culturally competent’ practice depends, 
amongst other things, on an understanding and appreciation of the 
impact of faith and belief.  
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Secular welfare organisations of course may face some constraints 
in this dimension of their work. The social workers or youth workers 
they employ will not find it all that easy to draw on the resources of 
particular faith communities. Those employed by such organisations 
will not be disposed, for example, to ‘promote’ particular religious 
perspectives. What they can do, however, especially if the young 
person they are working with says that religion plays a significant role 
in their life, is to work to understand better the valuable role this 
attachment to a particular faith community plays. Ungar’s (2005b) 
work for example reminds us that resilient communities engage 
young people in a variety of ways including religiously; his work also 
reminds us that nothing can damage the resilient communities more 
that concerted attempts to devalue or abolish their language, culture 
or religion.    
That said, there is also a need to be mindful that some members of a 
given faith community may engage in promoting particular 
interpretations of their religious tradition, texts and teachings in ways 
that are not necessarily conducive to fostering community harmony 
or helpful for young people in finding ways to live well. As Zahava 
Solomon and Avital Laufer (2005, p. 241) point out, rigid and extreme 
religiosity can have adverse consequences and ought to be 
discouraged. The promotion of hate and violence by some religious 
leaders which, in the current climate, has been picked up quickly by 
sections of the media, does not help community relations or promote 
an informed understanding of Islam (Fife-Yeomans, Watson & Farr 
2006; Harris & Hart 2005; Kearney & Ong 2007; Sheridan 2007). 
Comments like the following which were reported in the national 
newspaper The Australian, are what I refer to: 
Sydney-born Sheik Feiz Mohamed calls Jews pigs and urges 
Muslim children to find fulfilment as jihad martyrs (Sheridan 2007). 
In this context it is understandable that some service providers are 
cautious about drawing on the support of religious leaders. Having 
said that, I argue that it is critical for mainstream service providers to 
connect with the relevant community groups, including religious 
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groups, when working with young people for whom faith and 
spirituality is important.  
Equally important is the proviso that (like any other youth project) all 
such projects need to create the opportunities for young people to 
play a major role in shaping the project. There is a need to ensure a 
strong ‘youth voice’, including a strong sense of ownership, control 
and direction by young people in developing and implementing the 
project, along with the support and resources that the youth workers 
and the broader community can provide to the young people. The 
Australian Youth Research Centre (Taylor et al. 2010) strongly 
supports the proposition that successful youth projects are 
characterised by a strong ‘youth voice’. Their report found that if 
youth projects are to be successful then young people need to feel 
they have a major degree of ownership (Taylor et al. 2010, p. 10). 
This does not necessarily mean that young people have to run the 
whole thing on their own, because in many cases young people don’t 
have the time or the resources to do so. What it does mean is that 
young people’s interests, experiences and values are both heard and 
acted on (Taylor et al. 2010, p. 10). 
 
  
Fighting back and viable alternatives 
 
One of the findings from my research is that some young Australian-
Lebanese-Muslims deal with their experiences of prejudice by 
‘fighting back’ physically against those they believe are hostile to 
them or to Muslims and Arabs more generally. I have argued (in 
chapter four) that one way we can understand this reaction is to 
appreciate the role of moral emotions, such as the pursuit of respect 
and dignity, the rush to protect friends and family and the integrity of 
one’s community. I argued that there needs to be recognition from 
the broader population (including service providers) that these moral 
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emotions which drive young people to engage in acts of physical 
violence are equivalent to those moral emotions found at work on the 
part of organisations like the police, or of nation states when they 
resort to ‘violence’. There also needs to be recognition that, 
historically, young people’s engagement in activities not approved of 
by adults (such as violence) has been understood in ways that 
pathologise those young people by drawing on labels like 
‘delinquent’, anti-social’, ‘dysfunctional’ or ‘at risk’. Such discourses 
have not always worked generally to the benefit of young people.  
An alternative perspective acknowledges that young people may be 
engaging in forms of violent activity because, given the limited 
alternatives they have available to them, they see it as the best or 
only way to deal with problems such as the prejudice or the racism 
they experience. More controversially we may say that while this 
activity may be considered harmful to themselves and to others, it 
may also be a sign of their resilience. In other words, certain kinds of 
violence may offer certain young people the best way to achieve 
‘healthful outcomes’ and fulfil their needs. This includes achieving a 
sense of personal control and power to author their own identity on 
their own terms.  
According to Ungar many young people are also well able to 
challenge and reject descriptions of themselves they do not like. 
Ungar (2004, p. 165) found that many ‘high risk youth’ use violence 
as a way of ‘managing difficulties’. This was clearly evident in my 
own research. John, who was one of my interviewees, assaulted 
another boy at school because he saw it as the only way to stop the 
taunts and bullying. In responding to racism in this way, John said he 
was able to gain a sense of personal control, and restore his 
integrity. John also acknowledged that his action was not something 
that Islamic teachings supported, and he would have preferred taking 
a different course of action if he had access to viable alternatives. 
This highlights a major challenge for youth workers. As argued by 
Ungar (2004, p. 203) we cannot 
Page 206  
…side with teens and argue that dangerous or self-destructive acts 
are health-promoting. While the onus is on those intervening to 
understand the alternative discourses of youth, we need not act to 
empower these discourses further if we find them personally in 
conflict with our own values and beliefs. Nor can we, in good 
consciousness, allow youth to define activities as power-enhancing 
or healthy that are good for them but harmful to their community. In 
such cases it is incumbent upon helpers to join youth in a search for 
other ways of constructing similarly powerful identities, but ones 
which do not risk harm to themselves or others.  
Ungar is proposing that there is value in youth workers listening to 
what young people say, and in deconstructing ‘the relative power of 
conventional understanding of what is and what is not acceptable in 
a particular social context’ (Ungar 2004, p. 204). He says that we 
may not like what the young people are telling us, but it is imperative 
that space is given for young people to speak and share with us their 
stories and accounts of their identity. Doing so allows a space for 
negotiating alternative identity stories, that are ‘sufficiently 
resourceful to allow the young person to get from it what he or she 
hopes to achieve, while possibly decreasing the threat that the young 
person’s former self posed’ (Ungar 2004, p. 204). The challenge for 
youth workers then is to engage young people in deliberative 
processes, which will help young people to identify and express 
moral emotions like righteous anger, and fulfil  needs (such as the 
need to protect one’s integrity), but in ways that do not harm 
themselves or others. These deliberative process obliges youth 
workers to assist young people in constructing alternative self 
narratives; that allow them to experience the same power and control 
they find when they act in ways that trouble us (Ungar 2005a, p. 5). 
Ungar’s call to help young people explore alternative stories of 
themselves, draws on ‘narrative therapy’ developed by clinicians 
such as Michael White and David Epston (1990). Narrative therapy is 
based on,  
… the notion that persons are rich in lived experience, that only a 
fraction of this experience can be storied and expressed at any one 
time, and that a great deal of lived experience falls outside the 
dominant stories about the lives and relationships of persons. Those 
aspects of lived experience that fall outside of the dominant story 
provide a rich and fertile source for the generation, or re-generation, 
of alternative stories (White & Epston 1990, p. 15).   
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The generation of alternative stories does not necessarily have to be 
done through formal counselling. It can also be achieved, for 
example, through a variety of art forms such as film, theatre, music, 
text, and new media, to name a few. These provide as mediums in 
which young people can explore different ‘self narratives’ and it also 
allow others to witness their stories. These mediums can also be 
used to uncover young people’s hidden resilience and allows the 
young person to experience a new self that fulfils their needs in a 
different way to their former self.  
What this might look like in practice is illustrated by some of the 
youth projects coordinated by ‘Big hART’ – a not for profit and non-
government organisation.  As stated on the Big hART website:  
Big hART partners with artists and communities to run projects that 
empower communities to change through the arts… Big hART 
projects tackle a wide range of serious issues… Too often, we 
encounter these issues framed as narratives of despair with no way 
out… Big hART is there to help communities change the story. (Big 
hART 2011). 
Peter Wright (2009, p. 10), who has completed an investigation into 
Big hART’s work, writes: 
Broadly speaking, what we see in Big hART’s work is that the 
narratives of community and selfhood are not closed or self-
sufficient social units but flexible and dynamic social practices. More 
importantly, they are produced and reproduced through interaction 
with others. It is this imaginative and creative process that provides 
opportunities for participants to enter into different communities 
through dialogue and with reciprocity.  
 
This processual and performative work draws on the work of Freire 
(2002) and Boal (1993) where members of the community are 
encouraged to reflect on their experiences as individuals and to use 
their ideas to imagine new ways of being and develop new forms of 
social action. For individuals, this means that creative process of 
giving form to feeling is an ‘act of knowing’ where participants re-
order, reshape and re-evaluate the stories and knowledge they 
already possess to gain insights into their own situation. 
 
In short, Big hART uses cultural strategies that encourages 
participants to reflect on their own experiences by finding 
connections with others, and potentially (re)construct new identities 
and revitalise communities.  
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Notably, projects such those developed by Big hART draw “external” 
audiences in to witness and participate in the (re)construction of 
young people’s identities, and in the imaginative and dialogical 
process of finding new ways of being. White and Epston (1990, p. 
17) argue that bringing an audience in (for example the young 
person's parents and peers) to witness identity performance, can aid 
the process of transformation in several ways.  
The endurance of new stories, as well as their elaboration, can also 
be enhanced by recruiting an “external” audience. There is a dual 
aspect to this enhancement. Firstly, in the act of witnessing the 
performance of a new story, the audience contributes to the writing 
of a new meanings; this has real effects on the audience’s 
interactions with the story’s subject. Secondly, when the subject of 
the story “reads” the audience’s experience of the new 
performance, either through speculation about these experiences or 
by a more direct identification, he or she engages in revision and 
extensions of the new story (White & Epston 1990). 
For young people who are categorised as ‘problems’, ‘at risk’, 
‘disengaged’, or tagged with some other disempowering and deficit 
laden label, the opportunity to showcase what the categories placed 
on them leaves out – to reveal their hidden resilience – is a chance to 
re-author their lives.  
Creative mediums, such as theatre, can also be used by young 
people to: reflect on the decisions and actions they have taken; to 
think through the consequences of the actions that they are 
considering taking; and to identify alternative ways of achieving 
needs and desires (e.g. the need to respond to racism in ways that 
retain personal dignity and maintain respect in the eyes of their 
peers) in ways that are meaningful and viable to them.   
Take the example I gave earlier (of John assaulting a school yard 
bully who was taunting him with racial comments) as the basis for a 
theatrical piece to promote creative reflection and deliberation. 
Through their performance, actors could re-tell and reflect on the 
decision John took to assault the bully. It could be used to explore 
alternative ways of responding to the issue of racial bullying (for 
example, John using assertive communication to stop the bullying 
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instead of physical means). The performance could also work 
through the consequences of John’s actions on the bully.    
As mentioned before, theatre is one of many art mediums which can 
be used to engage young people in reflection and deliberation. 
Another popular medium is cartooning. For an example of how this 
might work in practice see the following website: 
http://www.racismnoway.com.au/gamesroom/cmics/ (Racism. No 
Way! 2005). The suggested web link showcases some comics that 
explore the consequences of certain actions, and the different 
options young people have in how they respond to racism. It could be 
used by service providers and young people as inspiration for their 
own creative projects, to explore options in responding to racism and 
to enable critical reflection on particular actions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Excerpts from a comic available to view from the ‘Racism No Way!’ 
website (Racism. No Way! 2005). 
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‘Us and them’ and the media in-between 
 
All of the young people I spoke with believed that many ‘non-Muslim-
Arab Australians’ had a negative view of Muslims and Arabs and 
attributed this in large part to harmful media representations. That 
said, it also seemed to me that many of the young people I spoke 
with were not very self-reflective. They did not seem to give much 
attention to the ways the media shaped their own views, identity or 
the feeling of being ‘Other’. Aly (2007, p. 28) in her research found 
the same thing:  
 The information gathered in the focus group and qualitative 
interviews suggest that Australian Muslims subscribe to a 
propaganda view of the media in terms of its influence on the 
opinions of the broader community, but are often unaware of their 
own role as active agents in the media communication process and 
the consequences of this. Respondents expressed a common belief 
that the media discourse strongly influenced public opinion against 
Muslims. At the same time however, respondents have actively 
developed a framework for understanding the media discourse that 
actually mirrors the underlying message that situate Muslims as ‘out 
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of place’. Yet they were less likely to recognise their own role in 
deconstructing and internalising this message or the impact of this 
on their own self-perceptions. 
According to Aly (2007, p. 35) some Australian Muslims used the 
anti-Muslim discourses to ‘reconstruct’ themselves and their Muslim 
identity in terms of being victims identity and treating ‘the problem’ as 
one of injustice:   
The victim identity is rooted in a notion that Australian Muslims are 
being victimised because of their religious beliefs. While it can be 
argued that there is much truth in this observation given the 
dominant messages in the popular media discourse, the fact 
remains that religion is the primary basis for constructing the victim 
identity. In this sense the victim identity corroborates the media 
discourse which recognises Australian Muslims wholly and solely as 
a religious entity and, importantly, as adherents of an ideology that 
is incompatible with the values of liberal secularism.   
She argues that some Australian Muslims engaged with alternative 
media discourses with a view to reinforcing the victim identity. Like 
Aly’s study, my research also shows how some of the young people I 
interviewed played into the dominant media discourses to establish a 
shared sense of injustice. Many of the young people for example 
used alternative media to reaffirm their experiences of being victims. 
This was illustrated in the following extract from my interview with 
Rocky, who talked about the way he made sense of news that was 
critical of the American military intervention in Iraq, which was 
circulating on the alternative media source YouTube24: 
You know what, Australia is against Muslims, that’s all I can say … 
pretty much it’s everyone against Muslims… Everyone just looks at us 
and says, “why should you hang around them, they’re someone 
completely different, their beliefs are different to us and they should 
go back to their country, they shouldn’t come here”. And everyone 
thinks, “Oh, Muslims aren’t allowed to have fun and Muslims aren’t 
allowed to do this” … they just see what the media wants them to see 
… Yeah, so that’s how they’re seeing us, that’s why, like, people are 
so racist, because the media sees all Muslims as like one person, like 
whatever a Muslim does, all a Muslim does is the same as … that’s 
what all these people have got it against us, because of the media… 
                                                 
24
 I realise that ‘YouTube’ could be defined by some people as ‘mass media,’ rather than my 
characterisation of it in this thesis as ‘alternative media’. I have categorised it as a form of 
‘alternative media’ for two reasons. First, while material on ‘YouTube’ is widely available, not 
all of the many videos shared on this site are viewed by everyone who uses this site. 
Furthermore, most videos are created and posted on the site by individuals, and non-
government and non-commercial/independent bodies.  
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I was watching a video on YouTube today and [it was about what 
happened in] Fallujah [in Iraq]. I have not heard of any death toll from 
Fallujah and then all of a sudden there’s a secret reporter [who has] 
gone and taken videos of all the dead bodies. The [video showed that 
the Americans had] killed nearly everyone and [even] the wives, they 
killed them. [When they found] injured people lying on the floor, they 
would shoot them. Kids were missing arms from a bomb or 
something, they would shoot them. It was a massacre…And they call 
Muslims the terrorists…And there’s one [American] soldier that 
confessed [that this really did happen] and they call us the terrorists. 
And there was [another YouTube video I saw] a guy in America, a 
politician, goes “Muslims, we have to wipe them out”. He went to a 
college in America and he told [the college students]: “what we have 
to do is get every Muslim student out of America and send them back 
to their country”. And everyone’s just applauding him. 
Rocky was not the only young person who used alternative media 
sources like YouTube to reaffirm his narrative about ‘everyone being 
against Muslims and Arabs’. Some young men in another of my 
focus groups said that after they observed the mass media blaming 
Muslims for the September 2001 terrorist attacks they started to look 
for alternative stories. They found the alterative stories they were 
looking for on the Internet. They found stories, for example, that 
blamed the Jews for the September 2001 terrorist attacks and stories 
built around a theory in which America was conspiring to turn the 
West against Arabs and Muslims, so that they could get access to 
the oil resources in Arab countries. 
Aden: Did you know that when the World Trade Centre happened 
there was not one Jew in that building? And that day there was 
meant to be 2000 Jewish people working?  
Usher: 8000 Jews. 
Aden: Sorry, he’s right … 8000 Jews. 
Usher: Yeah, 8,000 Jews and not one of them came to work. Have 
you seen Fahrenheit 911? 
Kavindi: Nah…  I haven’t yet. 
Aden: Go watch it. Coz if you watch it you will believe every single 
word.  
Salim: So America was saying the Muslims are doing this and that, 
and I’m thinking to myself… we look up to Osama Bin-Laden, he’s 
living a hard life, he’s living like the prophet, you know, we look up 
to him and then he sends people to go blow up the towers?  
Aden: But [Osama Bin Laden] he didn’t do that. 
Valentino: They just blamed him. 
Usher: [Then we thought] Is that possible [that it could be Osama – 
the person we look up to]? And that’s why we started thinking na, 
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it’s not him. That’s why we started to look for different options and 
then we started to find out that 8000 Jews took a day off work. 
Kavindi: So, how did you go and find out this information?  
Aden: It was all on the net and all on the news. 
Salim: America tries to get people to hate Muslims… they think of a 
reason why Kuwait needs to be invaded then they will invade it and 
take the oil…. And then there will come a time when…The western 
region… will turn around [and] say no more Arabs … no more 
Muslims [in our countries] you know what I mean? 
As this discussion indicates, there were three primary sources of 
information for these young men. One was the documentary film 
Fahrenheit 911. Another source was what they heard from others in 
the community. The third were Internet resources, all of which they 
uncritically accepted as ‘credible’ and reliable sources. It seems that, 
while most of the people I spoke with were well able to interpret 
‘mainstream western’ news stories critically, they were not so critical 
of news (especially news produced by Muslims and Arabs), which 
often reproduced and reinforced their existing prejudices.  
One of the people in Aly’s (2007, p. 33) research entertained similar 
ideas to those of some of the young men in my focus group. They 
argued that Muslims and Arabs were victims of a larger conspiracy 
aimed at undermining Islam. The person Aly spoke with said:  
They [the West] are aiming to destroy us and we are not aware of it 
but now we are under attack we are being destroyed. What about 
realising we are being attacked by purpose not by our people. And 
now there are terrorists – all these crimes that are happening under 
the name of the Muslims. Who are really behind them? (Aly 2007, p. 
33)  
Aly (2007) and I have found from our respective research that not all 
the people interviewed played into the media discourse of ‘us’ 
against ‘them’. Instead some interviewees have renegotiated their 
identity on the basis of shared or common values with the broader 
community. They have actively rejected the victim identity and 
refused to position themselves in opposition to ‘other Australians’ or 
non-Muslims. I suggest that service providers have a role to play in 
working with young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims (and others who 
may buy into ‘us’ and ‘them’ discourses) to find a way out of the 
‘Other’. As Aly suggests, ‘they will need to challenge the perception 
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of the Australian Muslim diaspora as a monolithic religious entity in 
order to secure representation in the public spaces of citizenship’ 
(Aly 2007, p. 38). They will need to disengage with the victim identity 
and re-engage with the broader community as equal citizens – as 
being ‘in place’ as Australian citizens (Aly 2007, p. 38).  
A way for service providers to join young people in this challenge is 
to start by first looking at how young people are already renegotiating 
belonging as equal citizens, working their way out of the ‘other’ and 
fighting racism and stereotypes using mediums such as YouTube. In 
chapter five, I argued that, through mediums such as YouTube, 
young Lebanese and Muslim Australians are creatively engaging with 
a wider audience, to deal with racism and to negotiate their sense of 
belonging in respect to a broader Australian society.  
Peta Stephenson (2008) has also been looking into how Australian 
Muslims have found creative ways to break down the ‘us and them’ 
rhetoric. She has argued that:  
A growing number of Muslim youth are actively creating spaces in 
which Australian Muslims, particularly young people, can be heard  
... These young Muslims, whether writing and staging a panel show, 
a stand up comedy sketch, or performing as hip-hop artists, say 
they are motivated … by a desire to encourage societal education 
and change. They want mainstream Australians to see Muslims as 
human beings, and to recognise them as fellow Australians. They 
also want the Muslim Australian community to show leadership, to 
engage confidently in both public debate and with non-Muslim 
Australians in their daily lives. To this end a growing number of 
young Muslims are adopting a community leadership role. They are 
using the media to serve and engage the community and are not 
only negotiating their place in the ‘West’, they are fulfilling their 
Islamic duty and service in a positive social role. 
The young Muslims that Stephenson has spoken with are motivated 
to develop and participate in projects such as Salam Café by the 
desire to serve and engage the community, to be heard, to 
encourage social education and change, to get ‘other Australians’ to 
see them as not radically different and to serve their Islamic duty and 
service in a positive social role. These same motivations were also 
reflected in my interviews with young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims. 
Identifying what motivates young people to take part in projects is 
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important for the success of youth projects that service providers 
wish to deliver.  
As scholars on youth work like Alan Prout, Richard Simmons and 
Johnston Birchall (2006, p. 77) have argued, identifying young 
people’s motivation to participate is one of several elements to 
effective practice in developing young people’s participation. Other 
elements to effective practice include removing social, economic and 
political obstacles that young people face in trying to participate 
(Bessant 2004, p. 388). If youth projects build on young people’s 
motivations and remove obstacles for participation, it is more likely to 
draw in participants, maintain young people’s continued involvement 
in the project, and better deliver on intended outcomes. I discuss 
next how this insight might be put into practice, by taking the 
example of YouTube videos created by young people. 
In chapter five I noted that young Arab and Muslim Australians were 
creating YouTube videos that were seen as problematic by other 
people. The ‘problem’ itself has been framed in terms of a proposition 
that the videos were designed at the least to express ‘anti-Australian 
sentiment’ or to ‘celebrate gang culture’. At the worst these sites 
have been understood as designed to incite violence (Gibson 2007; 
Tinkler & Hastie 2007). I argued that the videos could also be seen 
alternatively as reflecting these young people’s need and desire to 
create a sense of belonging and as a way to deal with their 
experiences of racism. The videos could also be understood as acts 
of resistance that helped the young people to experience a sense of 
power and control that buffered the effects of the social injustice they 
experienced (Ungar et al. 2007, p. 302).  
The challenge for youth workers is to see the videos (even those 
defined as violent or negative in some other way) as a means by 
which young people are accessing ‘health resources’, such as the 
exercise of personal agency, on their own terms. The videos, 
although some people might be highly critical of them, could also be 
treated as demonstrating these young people’s strengths and 
resilience (Ungar 2005c, p. 10; Ungar 2006, p. 55; Ungar et al. 2008, 
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p. 429). Apart from high level video editing skills, some of the 
strengths demonstrated through the videos include, an imaginative 
ability to carve out spaces of belonging and develop narratives that 
speak to other young people through creative use of music and 
images. The challenge then is for youth workers to join with the 
young people to develop alternative identity stories that can be 
communicated through creative mediums such as YouTube videos. 
The alternative identity stories will need to be sufficiently resourceful 
to allow the young person to get from it what they hoped to achieve 
through their original identity stories  (Ungar 2004, p. 204). For 
example, instead of a video projecting a story of taking control over 
Australia (and thus making a claim to space) through visual images 
such as the one below, perhaps an alternative story of place and 
belonging could be negotiated and told via media such as YouTube? 
Perhaps a story of belonging that engages with the broader 
community as equal citizens – as being ‘in place’ as Australian 
citizens – with an overarching and binding commitment to honouring 
all members in the national home. 
 
 
 
 
(Aussiekillaonstandby 2008a) 
 
 
 
 
Page 217  
Conclusion 
 
I have argued in this chapter that a social-ecological approach to 
resilience can be used to inform the development of projects and 
programs that are anti-racist and can strengthen young people’s 
sense of connection to the wider Australian community. Using 
arguments put forward by Ungar (2001, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 
2005d; 2006; 2008; 2008; 2007) I argued that an application of the 
strengths and resilience perspective to youth work practice requires 
listening to young people. It means accepting that some of the ways 
young people deal with prejudice and issues of belonging, such as 
creating YouTube videos that carry anti-white Australian messages, 
is not necessarily a sign of pathology. It means considering that such 
actions by young people may reflect the young person’s strengths 
and their resilience – a sign of their resourcefulness in the face of 
limited options to do this in more socially accepted ways. It requires 
also recognising that young people are already finding ways to cope 
with the stressful effects of racism without requiring the intervention 
of more structured and formal youth projects.  
One collective resource that is available and being used by these 
young people is their religion, Islam, which my interviewees drew on 
to guide them as they interpreted and responded to their experiences 
of racism. I have argued that youth workers have a role to play in 
tapping into religious resources if young people find this is a 
meaningful way to deal with challenges such as racism. The next 
mechanism that some young people used, namely recourse to 
physical violence, is clearly a more difficult one to sanction. As I 
showed, there was a tendency on the part of some of the young men 
I interviewed to think that bashing those they perceived as racist was 
a logical and necessary response. On moral grounds we need to 
tread carefully between valuing ‘legitimate’ violence (e.g. police or 
military ‘force’ is happily accepted by most in the community) and 
‘illegitimate’ violence, which can attract serious legal sanctions. I 
argued that one role for youth agencies may be to work with these 
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young people to find alternative ways to satisfy the ethical and social 
imperatives that moral emotions like the desire for revenge or justice 
seem to require. I argued that youth workers could help young 
people to think through the costs and benefits of different kinds of 
responses to racism. I explored some options for doing this, like 
collectively designing and producing a comic that explores the 
consequences of certain actions, and the different options young 
people have in responding to prejudice or racism.   
The last section of the chapter looks at the role of media. In this 
section I argue that young people are already using the media and 
other creative mediums to meet their needs and fulfil desires. I 
propose that youth workers can tap into what motivates young 
people to participate in actions such as creating online videos, and 
build on these motivations in the development of youth programs. 
They can help young people to fight racism, carve out spaces of 
belonging and achieve a range of other outcomes by building on 
young people’s demonstrated strengths and abilities in using new 
media.   
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Thesis Conclusion  
 
I began this study in 2003 at a time in Australia when various ‘moral 
panics’ about Muslims and Lebanese young people were erupting. 
Some of these moral panics were expressions of concern about 
‘Islamist’ terrorism. There was mounting concern about asylum 
seekers, many of them Muslims arriving from the ‘Middle East’ which 
climaxed in 2001 with the Tampa crisis. A succession of terrorist 
attacks beginning in September 2001 with the bombing of the twin 
towers of the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon 
building in Washington were followed by the Bali bombings of 2002 
and terrorist attacks in London in 2005. Locally concern was being 
expressed about young Muslims implicated in ethnic gang rapes of 
‘white’ Australian women in Sydney. Media coverage of the resulting 
trials spanned five years from 2001 to 2006. Then there was also the 
so-called ‘Cronulla race riots’ in Sydney during December 2005, 
organised as an expression of anger over what was perceived to be 
young Lebanese Muslims’ encroachment on the ‘Australian way of 
life’. These events and public and media reactions to them helped 
create a hostile context for young Muslims, particularly those of 
‘Middle Eastern appearance’ growing up in Australia.  
I was interested in understanding better how these events were 
affecting young Muslims, and particularly young second-generation 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims who lived in the northern and western 
suburbs of Melbourne. I did some preliminary research to understand 
better how events like the ‘9/11 attacks’ were critical in the 
construction of Australian-Lebanese-Muslims as ‘terrorists in the 
making’, and how these meshed in with accompanying moral panics 
(e.g. about ‘Lebanese gangs’) and drew on long-standing discourses 
(e.g. the dangers of young ‘ethnic’ men), all of which contributed to a 
framing of young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims as a serious 
‘problem’.  
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I eventually decided that there were four key questions I wanted to 
address. First, how did young (12-25 year old), second-generation 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims living in the northern and western 
suburbs of Melbourne both experience and make sense of their 
interactions with other Australians? Second, how did these young 
people deal with often challenging and hostile interactions with some 
other Australians following events like the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks and the ‘Sydney gang rapes’? Third, how did these 
young people experience a sense of belonging to the broader 
Australian society? Finally, I wanted to establish what how my 
research findings might be put towards youth work practice. 
To answer these questions I decided that I needed to get an insider’s 
perspective. To achieve this I interviewed thirty-one young 
Australian-Lebanese-Muslims.   
In my interviews, I paid particular attention to making sense of the 
everyday aspects of the lives of some young Australian-Lebanese-
Muslim men and women. In listening to the stories of my participants, 
I discovered they experienced various kinds of prejudice that merit 
the use of the category ‘racism’ and that they experienced racism 
both directly in their personal encounters with other Australians and 
indirectly as mediated or vicarious experiences.  
My interviewees’ direct experiences of racism included encounters 
such as being called ‘terrorists’, often by complete strangers, 
because they had been identified as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’. I also found 
that my interviewees experienced racism vicariously via reports 
conveyed to them by other people and or through the media. These 
indirect experiences included, for example, hearing about prejudice 
or racism encountered by their friends and family, as well as hearing 
about and responding to the negative experiences of other people 
who they did not know personally, but who were identified as of ASB 
and/or as Muslims. It was also experienced in more abstract ways via 
the mass media when, for instance, my interviewees observed that 
Arabs and Muslims were being negatively stereotyped on radio and 
television and in the press.  
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I also discovered that vicarious and mediated experiences of racism 
had a significant impact on people and how they interpreted their 
social context, affecting both how they made sense of their face-to-
face interactions and their relations more generally with ‘other 
Australians’. Indeed, for some of the people I spoke with, vicarious 
and mediated experiences were often more significant than their 
more direct encounters with racism. For example, as I reported in 
chapter four, young people like Nuer stayed at home for a week 
following the 9/11 attacks, not because she had personally 
encountered prejudice immediately after the terror attacks, but 
because she had heard via the media, and through her friends and 
family, that going onto the streets was dangerous because ‘Muslims’ 
were being vilified and physically attacked. This finding addresses a 
gap in the existing Australian research literature because, up until 
now, it has not been identified that a substantial part of young 
Australian–Lebanese-Muslims’ experience of racism was shaped 
vicariously. In other words, one need not have many personal 
encounters with racism to feel a sense of being ‘Other’. My research 
therefore tended to support the work of international researchers 
(e.g. Essed 1991) who argue that people’s ‘everyday experiences of 
racism’ are typically multi-dimensional. This understanding along with 
my findings about the significance of mediated and vicarious 
experiences of racism highlight the need to include more abstract 
expressions and experiences of discrimination in the design of any 
policy or program interventions designed to promote belonging and 
tackle racism. In this way, my research supports the case for taking a 
holistic approach that goes beyond addressing individual racist 
behaviours and attitudes, and which is inclusive of other ways in 
which racism is transmitted and experienced (Essed 1991, 2002).   
In addressing the research question about belonging to the broader 
‘Australian society’, I found that my interviewees tended to adopt an 
ambivalent approach to the idea that they ought to feel ‘connected’ to 
‘mainstream Australia’. As they talked about their feeling of belonging 
to ‘Australia’ it became clear that whatever they meant by being 
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‘connected’ or ‘belonging’ was contingent on their sense that they 
were being recognised or acknowledged by others in that broader 
community as being ‘one of them’. Typically their overall experience 
tended to suggest that they were not often recognised as part of 
‘mainstream Australia’. The message they often heard was that as 
Lebanese-Muslims they were not ‘real’ or ‘deserving Australians’, 
but, instead, were ‘Other’ and even possibly a threat or ‘the enemy’ 
(El-Zein 2002, p. 229). This is a key reason why the young people I 
spoke with were ambivalent about belonging to the broader 
‘Australian community’. In this way my research complemented the 
work of other researchers such as Noble (2010, p. 114) who for 
example has  pointed out how: 
Crucially, our ontological security is founded on our ability to be 
recognised. Our ‘fit’ in an environment requires the 
‘acknowledgement’ of other actors … /that we fit … 
The people I spoke with did not feel that they fit the ‘national norm’ 
because they were too often being represented as ‘Other’.  
The construction of young Lebanese Muslims as ‘Other’ occurred in 
a wide array of social spaces and processes. The process of 
Othering certainly does not only occur during the face-to-face 
interactions between young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims and ‘other 
Australians’. Othering for instance also takes place when politicians, 
policy makers, media workers, advocates and experts engage in 
debates on immigration, asylum seeker policy or multiculturalism. 
Building on the work of others (Ang & Stratton 1998; Hage 1996, 
2000, 2007; Jakubowicz 2002; Joppke 2004; Jupp 1996), it is 
possible to say that, in the Australian policy and political context, 
‘belonging’ to Australia is often imagined as a need to have a ‘correct 
fit’ with the characteristics of ‘mainstream Australia’. People included 
in the category ‘mainstream Australia’ are those who typically are 
white, heterosexual, ‘able-bodied’, ‘middle-class’, and Christian, or at 
least a certain kind of liberal, secular humanist. Excluded were those 
who are considered members of a ‘minority’, be they 
environmentalists, welfare recipients or young, dark-skinned ‘Arab-
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looking’ Muslims (Ang 2001; Dale 1997; Jackman 1998; Kalantzis 
1997).   
Given that the feeling of belonging to a group or community depends 
whether or not the other people in those groups recognise that you 
‘fit in’ or are ‘one of them’, it came as little surprise to discover that 
some of the people I spoke with felt a strong sense of belonging to 
communities that were predominantly or exclusively Muslim and/or 
Arab. These were environments such as their Islamic school or 
certain suburbs where there was a high proportion of Arabs and 
Muslims (Suburbs such as Broadmeadows and Coburg). Through 
shared cultural and religious practices the message was clear: they 
belonged.  
I also found that one way some young Australian-Lebanese-Muslims 
attempted to feel they belonged to the wider Australian community 
was by engaging in practices that some such as Hage (2000, pp. 49-
55) have described as ‘accumulating national capital’. National 
capital can be accumulated in many ways and one strategy is to play 
down any prejudice or racism that may be encountered (Hage 2000). 
It includes, for example, supporting claims that Australia was once a 
racist society but is no longer, and that now ‘we’ are a multicultural, 
inclusive and tolerant society. In this way developing a sense of 
‘belonging to the nation’ required, in the case of some of the people I 
spoke with, that they deny the racist context in which they live, and 
that they interpret and name their racist encounters as something 
else. Some interviewees told me how they were subject to quite 
vicious discrimination, how upset those experiences made them and 
how different they felt they were to ‘Aussies’, but then they would say 
that racism was not a problem for them and that they were no 
different to Aussies. The disjunction between these contradictory 
stories may give the impression that my interviewees were talking 
about two different and distinct realities. How did I make sense of 
this? A more traditional ‘objectivist’ social science account might 
reach for a concept such as ‘identity crises’. My own interpretivist 
framework however, allows me to appreciate that we all can and do 
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assume what may be seen as quite contradictory positions or 
aspects of our identity, because we are all positioned across various 
and often incompatible discourses (Yeatman 1990). 
As I also hope has become clear, there is not one way of belonging 
but rather an array of different kinds and mutable forms of belonging, 
some of which are not dependent on being able to ‘fit into dominant 
cultural norms’. For some of the people I spoke with, ‘belonging to 
Australia’ had a lot to do instead with a commitment to honouring and 
caring for all its members (Hage 2003). This is a mode of belonging 
that has fortunately been experienced in places – as interviewees 
like Nuer described – like in ‘good multicultural schools’. In these 
spaces belonging as interviewees reported was characterised by 
evidence that they were being listened to, valued, had a sense of 
human agency and space for open and safe deliberative dialogue 
and, perhaps most importantly, a sense of being accepted ‘for whom 
you are’.  
In answering the question of how young people deal with the often 
challenging and hostile interactions that followed events such as the 
9/11 attacks, I found that the people I interviewed tended to respond 
in a range of ways. Sometimes they dealt with racism by trying to 
avoid racist encounters or by trying to minimise the impact of the 
racist experience. Sometimes they ‘fought back’ or responded in 
ways that I have called ‘constructive engagement’. As discussed in 
chapter four, avoiding or minimising racist encounters included 
strategies like ‘sticking to themselves’ (i.e. hanging out with other 
Arabs and Muslims and avoiding ‘White spaces’) and ignoring or 
denying offensive commentary and actions. ‘Fighting back’ could 
involve strategies such as ‘bashing racists’, ‘talking back’, and 
embracing and capitalising on Othering (Jensen 2009) through 
various mediums including YouTube. ‘Constructive engagements’ 
taken up by the young people were those activities that were 
generally seen to be more socially acceptable ways of dealing with 
racism and experiences of Othering. Examples of these responses 
included ‘Salam Café’ and stand-up comedy designed to breakdown 
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stereotypes. I argued that activities of this kind can provide a basis 
for further intercultural dialogue, and for developing a sense of 
belonging that is based on an ethics of care for the ‘Other’.  
In considering how the research findings of this thesis can be applied 
in program development and youth work practice more generally, I 
argued, drawing on the work of Ungar (2001, 2004, 2005b, 2005c, 
2005d; 2006; 2008; 2008; 2007), that a resilience framework was 
useful. This framework requires those working with young people to 
not only listen to young people, but also reflect on ‘our’ own 
assumptions and prejudices. This entails, for example, resisting the 
powerful tendency to pathologise young people who act in ways that 
provoke the ire of ‘socially accredited experts’, who then ‘guard the 
barricades’ to protect ‘all that is good and virtuous’. This approach, 
which requires reflective practice, helps ensure ‘we’ do not wittingly 
or unwittingly vilify ‘youthful transgressions’, which after a little sober 
assessment may lead to the realisation that certain commonalities 
exist between ‘them’ and ‘us’. I refer, for example, to the realisation 
that ‘we’, as practitioners and ‘socially accredited experts’, can act on 
the same kinds of moral emotions and provide the same rationales 
as ‘they’, that is, those who are constructed as ‘problems’. 
Recognising the role of moral emotions like righteous anger, pride in 
place and culture, humiliation and shame is critical for those 
interested in developing anti-racist and similar youth programs. With 
this recognition comes the acknowledgement that moral emotions 
can move politicians to campaign for ‘righteous murder’ in the form of 
war or to engage in public deception, and it can move those who are 
often seen as respectable, hard-working people, to carry out white-
collar crime. These same moral emotions have on occasion moved 
some of the young people I interviewed to engage in ‘anti-social 
behaviour’ in forms such as ‘bashing’ those they saw as racist, and 
creating videos that expressed racism towards white people. I argue 
that recognising this improves the prospect of developing good 
professional practice and working relations.  
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Drawing on Ungar’s work I found that attempting to understand 
young people’s life-worlds (including why they took certain responses 
to problems such as racism) from their perspectives, offered 
invaluable insights into the dynamic processes that contribute to 
positive development. Understanding the meanings they attribute to 
their experiences – whether they be socially approved or not – 
assists in recognising the young person’s strength and resilience. I 
argued that resisting the impulse to make normalising judgments, 
and instead looking for signs of resourcefulness in the face of limited 
options and adversity, provides basis for successful program 
development. Given the difficulties most of us have in recognising 
our own assumptions and prejudices, such a disposition does not 
usually come easily. This is particularly so when what we witness is 
radically ‘different’. My discovery, for example, that the teachings of 
Islam provided a source of resilience for many of my interviewees 
may be a research finding that some professionals have difficulty in 
recognising and building on. I argue that whilst there may be 
challenges for service providers in engaging in ways that are 
meaningful to young people, and whilst I acknowledge that there 
obstacles to building on the pathways of resilience that young people 
have already been paving, it is nevertheless essential for good youth-
work practice. At least it is essential for those of us interested in 
empowering young people to meet challenges such as racism and 
negotiating their relationship to ‘mainstream Australia’. 
That all of this matters is suggested by one final and sobering point. 
In 2010 as I complete this research, young people from Lebanese 
and Muslim backgrounds continue to be constituted as a serious 
‘problem’ and are still being subjected to negative representations in 
the Australian mass media.  
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Appendix A: CDATA  
Australia and Religious Affiliation (RELP) by Ancestry 
1st Response (ANC1P) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: 2006 Census of Population and Housing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counting: Persons, Place of Usual Residence 
 
Ancestry 1st Response (ANC1P)  
Lebanese Ancestry  
 
Australia 
Religious Affiliation 
(RELP) 
 
 
Christianity 82,662
Islam 61,288
 
Total 
(Australia)  Druse (Other Religions) 2,176
 
© Commonwealth 
of Australia 2007 
Total Number  
of Lebanese  
Australians   143,890
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Appendix B: An Illustration of Hollywood 
Movies Has Contributed to the Othering of 
Arabs and Muslims 
 
One way in which Orientalist understandings of the Arab and Muslim 
Other are disseminated and become part of an everyday 
commonsense is through the apparatus of popular culture, including 
Hollywood movies. The documentary ‘Reel Bad Arabs: How 
Hollywood Vilifies a People’, which was screened in 2006, illustrates 
and discusses the pervasiveness of antiquated stereotypes of Arabs 
(Media Education Foundation 2007). The movie is based on the 2001 
book by the same title authored by Lebanese-American academic Dr 
Jack Shaheen (2001).  
Sheehan found that only 5 percent of more than 900 Hollywood films 
he reviewed could be considered positive towards Arabs – ‘that is 
casting an Arab as a regular person’ (Shaheen 2001, p. 33). The 
other 95 per cent depicted Arabs and Muslims as violent, calculating, 
misogynistic people, and as fanatically religious or nationalistic 
terrorists. In sum, these movies positioned Arabs and Muslims as 
‘Other’. Such pop-cultural depictions project powerful messages to its 
audience. These symbolic representations of Arabs and Muslims 
become part of a public common-sense and instrumental to the 
‘West vs. the Rest’ discourse, which we have seen come to the fore 
following events such as the 9/11 attacks.  
Orientalised depictions of Arabs and Muslims is so widespread in 
Hollywood movies that they are considered normal and invisible to 
viewers who grow up with these stereotypes (Attum 2007). With very 
few alternative representations that humanise Arabs, Shaheen is not 
surprised that Americans find it psychologically easier to support their 
government to invade Iraq and Afghanistan, and have little empathy 
for the innocent Arabs that killed as part of the war (Attum 2007). 
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The images presented here are from the documentary ‘Reel Bad 
Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People’, which screened in 2006 
(Media Education Foundation 2007). In a review of the movie, 
Omar Attum (2007) wrote: 
It would be convenient to think that these negative portrayals 
became prevalent only after September 11, 2001, but this 
powerful documentary illustrates that degrading stereotypes of 
Arabs have been the norm since the first silent films in the 
1880s…  
For example, instead of Hollywood depicting the 19 Arab and 
Muslim terrorists of September 11 as a lunatic fringe, movies 
regularly attribute these characteristics to the greater Arab and 
Muslim community. At the same time, Shaheen notes that the 
other fringe groups or individuals, such as the Ku Klux Klan or 
Timothy McVeigh, are not made to represent their larger 
community.  
According to the documentary, the political ramifications are 
enormous. Shaheen makes the argument that these movies 
closely follow Washington’s foreign policy and that “politics and 
Hollywood’s images are linked and they reinforce one another.” 
He claims that some of the most offensive movies are created 
in cooperation with the Department of Defence, often showing 
US armed forces killing Arabs at random.  
Further to the points raised in this movie review, it can be added 
that the stereotypes propagated through movies, such as 
Disney’s Orientalist Aladdin, shapes the lived experiences of 
Arabs and Muslims, public opinion and policies. 
Appendix B: An Illustration of Hollywood 
Movies Has Contributed to the Othering of 
Arabs and Muslims Continued 
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Appendix C: Lyrics to ‘AussieDiss 2- Thug Love’   
 
 
For all you Faggot Racist Aussie MuthaFuckerz.  
This aint your country, It’s mine too.  
Deal with it you Faggots!  
 
You Aussie Mutha Fuckerz, 
Why you always got to hate for? … 
 
I took a stroll to the shire… 
You were once safe there  
But now you’re rolling fire, 
But where the fuck were ya’s? 
I was up in Bankstown,  
Waiting for you pussies but youse didn’t even make a sound. 
We fucked ya’s Bro! 
Broken glass everywhere. 
Broken arms on the floor. 
What you want, another war? 
Don’t bother, unless you coming down this time… 
 
Talking about the Koran.  
Muslim or Christian Arabs we are all one here.  
Talking about the veil, and what our women wear?  
Muthafurkerz look at Mary, what does she have on her hair?  
Talk about our men, and how they grow the beard? 
Muthafurkerz look at Jesus, if he was only here he would say: fuck u cuntz. 
What you want, to be Christ like?  
Just stop the racism and then you fucken might just last in this land.  
Don’t call it your own.  
God put us here, so this is my home! … 
 
Don’t start on your women. 
They all know they want us 
Maybe if you circumcised your dick 
And lost your beer guts 
You might just get some. 
 
They’re sluts. It’s known. 
Right now, I’m getting blown by a little Aussie brat, 
While having sex on the phone  
With maybe your sister, daughter or your mother… 
 
Coming out of Bankstown killing Aussie Mutha Fuckerz 
 
 
(Aussiediss69 2010) 
 
 
Aussiediss69 2010, Aussie Diss 2 - Thug Love 04/10/10, 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FTrjIG-FKP4>. 
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Appendix D: A Different Approach to Comedy 
 
Melbourne based Maysa Abouzaid, is one of the young stars of the 
VASS youth project A.R.A.B (Anti Racism Action Band). She uses 
comedy to break down stereotypes and for getting people to think 
more deeply about the assumptions they make. Her comedy is based 
on sharing the funny side of her personal experiences of being 
treated as the ‘Other’. Maysa herself points out that she is positioned 
and even embraces her position(s) as Other, by comically 
capitalizing on her very hyphenated identity.  
I describe myself in my routine as a blind, Italian-Egyptian, Muslim, 
female comedian learning sign language who can also do salsa 
dancing (Harford 2007). 
Abouzaid tends to avoids the ‘us and them’ binary in her comedy 
because to play into this would be antithetical to her hyphenated 
identity. Journalist Saeed Saeed (2007) points out how Maysa 
prefers to metaphorically sit in the ‘grey area’ between ‘us and them’. 
Abouzeid was 13 when the twin towers went down in New York. In 
fear, she locked herself in her home during that entire school term 
holiday. Returning to Preston Girls Secondary College, she recalls 
an immediate change within the classroom. "It was like all the 
Lebanese, Afghans and Egyptians were on one side of the 
classroom and then the other side was Anglo-Saxons, Italians and 
Greeks," she says. "I'm half Italian-Egyptian and Muslim – I ended 
up sitting in the middle of the class" (Saeed 2007) . 
Abouzeid explains in the video documentary ‘It’s a Blind Chick 
Thing’:  
I can’t deny it. But I have to live with what I have. And comedy helps 
me live with it. Like growing up with a disability. Growing up as a 
Muslim. Growing up as an Italian.  Growing up with… what ever I 
grow up with. Whatever comes my way. Like going to uni… or just 
being me pretty much. I do it with a sense of humor (Gillick 2008).  
In other words, Abouzaid deals with her otherness and the 
challenges it brings (including dealing with racism and discrimination 
for being blind) by employing humour.   
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(Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Above: Poster promoting short film featuring comedian Maysa 
Abouzaid. This picture was obtained with consent from Abouzaid via 
her Facebook page.  
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Appendix E: Lyrics from ‘The Silent Truth’ by 
the Brothahood 
 
This is the silent truth man. Racism everywhere man. Cronulla riots. 
I can feel your eyes on me but I aint in the wrong…  
Label me a thug coz I’m from Lebanon.  
But you’re wrong. 
I’m like any other Aussie.  
Try to ride the train but you always go to stop me.  
Coz of 9/11 now you all want to drop me…. 
Australia’s mine too so I’m going to put up a fight.  
You want to send me back. Yo send me back where? 
Australia’s the place that I let down my hair… 
I’m a peaceful kind of guy come sit with us. 
Haten on me coz television got you brainwashed… 
Peace be upon him. Peace be upon you.  
Black, yellow, white or blue. 
I’m a man, understand I respect you….  
You can’t tell the difference? I’m human too…. 
All that I ask is that we are all treated equally. 
And that my name won’t make you scared to speak to me….  
  
       (lugzlebo 2007) 
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Appendix F: Children Overboard 
 
In 2001 Liberal Party members claimed that asylum seekers threw 
their children overboard in an effort to coerce the Navy to offer them 
sanctuary. The leader of the Liberal Party, John Howard, was quoted 
in Australian newspapers as saying, ‘I don’t want in Australia people 
who would throw their own children into the sea’ (Macken-Horarik 
2003). Statements like this created the impression that it was the 
cultural background of the asylum seekers that had led them to treat 
their children so callously (Griffiths 2004, p. 2). Through statements 
such as this, the Liberal Party leaders, and sections of the media, 
framed asylum seekers as having very different values, and as being 
a threat to ‘us’ (i.e. White or ‘mainstream’ Australia). Together they 
led the public to believe that ‘we’ Australians have a love for our 
children, which is qualitatively different to the cultures of asylum 
seekers. It is important to note that leaders of the Liberal Party would 
not have fed these lies to the media if they thought the Australian 
public would not buy into it. They knew that many Australians were 
willing to believe that some ‘Other’ cultures were depraved enough to 
even kill their own children so as to secure a place in Australia. As 
Justice Marcus Einfeld AO QC said so eloquently at the 2002 Annual 
Human Rights and Social Justice Lecture: 
Did anyone stop to think then, do they think now, whether they know 
any parents anywhere who would struggle to get their kids away 
from terror and torture and out of wretched refugee camps of misery 
and horror, and then celebrate their freedom by drowning their own 
kids in the sea? Yet that is precisely what large numbers of 
Australians bought at the last federal election when the authorities 
knew it was not true. Are there no limits to our willingness to 
connive in evil (Einfeld 2002)? 
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Appendix H: Transcript from Salam Café 
Episode about a Visit to the Melbourne Suburb 
of Frankston 
 
Nazeem Hussein: What do you know about Muslims? 
Frankston man: Muslims. Oh not a lot but I know that their beliefs 
and religions are pretty dangerous to the rest of the world. 
Nazeem Hussein: What’s Ramadan? 
Frankston Woman: Is that like a Papadum? 
 
Uncle Sam: You know John Howard is saying to do to become 
Australian you need to learn English? Do you agree with this?   
Young Frankston man: One hundred Percent! 
Uncle Sam: He is saying you need to do the spelling test. I don’t get 
it! Do you understand this? 
Young Frankston man: Yeah he is saying you need to spell in 
English. 
Uncle Sam: Okay now let me ask you a few questions about the 
spelling test. Can you spell for me beauty? 
Young Frankston man: No. 
Second Frankston young man: B.E.U.T.I 
Uncle Sam: Get out of my Country Please! 
Second Frankston young man: It’s not your country anyway! I’m 
not going anywhere! 
(lugzlebo 2006) 
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